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A bstract
This research study presents a review of the vast literature on the term ‘re­
source curse’, focusing particularly on the question whether natural resource 
abundance is really bad for economic growth and development. The study 
observes that, while the existing literature provides considerable evidence 
that natural resource abundance is associated with negative development 
outcomes, the evidence is by no means conclusive nor robust, after control­
ling for the empirical errors associated with the estimation methodologies 
adopted in such analysis.
The research investigates the consistency and robustness of the different esti­
mation methodologies hitherto used to explain the slow and volatile growth 
performance of developing oil-rich countries. Firstly, the research empirically 
establishes whether oil, as a natural resource endowment, is a significant de­
terminant of economic growth and by extension, whether the negative corre­
lation between natural resource abundance and long-term economic growth is 
necessarily significant, after controlling for model endogeneity and country- 
specific hetereogeneity errors. Secondly, the study investigates whether ‘oil 
boom’ accounts for the decline in manufacturing output and economic growth 
in developing oil rich countries as the ‘Dutch Disease Hypothesis’ suggests. 
Thirdly, the research establishes a strong correlation between the quality of 
institutions and the current growth performance of developing oil economies.
In this research, rather than ask the usual question - why natural resource 
wealth promotes poor growth performance? We answer the question - what 
fundamental factors enable some resource abundant countries to utilize their 
natural resource advantages to promote steady growth and development, 
while others could not? The thesis suggests that institutions are important
to unraveling the resource curse dilemma, and until fundamental institutional 
re-engineering of the economies of developing oil-rich countries is embarked 
upon, the gains from a resource boom cannot be transformed into a sub- 
optimal development outcome. This necessary institutional revival will re­
quire a radical departure from the historically inherited ‘extractive’ colonial 
institutions - which currently characterize developing oil exporting countries.
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1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
2 .1  O verview, Scope and O bjectives
This thesis addresses the poor and volatile growth experiences of develop­
ing oil-rich countries, by providing a renewed and coherent analysis of the 
salient and unidentified causes of the continued dismal growth performance 
of developing oil-rich nations. The research is particularly motivated by 
the fact that the slow and volatile growth experience of these developing 
resource rich countries contradicts the basic predictions of standard macroe­
conomic theory. In some cases, even after embarking on macroeconomic 
policy reforms and structural adjustments, these economies are still unable 
to resume a steady and positive growth path compared to the previous years 
or many non-oil-exporting developing countries. The curious question is, 
why have these economies been unable to utilize the opportunities of their 
resource abundance, to transform their economies to the fast and steady 
growth economies of the world.
The literature on the impact of oil prices on economic growth is quite exten­
sive but most of the studies have focussed on the implications of higher oil 
prices and its security of supply for the developed countries. Recent studies1 
have found that oil price shocks have stagflationary effects on the macroecon­
1 Including: Cunado et al,, (2003); Kilan, (2005), Balke et al., (1999); Wen et al., (2006); 
and Gylfason et al., (1999)
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omy, such that they slow down rate of growth and lead to an increase in the 
price levels or rate of inflation. However, the effects of oil price shocks on the 
macroeconomy depend on factors like the size of the shock, the persistency of 
the shock, the degree of dependency of the importing country and the initial 
policy response of the affected economy.
On the other hand, research on the macroeconomic implications of oil revenue 
shocks on the economies of developing oil exporting countries2 is relatively 
sparse. Since the seminal works by Sachs and Warner, (1996, 1999); Gelb 
(1988) and Gylfason (1999), which all establish a strong negative correlation 
between resource abundance and economic growth, empirical advancement 
in this field has been relatively slow until recently. This thesis contributes to 
the literature on the poor growth performance of developing oil-rich countries 
by identifying the robust and consistent factors that have accounted for the 
persistent poor growth performance of developing oil-producing countries.
This research adopts both the empirical methodologies and theoretical foun­
dations used in previous studies to analyse the impacts of oil price changes 
on developed oil importing countries to re-appraise the poor growth perfor­
mance of the developing oil exporting countries. It is theoretically intuitive 
that if higher oil prices could have negative implications for the oil importing 
countries due to the increase in resources require to obtain the same quan­
tity (cost), then reciprocally, the higher oil prices should mean higher revenue 
for the same quantity of export accruing to the oil exporting countries - ce­
teris paribus. However, the reality has been that oil exporting countries 
have persistently experience slow, and in some cases, volatile growth even in
2 In this thesis we have considered only the oil economies of the Middle East, North 
Africa and Sub-Sahara Africa as the group of countries that constitute developing oil 
exporting countries.
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the era of consistent higher oil prices. This economic outcome negates fun­
damental principles of economic growth theory or rational macroeconomic 
expectations. This dilemma as been commonly tagged in the literature as 
the ‘paradox of wealth’ and more recently, ‘resource curse’.
Given the growth experience of developing oil exporting countries, we are 
interested in testing the stylize fact that resource endowment (such as oil) 
is not necessarily bad for growth and that the growth episode of the oil ex­
porting countries can still be explained within the context of fundamental 
economic growth theory. In this regards, the central objective of this research 
is to investigate whether resource abundance is really a ‘curse’ rather than 
a ‘blessing’ as entrenched in the literature3 and if so, why? This question is 
more pertinent if one observes that the economies of the US, UK and Norway 
have utilized the advantages of natural resource discovery and abundance, at 
a particular stage of their development history to transform their economies 
to become industrial and fast growing economies.
The thesis is structured, amongst other goals, to answer the following re­
search questions:
• How significant is oil endowment in explaining cross-country growth 
differentials ?
• What accounts for the negative correlation between oil and economic 
growth ?
• Does oil price/revenue shocks lead to a decline in growth or is it the 
associated government expenditure shock ?
• What other factors account for the persistently poor and volatile growth
3 See for example Gelb, (1988), Gylfason et al., (1999) and Sachs et al., (1996)
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performance of developing oil-exporting countries ?
• Could institutions explain why oil is seen to be bad for growth in de­
veloping oil-exporting economies ?
Following from these research questions, the thesis concentrate on testing the 
following specific research hypotheses:
• Whether the negative correlation between resource abundance and eco­
nomic growth is statistically significant and robust;
• Whether positive oil price or revenue shocks lead to a decline in eco­
nomic growth or manufacturing output in either developing oil-exporting 
countries or developed oil importing countries;
• Whether after controlling for institutions, macroeconomic policy vari­
ables play any important role in explaining growth outcomes: - growth 
volatility and crises.
In the chapters that will follow, the thesis addresses each of these research 
questions and the related hypothesis. Chapter 2 looks at the significance 
of natural resource abundance, using oil dummy as a proxy, in the deter­
mination of long-term growth rate. The chapter follows a literature survey 
of the econometrics of cross-country growth regression, with particular em­
phasis on the link between growth theory and growth econometrics and how 
the estimation methods control for model endogeneity, measurement error 
associated with macroeconomic aggregates and country-specific heterogene­
ity associated with pooling cross-country data. The reason for following this 
procedure in the chapter, is based on the argument that many previous stud­
ies have used estimation methodologies that may be statistically inconsistent 
and unreliable, thereby giving spurious results and inconsistent estimated 
parameters. In addressing these concerns, many studies have followed the
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Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel approach. For example Islam, 
(1999) and Caselli et al., (1996) used an instrumental Generalised Method of 
Moment (GMM) procedure to estimate cross-country growth with the Barro- 
type dynamic endogenous growth model4.
The instrumentation and moment restrictions of the GMM approach, is ar­
gued, corrects for model endogeneity, measurement error and country-specific 
heterogeneity. The methodology can also correct for period-specific country- 
invariant structural effects and the cyclical reversion effects associated with 
the data generation process of a panel data model. Improving on the GMM 
transformation in our approach, we found that after controlling for endo­
geneity, omitted variable bias, period specific country invariant factors and 
cyclical effect (catch-up/output gap), natural resource abundance (oil) is 
not a significant determinant of economic growth in a cross country growth 
regression. Redefining our model by using a homogenous data - from only 
developing oil-rich countries, we found that oil endowment is positively cor­
related with long-term growth - suggesting that the natural resource endow­
ment does not necessarily account for why these countries have experienced 
poor and volatile growth as suggested, in the literature by the ‘Dutch disease’ 
hypothesis. In other words, the oil exporting countries would have performed 
worst-off without oil, as against the belief that they would have performed 
better. We further substantiate these results by conducting a robustness test 
of the models using the Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) technique and found 
that most of the growth determinants used in the previous models are not 
robust within the specifications.
We observed that, using a more recent panel data set, the negative correlation 
between the oil variable and GDP per capita (representing long-term growth
4 See Barro and lee 1993 and 1996; and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003
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rate) is not statistically significant in the ‘general’ cross country growth re­
gression. This conclusion is based on the fact that the estimated parameters 
are numerically insignificant and associated statistics (p-values) suggest that 
the parameters are not robust. Therefore, the fact that a country is rich in 
oil resources has not consistently explained why an increase oil price has led 
to a decrease in the growth rate of such a country. This finding strongly con­
tradicts the conclusions in Sachs et al, (1996) and Gelb, (1988), that oil-rich 
developing countries have perform poorly because oil is bad for growth due 
to its negative effect on the composition of GDP - particularly manufactur­
ing output and trade. Furthermore, our results show that other factors, such 
as institutions, initial income, government consumption, and environmental 
factors- geography/ecology/demographic transition, are important determi­
nants of cross-country growth differentials.
Chapter 2 follows three modeling approach5 with each subsequent model be­
ing an improvement on the previous one and addressing a particular model 
specification or consistency error. The adopted generalized method of mo­
ment estimation methodology, in contrast to the pooled least squares and 
fixed effects model used in previous growth regressions, accounts for regressor 
endogeneity and individual heterogeneity effects, as well as period specific - 
country invariant factors associated cross-country growth econometrics. The 
test statistics of the results confirm the validity of the instruments used to 
correct for endogeneity, as well as the non-existence of either first-order or 
second-order serial correlation in the model. The analysis of this chapter 
addresses our first research question of whether resource abundance is a sig­
nificant determinant of economic growth and whether it accounts for why 
resource rich countries have experienced poor and volatile growth.
5 These approaches which are later discussed in details are: Ordinary Least Squares, 
Fixed Effects and Generalized Method of Moments approaches.
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Chapter 3 examines the impact of higher oil prices or revenue for both oil 
exporting countries and oil importing countries with a view to explaining 
whether oil price shocks reduce growth, and also to explain the large asym­
metry of response between the developing oil exporting countries and oil 
importing countries to the same price shocks. Using an identified structural 
vector autoregressive model, the chapter forecasts the responses of certain 
macroeconomic variables to a one standard deviation innovation to oil rev­
enue for the exporting countries and to oil prices for the importing countries. 
In line with previous studies and to answer some of the research questions of 
the thesis, the chapter also includes manufacturing output and government 
expenditure, amongst the explanatory variables in the VAR model. It is ar­
gued in the Dutch disease hypothesis that a resource boom affects long-term 
growth by diverting resources and other factors of production away from 
the manufacturing sector (which is assumed to be the engine of growth via 
learning-by-doing) to the non-traded sector(which has no synergy with the 
domestic sector and real sectors of the economy). The inefficient factor re­
allocation leads to a growth decline and hence ‘resource curse’. It is found 
from the impulse response to oil shocks that higher oil prices or increased 
revenues do not necessarily lead to a decline in manufacturing output growth. 
However in some cases, the results show that government expenditure shocks 
lead to a decline in manufacturing output and a decline in GDP growth rate. 
In the case of the oil importing countries, oil price shocks do not necessarily 
lead to a decline in GDP growth rate or an increase in domestic prices - such 
as inflation rate, interest rate and exchange rates, compared to the develop­
ing oil-exporting countries.
This chapter suggests that oil revenue shocks do not in all cases lead to 
a decline in GDP growth rate or manufacturing output growth for develop­
1. Introduction 9
ing oil exporting countries. However, there are some evidence that govern­
ment spending shocks, in some cases have lead to a decline GDP per capita 
growth rate and manufacturing output growth. The chapter addresses both 
the second and third research questions that relate to the implications of oil 
shocks and economic growth, and the research hypothesis of whether positive 
oil price shocks lead to a decline in manufacturing output. In general, the 
chapter shows that the Dutch disease theory does not effectively explain the 
poor growth performance of most developing oil exporting countries of Africa 
and the Middle-East as has been popular argued in the literature. There is 
evidence that oil revenue shocks have actually led to an increase in manufac­
turing output and GDP per capita growth rate, while shocks to government 
expenditure have played the opposite role. It is important to mention that 
this outcome is by no means conclusive nor is the result persistent in all 
cases. The result is quite mixed and vary significantly from country to coun­
try indicating that there is absolutely no bases for generalization - such as oil 
revenue shocks or government expenditure shocks is good or bad for growth, 
particularly for the developing oil exporting countries.
Chapter 4 specifically identify the missing link in our analysis of the growth 
performance in developing oil-exporting countries. The chapter suggests that 
economic theory combined with advanced estimation methodologies cannot 
provide a complete answer to why developing oil-rich countries have contin­
ued to experience poor and volatile growth over the last four decades. There 
is a need to effectively marry the theory and econometrics dimensions to 
the political economy perspectives. The chapter explains why bad economic 
policies which have led to poor and volatile growth are actually rational 
and good political decisions. Robinson, et al., (2005) and Melhum, (2006), 
have shown that the political incentives generated by a resource endowment, 
accounts to a great extent for why resource abundance is a curse rather
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than a blessing for the developing countries. A major instrument that facili­
tates this outcome is the quality of institution, which has greatly determined 
why some countries have been able to transform their resource advantage 
to meaningful growth and development, while others could not. The chap­
ter provides a simple estimate of the relationship between institutions and 
economic outcomes, using various measures of institutions and controlling 
for other macroeconomic policy variables. The results of these relationships 
show that after controlling for institutions, other macroeconomic variables 
have no significant effects on economic growth (ceteris paribus)- suggesting 
that a key factor to understanding and explaining the dismal growth per­
formance of most developing oil-rich economies, is the quality of institution. 
The initial institution, measured by the constraints on the executive (as at 
1970) of any particular country determines, to a large extent the degree at 
which such a country can transform its resource gains (for example increase 
oil revenue) to positive economic outcomes that will be beneficial to the gen­
eral society. In our analysis, we follow closely the procedures in Acemoglu et 
al., (2003b), to identify the strong correlation between measures of quality of 
institution and economic outcomes - such as growth volatility, growth crises 
and economic growth.
In the growth representation developed in this chapter, we included ini­
tial income and other macroeconomic policy variables such as government 
expenditure, inflation rate and exchange rate overvaluation as explanatory 
variables while retaining GDP per capita growth rate as our measure of eco­
nomic growth. We vary the dependent variables amongst the three growth 
outcomes- growth volatility, growth crises and economic growth. The results 
of these simulations show a strong positive correlation between institution 
and economic growth, as well as a strong positive correlation between lower 
institutional scores (weak institutions) and adverse economic outcomes such
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as growth volatility and growth crises. In the models where we have both 
institution and initial income as regressors, we found that the coefficient of 
institution is less significant - suggesting a strong correlation between insti­
tution and initial income. Linking this chapter to chapters 2 and 3, we found 
that the coincidental negative correlation between the oil variable and eco­
nomic growth could be accounted for by the role of institutions - such that 
after controlling for institution, the oil variable and other variables for that 
matter, do not necessarily explain economic growth. Therefore, the quality 
of institution explains why oil revenue shocks and, by causation, government 
expenditure shocks could lead to a decline in growth or manufacturing out­
put. This chapter answers the research question of whether other factors 
account for the persistently poor growth performance of developing coun­
tries. This singular factor - institution, explains why resource abundance 
seems to be a ‘curse’ to the resource rich countries rather that a ‘blessing’ as 
predicted by economic theory. The same factor explains why there is a nega­
tive correlation between the oil variable and economic growth. It is observed 
in our analysis that the economies of the developing oil exporting countries 
are characterized by weak initial institution and this weak initial institution 
is strongly correlated with other growth determinants.
In general, this research identifies the missing link in the literature of eco­
nomic growth and resource abundance, and shows why previous empirical 
studies on cross-country growth determinants have not explained why de­
veloping oil-exporting countries have experienced poor growth performance. 
The thesis suggests the need to align macroeconomic theory with political- 
economy fundamentals, in order to effectively analyze the poor growth ex­
perience of resource abundant economies. In this regards, there are three 
major outcomes of this research, which we belief has provided a clearer and 
more coherent explanation to the growth paradox of developing oil exporting
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countries: firstly, this research shows that there is no significant negative 
correlation between resource abundance and economic growth, if appropri­
ate corrections are made in the specification of a cross-country growth model. 
Using an homogenous data sample of a cross-section of developing oil-rich 
countries, we found that oil endowment is positively correlated with growth as 
against the outcome in a general (heterogenous) data sample of cross-section 
of countries which include advanced economies and oil importing countries; 
secondly, there is no consistent empirical evidence to show that oil revenue 
shocks have led to a decline in economic growth or manufacturing output 
in developing oil-rich economies, as argued in the Dutch-Disease literature; 
thirdly, there is robust empirical evidence which shows that institutional 
characteristics have, to a large extent, accounted for the poor and volatile 
growth experience of most developing oil-rich countries and by extension ex­
plained why resource abundance has been associated with negative growth. 
This thesis argues that because the economies of developing oil-exporting 
countries have been characterized by weak economic institutions and inef­
ficient political structure, the economies have been unable to maximize the 
gains of increasing oil prices, and as well been unable to resume steady and 
strong growth since the oil price shock of the early 1970. The weak quality 
of institutions has accounted for why the oil economies have had ‘resource 
curse’ rather than ‘resource blessing’ in the aftermath of higher oil price. 
The positive institutional transformation of the emerging East Asian coun­
tries have been shown in our analysis to account for why higher oil prices 
have not impacted negatively on key determinants on growth and how they 
have persistently sustain strong growth rates with lesser vulnerability to ex­
ternal shocks.
Finally, this research shows that negative policy outcomes, such as fiscal 
indiscipline, monetary instability and exchange rate misalignment, are not
I. Introduction 13
necessarily the mediating channels through which weak institutions affect 
growth volatility and growth crises - suggesting that macroeconomic vari­
ables are not important for growth after controlling for institution. This is 
a very strong conclusion which we cannot claim to have robustly established 
in this research but have provided a strong motivation for future research.
2 . T H E  D E T E R M IN A N T S O F EC O N O M IC  G R O W TH : A 
SURVEY AND A PPL IC A T IO N
2.1 In troduction
The fact that there are large variations in income per capita or total factor 
productivity across countries in the world is an inquisitive phenomenon. In 
the world income hierarchy, some countries at the top are eighty times richer 
than others at the bottom of the hierarchy. For example while the United 
States GDP per capita stood at $37,436 (valued at 2000 PPP constant inter­
national $ ) in 2005, the GDP per capita is much more lower in many other 
countries : $2,121 in Algeria, $4,434 in Malaysia, $13,209 in South Korea, 
and $459 in Nigeria1. Comprehending how some countries could be that 
rich while others are so poor is a very important challenge facing develop­
ment science and economists in particular. The reason why a country could 
be much more richer than another lies in the differences in their long term 
growth rates. For example, lets take country X and Y with the same level 
of income at the start of period t but country X has 0% growth per capita 
while country Y has 2% growth per capita. In 100 years time (Uoo)> country 
Y will be more than 26 times richer than country X. Therefore the United 
States is considerably richer than Nigeria because it has grown steadily over 
a long period of time while Nigeria has not. The question is what will make 
one country grow persistently while another will not?
1 World Bank: World Development Indicators (Edition-2006)
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Several studies2 have used cross-country regressions to search for empiri­
cal links between long-term growth rates and a variety of economic policy, 
political objectives and institutional factors. Generally, each of these studies 
have only consider a small number of explanatory variables to establish a cor­
relation between growth and the identified variables of interest. In a survey 
of growth econometrics, Durlauf et al., (2004) identified over 200 variables 
suggested in the literature to have been significantly correlated with growth. 
In most studies, researchers substantiate the validity of a growth determinant 
by developing a simple regression model or set models and conduct inference 
as if the model generated the data. However, inference procedures based on 
a simple linear growth regression model which is conditional on the truth 
of that model, can grossly overstate the precision of the inference above a 
given phenomenon and ignore the uncertainty that surround the validity of 
the model.
This chapter provides a survey and synthesis of both the theoretical and 
econometric tools that have been employed to study economic growth. While 
these tools range across a variety of statistical methods, they are united in 
the common goals of first, identifying interesting contemporaneous pattern 
in growth data and second, drawing inferences on long-run economic growth 
from amongst countries and the inter-temporal variations in such growth. 
The survey introduces the main stylized facts that have motivated the de­
velopment of growth econometrics, the major statistical tools that have been 
used to provide structural explanation for these facts, and the primary sta­
tistical issues that arise in the study of growth data. An important contri­
bution intended by this survey is to identify the limits that exist in drawing
2 See Barro et al., (1991, 1997, 2002), loayza et.al., (2002), Rodrilc (2003) and Temple 
et al.,(2003)
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conclusions from growth data, limits that reflect model uncertainty and by 
extension, lack of robustness that characterised growth determinants.
In addressing the uncertainties associated with the factors that may account 
for growth differences among countries, this research investigates the incon­
sistencies that may be associated with the factors that have been argued to 
account for the growth stagnation of resource-abundant developing countries 
- such as the oil exporting countries. In Particular, this chapter investigates 
the relationship between resource abundance and economic growth, with a 
view to establish whether resource abundance could account for the poor 
growth performance of oil-rich developing countries. Many studies which in­
clude: Barro, (1997), Auty, (2001), Easterly (2001), and Sachs et al., (1999) 
have found that there is a significant negative correlation between natural re­
source endowment and economic growth, such that the negative relationship 
have accounted for why resource abundant countries have grown relatively 
slower than other countries. The methodologies adopted in these studies 
to arrive at this result follow the estimation of an ‘endogenous’ neoclassical 
growth model using a combination of traditional growth determinants3 with 
other control variables which include an ‘oil dummy’ in a cross-country lin­
earized growth regression. This models have as their dependent variable, the 
average GDP per capita growth rate over an extended time period and the 
right hand variables are simultaneously estimated as parameters of growth 
but each parameter is interpreted holding all other parameters constant.
It follows from this analysis that the channels through which resource abun­
dance translate to poor growth includes through: long-term decline in terms 
of trade; oil revenue volatility; the Dutch disease syndrome; crowding-out
3 These are the variables identified in Solow, (1956), Manlciw et al., (1992) and discussed 
in Barro et al., (1991b) and Durlauf et al., (2004))
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effects; increasing state dominance; socio-cultural and political hinderance 
etc. In this chapter we have focussed on three of these channels: Dutch 
disease syndrome (a decline in manufacturing output), increasing state dom­
inance and socio-political hinderance. We conduct both simple empirical 
and robustness tests to investigate the validity of the proposition of the first 
channel which relates to the Dutch disease hypothesis. However we followed 
a systematic procedure of first presenting the facts as it relates to the growth 
performance of oil-exporting countries so far. Secondly, the factors attributed 
to the growth performance in oil exporting countries and how those factors 
are derived. Thirdly, the reliability of those facts and the consistency of such 
derivation procedures. In the next section we present the facts as evident 
in the statistics and growth indicators of developing oil-exporting countries 
over the investigation period (1960-2004).
2.1.1 Growth Performance of Developing Countries
The growth experience of oil exporting countries, in the last four decades 
since 1960, can be classified into four episodes: 1960 - 84; 1985 - 94; 1995 - 
2000; and 2001 - 2005 (Table 2.1)4. The choice of these four classifications 
enable us to account for the various major structural transitions that charac­
terize the growth pattern of the developing countries in response to global oil 
price shocks. The period 1960-84 captures the transition of these economies 
from positive and strong growth economies in the 60’s to slow and negative 
growth economies by the beginning of the 80s following the oil price boom of 
the early 70s and the oil price collapse of the early 80s. The second period
4 In this table we are only interested in comparing the growth rate and volatility of some 
oil economies with that of non-oil economies in the South East Asia. This comparism has 
been used extensively in the literature to suggest that the dependence natural resource 
abundance may have accounted for the slow and volatile growth episode of developing oil 
rich countries.
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of 1985 - 1994 corresponds to the decade that witnessed radical structural 
reforms to address the perceived negative macroeconomic consequences of 
the dependence on oil revenue inflows5 The third period 1995 - 2000 marks 
the beginning of positive growth in some resource rich countries and era of 
growth crisis in the Asian sub-region following the region’s financial crisis. 
The last period 2001 - 2005 marks the beginning of a new trend in oil price 
increase but with less negative negative consequences on the macroeconomic 
indicators of oil-rich countries.
5 These era marks the period when the structural adjustment program initiatives (of 
the World Bank and IMF), import substitution strategies, floating exchange rate regimes 
and trade liberalizations policies were implemented to ginger fast growth.
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Table 2.1: GDP Growth rates and Volatility in Selected Developing Countries:
The Growth Performance and Volatility of Some Developing Countries 1960 - 2005
1960 - 84 1985 - 94 1995 - 2000 2000 - 2005
Countries/ Growth Growth Growth Growth
Regions Growth Volatility Growth Volatility Growth Volatility Growth Volatility
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
UAE - 4.3 2.3 -4.4 2.1 -1.4 5.1 1.2 2.1
Kuwait -6.6 1.5 4.5 9.8 -3.2 1.2 3.7 3.2
Bahrain 5.5 2.8 1.5 4.0 1.6 1.3 1.8 2.1
Oman 8.3 2.0 1.0 4.0 0.8 2.2 1.7 3.1
Qatar 12.4 2.4 0.6 19.3 21.6 0.4 3.1 2.4
Libya 13.0 1.4 1.4 6.8 12.8 1.1 3.0 1.6
S/Arabia 3.2 2.1 -1.3 3.8 -1.0 1.8 1.7 1.8
Hong Kong 6.7 0.6 3.4 1.4 2.9 2.3 3.5 0.4
Indonesia 3.8 0.9 3.7 1.6 3.1 2.1 3.4 0.1
Malaysia 4.4 0.5 3.5 1.3 3.0 2.4 2.5 0.6
Singapore 6.9 0.6 5.2 0.7 3.3 1.9 4.2 0.1
S/Korea 6.6 0.6 6.2 0.7 3.9 2.2 4.5 0.2
Thailand 4.4 0.5 6.5 0.5 3.2 2.3 4.1 0.3
East Asia 4.3 0.6 5.2 0.3 2.9 2.2 5.1 0,7
SSA 1.1 3.5 -1.1 1.8 0.1 3.6 2.1 4.6
MENA 5.5 2.1 1.0 4.0 0.8 1.3 2.2 4.1
Sources: WDI World Bank (2006), Summers and Heston (2005), and Author’s calculations.
MENA =  Middle East and North Africa Region; SSA = Sub Saharan Africa Region.
Note:
Country-specific growth rates are the period averages of GDP per capita growth and
the regional-type growth rates are measured as the median of average countries growth rates.
The calculation of growth rates uses the growth rate of Real GDP per capita
measured in domestic currency.
Country-specific growth volatility is measured as the ratio of the standard deviation of growth
over the absolute mean value of growth during the sample period and
the region-specific volatility is measured as the median of the country-specific volatility.
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In these categorizations we observed that in the first period, GDP per 
capita grew at an annual average rate of 5.5% in the oil-rich region of the 
Middle-East and North Africa region, with countries like Libya, Oman and 
Qatar recording a spectacular per capita growth rates of 13%, 8.3% and 
12.4% respectively6. In the same period, GDP per capita grew at an annual 
average of 1.1% for the sub-Saharan Africa region7 and 4.3% for South-East 
Asian region8. However, following the collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s, 
the annual average growth rate of per capita GDP for the oil economies in the 
second period ( 1985 -1994) declined to a meagre 1%, while the sub-Saharan 
African region recorded a negative annual average per capita growth rate of 
-1.1%. The average annual growth rate collapsed in the second episode for 
both the oil-economies of Middle East and North Africa, as well as the sub- 
Saharan African economies, while the South-East Asian countries were able 
to sustain and increase their strong growth performance to 5.2% from 4.3% 
in the first episode. Associated with the per capita annual average GDP 
growth rate over the two episodes is the growth volatility in the regions 
and countries. In the first episode, growth volatility in the Middle-East and 
North Africa (MENA) region was 2.1%, sub-Saharan Africa 3.5%, and East 
Asia 0.6%, and in the second period between 1985 - 1994, growth volatility 
increased significantly to 4.0% from 2.1% in the Middle-East and declined in 
both the East Asian and sub-Saharan regions to 0.3% and 1.8% respectively. 
At the individual country level, annual average per capita growth rate fell
6 This period also witnessed the first major oil price shock.
7 The sub-Saharan African countries include Nigeria, Angola, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra 
leone, Bostwana, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Republic of Congo, Gambia, Kenya, Mada­
gascar, Malawi, Niger, Senagal, Togo, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zam­
bia and Zimbabwe
8 The South -East Asian region includes countries like: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Thailand.
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significantly from 5.5% the previous episode to 1.5% the second episode for 
Bahrain, 13% to 1.4% for Libya, 8.3% to 1.0% for Oman, and 12.4% to 0.6% 
for Qatar. While GDP per capita growth rate declined significantly dur­
ing the second growth episode for the oil economies, growth volatility also 
increased significantly, with Qatar recording an increase in growth volatility 
from 2.4% to 19.3%, Libya - from 1.4% to 6 .8%, Kuwait - from 1.5% to 9.8%, 
and Saudi Arabia- from 2.1% to 3.8%. In the third period between 1995 - 
2000, the growth statistics of the oil-rich economies dwindled further to an 
annual average growth rate of 0 .8% though with a decline in growth volatility 
from 4.0% to 1.3%.
During the second growth episode, the East Asian economies performed rea­
sonably well, in terms of growth volatility, compared to the Middle-East and 
sub-Saharan Africa. Even though annual average per capita GDP growth in 
the region increased from 4.3% in the first period to 5.2 the second period, 
growth volatility declined further from 0.6% to 0.3%. However, at individual 
country level, most of the East Asian economies recorded marginal increases 
in growth volatility. Although the sub-Saharan African region recorded a 
negative growth of -1.1% in the second period, growth volatility declined 
from 3.5% to 1.8%, suggesting that they actually performed better than the 
Middle-East and North African economies in term of growth volatility. In 
general, the oil-rich countries were still worse-off in terms of growth perfor­
mance and growth volatility relative to the East Asian countries.
The third growth period between 1995 - 2000 witnessed the Asian financial 
crisis of the 990s when the region’s growth volatility increased considerably 
to more than 2.0% compared to the MENA region with 1.3%, and annual av­
erage GDP per capita growth rate declined from an average of 5% the second 
period to less than 3% in the third period. Some MENA economies witnessed
2. The Determinants of Economic Growth: A Survey and Application 22
phenomenal growth and low volatility while others performed poorly. For ex­
ample, Qatar and Libya recorded an annual average GDP per capita growth 
rate of 21.6% and 12.8% with volatility of 0.4% and 1.1% respectively, while 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate recorded negative growth 
rates of -3.2%, -1.0% and -1.4% respectively. Even with the increase oil prices 
in the 1990s, the Asian economies still performed better that oil-economies 
in terms of GDP per capita growth rate, regardless of the financial crisis 
witnessed in the region. In the fourth period between 2001 - 2005, growth 
performance still remained low and more volatile in the oil rich countries 
compared to the the East Asian countries. The sub-Saharan African region 
was worse-off compared to the other two regions in both growth performance 
and growth volatility.
Several factors have been suggested to account for the poor and volatile 
growth performance of oil-rich countries, particularly the developing oil- 
exporting countries. Important and controversial amongst these factors is 
the compelling evidence that natural resource abundance is negatively cor­
related with growth and by implication accounts for the poor, as well as the 
volatile growth performance of resource-rich countries. In the next section 
we discuss the literature on ‘resource curse5 with particular reference to the 
Dutch-Disease hypothesis and its implications for the growth experience of 
developing oil-producing countries.
2.1.2 Resource Curse: A Growth Dilemma
There is a large volume of literature on the determinants of long-term eco­
nomic growth, however in this section we will concentrate on the studies that 
have focussed on the significance of resource abundance as a determinant of 
long-term economic growth. Sachs et al.,(1996) found that economies with 
a high ratio of natural resource export to GDP in 1970 tend to have lower
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growth rates especially at period following higher returns on the export of the 
resources. They argued that such negative relationship holds even after con­
trolling for other variables found to be important to economic growth, such as 
initial income, terms or trade, inflation rate, human capital, investment rates 
and government consumption9. They conclude by observing that one of the 
surprising features of modern economic growth is that economies abundant in 
natural resource have tended to grow slower than economies without natural 
resources. Although they stop short of making any drastic policy recommen­
dation in their study, an implication following from their conclusion would be 
that natural resource abundance is a disadvantage for growth. In an earlier 
study, Matsuyama (1992) adopted a ‘Linkage Approach’ model to analyse 
the effect of natural resource endowment on economic growth. Using this 
approach he argued that while return on agriculture is factor-specific, social 
return to manufacturing employment exceeds private return because of the 
externality of ‘learning-by-doing’ associated with manufacturing production. 
Therefore forces that push the economy from manufacturing production and 
towards agriculture or natural resource extractions lower the growth rate of 
the economy, by reducing the learning-by-doing induced growth associated 
the manufacturing sector which invariably affects the long-term growth of 
the economy.
Sachs et al, (1999) generalized the Matsuyama (1992) approach in explaining 
the genesis of resource disadvantage on economic growth using the framework 
of the ‘Dutch Disease’ hypothesis10. In their version of the Dutch disease
9 Durlauf et al., (2004) provide a list of over 200 variables found in the literature to be 
important for growth.
10 ‘Coined’ after the growth experience in the Netherlands following the discovery of oil 
in the North Sea continental shelf in the 1960s.
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model11, the economy has three sectors; a tradable natural resource sector, a 
tradable (manufacturing) sector, and a non-tradable domestic sector. Cap­
ital and labor are used in the manufacturing and non-tradable sectors, but 
not in the natural resource sector. The larger the natural resource endow­
ment, the higher the demand for non-tradable goods, and consequently, the 
lesser will be the allocation of factors of production (labor and capital) to the 
tradable non-resource manufacturing sector. The abundance of natural re­
source means tradable production will concentrate on natural resource rather 
than manufacturing, capital and labor that otherwise might be engaged in 
manufacturing are pulled into the non-traded goods sector. As the economy 
experiences a resource boom, in the form of either a terms-of-trade improve­
ment, or resource discovery, or price increase, the manufacturing sector tends 
to shrink and the non-traded goods sector tends to expand. The shrinkage 
of the manufacturing sector is tagged the ‘disease’ and can be a source of 
slow growth if the manufacturing sector is so characterized by other social- 
economic externalities that are important for growth.
In Corden et al.,(1982) analogy of the Dutch-disease syndrome, a model 
where there are both direct and indirect de-industrialization effects of nat­
ural resource discovery was developed. The model assumes that there are 
three sectors in the economy: a booming sector (B); a tradable sector (T); 
and a non-tradable sector(N). The first two sectors produce tradable goods 
given world prices, whereas prices for non-tradable goods are given by do­
mestic factors. The negative effect of resource abundance occurs when there 
is an unexpected increase in the demand for the resources or a sudden price 
rise, such that factors of production are shifted to the ‘booming’ sector - re­
ferred to as ‘Resource Movement Effects’. The movement of labor from (T)
11 There are other interpretations of the Dutch-disease which includes: Dornbusch et al., 
(1995), Van Wijnbergen , (1984), Corden et al., (1982), and Gelb (1988).
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to (B) will lower output in (T) directly and the movement of labor from (N) 
to (B) at constant prices, will reduce the supply of (N) and create an excess 
demand for (N), so that price of (N) in terms of (T) will rise, leading to real 
appreciation and further movements of resources out of (T) into (N)12. The 
increased demand for goods and services by the booming sector will also lead 
to an indirect (spending) effect through increased demand for resources by 
the sector that produce goods and services for the oil sector - with positive 
income elasticity of demand for (N), the price of (N) relative to price of (T) 
must rise, inducing a further real appreciation and additional movement of 
resources out of (T).
Following the Dutch-disease analysis the argument that, rather than a bless­
ing, natural resource abundance ( or at least the abundance of a particular 
natural resource) increases the probability that a country will experience 
negative economic, political and social outcomes including poor economic 
performance, low levels of democracy, social fraternization and civil war has 
become a stylised fact with popular acceptability in growth literature. The 
argument over the period, became extremely influential such that the opinion 
that natural resource endowment is bad for development became accepted by 
prominent economists and officials of major international financial and devel­
opment institutions, such as, the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. Further seminal work re-echoed this negative correlation, including: 
Gelb, et al.,(1988); Sachs and Warner (1997), Leite, et al., (1999); Isham, 
et al., (2003); Davis et al., (2003); Eifert, et al. (2003); Collier (1999a) and 
Sala-i-Martin, et al.,(2003), such that convectional wisdom became arguably 
the exact opposite of what it was prior to the early 1980s.
12 In a small semi-open economy assumption, the increase in the relative prices of non­
tradable goods in terms of traded (manufacturing) goods is equal to a real exchange rate 
appreciation if terms of trade in manufacturing is fixed.
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Sachs et al.,(1997), Leite et ah,(1999), and Gylfason et ah,(1999), exam­
ined the experiences of a large and diverse set of natural resource economies 
between 1970 - 1990, and found that even after controlling for other macroe­
conomic factors, natural resources abundance was negatively correlated with 
economic growth as predicted in the Dutch-disease. More recently, Neumayer 
(2004) investigates whether natural resource abundance has any negative ef­
fect on economic growth if one measures economic growth in terms of ’gen­
uine income’ - that is GDP minus the depreciation of produced and natural 
capital, and found that there is still a negative correlation between resource 
abundance and such measure of economic growth. In the next section we 
provide a general empirical framework of cross-country growth regression, 
including the theoretical foundation that underly the empirical framework. 
The framework principally follow a neoclassical growth theory and represents 
the basis for most empirical growth work13.
2.2 G rowth Regression: A  C ross-C ountry A nalysis
The development of economic growth literature can be classified into two 
framework of applied analysis that involves the application of economic the­
ory to growth estimations. The first framework addresses the issue of ‘con­
vergence’ which relates to whether contemporary differences in aggregate 
economies transient over sufficiently long time horizons or converges to an 
‘initial equilibrium’. The second framework concerns the identification of 
growth determinants which suggest the factors that explain the observed dif­
ferences in growth among countries. In addressing the growth phenomenon 
two models that are legendary in growth literature on the appropriate spec­
13 See Mankiw et al., (1992) and Barro et al., (1995). Most transformation of growth 
models built on this background, including endogenous growth theories.
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ification of a growth equation are the neoclassical growth model (Solow, 
1956 Swan, 1956) and the endogenous growth model (Romer 1986 and Lucas 
(1988). Many of the differences between the neoclassical and endogenous 
growth models can be narrowed down to issues that concern the long-run 
effects of initial conditions on growth. In this section we shall discuss the 
theories that underly these models and the analytical framework, and the 
estimation procedures that follow from the derived theoretical specifications. 
Particularly, our focus shall center on the development of growth economet­
rics following from the application of growth theories.
2.2.1 Theoretical foundation
We first describe how statistical models of cross-country growth differences 
have been derived from theoretical growth models. A significant anchor of 
all growth specifications is the inclusion initial income variable in all growth 
model. We introduce the theoretical foundation of how initial income enters 
growth regressions with a negative sign by following the common derivation 
in growth econometrics14. This derivation follows thus: Given an economy 
i at time t, let Yit represent output, Lit is labor force which follows the as­
sumption Lit = I>iYnit, where n» is the population growth rate and it is 
constant. The efficiency level per worker is represented by Ait and it follows 
the assumption A it — Ai0e9it, where gt is the rate of (Labor augmenting) 
technological progress and it is constant. In the analysis we use two main 
per capita notions: output per efficiency unit of labor input, yft = =
and output per unit of labor, yit = jk
14 Using the endogenous growth model specification in Mankiw et al., (1988) and ex­
tended in in Barro et al., (2004), we follow the basic ideas behind growth dynamics.
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The generic one-sector growth model, in either its Solow-Swan (1956) ver­
sion or the Mankiw Romer and Weil (1992) variant, implies to a first-order 
approximation that15:
where y jj  is the steady-state value of y§, and limt_>ooyft — yf^. The pa­
rameter A4 (which must be positive A > 0) measures the rate of convergence 
of yft to its steady state value and depends on the other parameter of the 
model. Thus , for any I > 0, log y^ is a weighted average of the initial and 
steady-state values, log and logy^,, with the weight on the initial value 
declining exponentially at the rate A. We also assume that given Aj > 0, 
the value of yfQQ is independent of y§ so that, in this description the initial 
condition does not matter in the long-run - assuming that yfQ> 0 , eliminates 
the trivial equilibrium yft = 0 , for all t.
Equation (2.1) expresses growth dynamics in terms of the unobservable yft . 
In order to describe dynamics in terms of the observable variable yu, eq.(2.1) 
is re-written as:
15 The procedure follows from the maximization of societal welfare function, given the 
production function, aggregate consumption and resource constraints - with exogenous
log yft = e Xit log Vio + (1 -  e Xit) log y f t (2 .1)
(2 .2)
so that
(2.3)
constant growth factor in labour force n — ^ and technological progress g = ^
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comparing to eq (2 .1) one can see that
lim (y it -  y^Aioe3^ )  = 0 (2.4)t—> oo \ J
so that the initial value of output per worker has no implications for its long- 
run value. This description of the dynamics of output provides the basis for 
describing the dynamics of growth, let
7% = £_1 ^ Ugyit -  log yiQ j  (2.5)
represent the growth rate of output per worker between 0 and t . Subtracting 
logyiQ from both sides of eq. (2.3) and dividing by t yields
Ti = 9i + Pi ^ log yfyOQ + log Ai0 -  log yi0)  (2.6)
where
Pi = r 1 ^1 -  e~Mtj  (2.7)
As we shall show, the pt parameter play a very crucial role in empirical 
growth analysis.
Equation (2.6) thus decomposes the growth rate in country i into two distinct 
components. The first component, measures growth due to technologi­
cal progress, while the second component pA log yf^  + log A*0 — log^o ) =
Pi ^ log y/J — log yfQj  measures growth due to the gap between initial output 
per worker and the steady-state value, both measured in terms of efficiency 
units in labor. This second source of growth is what is meant by ‘catch-up 
effect’ in the literature. As t —► oo the importance of the catch-up term, 
which reflects the role of initial conditions, diminishes to zero.
Under the additional assumptions that the rates of technological progress,
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and the Ai parameters are constant across countries, such that, gi—g} and A* 
=  A Vi, eq. (2.6) may be rewritten as
The important empirical implication of eq. 2.8 is that, in a cross-section of 
countries, a negative relationship should be observed between average rates 
of growth and initial levels of output over any time period - countries that 
start out below their balanced growth path must grow relatively quickly if 
they are to catch up with other countries that have the same levels of steady- 
state output per effective worker and initial efficiency. This implication is 
closely related to the hypothesis of conditional convergence, which is often 
understood to mean that countries converge to parallel growth paths, the 
levels of which are assumed to be a function of a small set of variables. 
Several studies16 have shown that, the negative coefficient on initial income in 
a cross-country regression does not necessarily imply conditional convergence 
in this sense, because countries might instead simply be converging towards 
their own different steady-state growth paths.
certain broad fundamentals which include: stable macroeconomic environ­
ment, efficient human capital, structural policies facilitating trade openness,
16 See for example Bernard et al., (1996), Bliss et al., (1999), Brock et al., (2001), Bulli
(2001) Barro et al., (2002) and Dorwick et al., (2002)
17 For a comprehensive review of growth empirics, see loayza and Soto (2002) and Durlauf
S.N. et al (2004))
(2 .8)
2.3 M ethodology
2.3.1 The Determinants of Growth: A Panel Data Approach 
Empirical growth literature17suggests that high growth is associated with
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efficient and appropriate public sector, good governance and effective insti­
tutions for the protection of property right and returns on investments. In 
the various growth analysis, the choice of the combination of growth determi­
nants depend on the particular definition of growth, the specification of the 
growth model and the research objective of the analyst. Given that we are 
focussing on the growth experience of developing oil rich countries in a dy­
namic panel endogenous growth model, we have identified the key variables 
that are common to these group of countries and adjustable to our growth 
model, and control for the other variables that vary significantly amongst 
the countries and growth specification.
However, before we consider the various empirical procedures, suffice we dis­
cuss the variables we shall consider in the model and how they are defined. 
We have considered 13 key variables including the neoclassical traditional 
growth determinants common to all growth regressions and our chosen con­
trol variables with appropriate justifications. We have deliberately chosen 
the control variables to specifically account for the effects of geography, ecol­
ogy, demography and natural resource endowments on cross-country growth 
differences. These variables we have considered are:
2.3.2 Traditional Growth Fundamentals
• Initial Income:
Conditional Convergence
The major distinctions between endogenous and neoclassical growth 
theories centers on the long-run effect of cross-country differences in 
initial human and physical stocks. The effect of initial conditions on 
long-run outcomes represents the primary empirical question that has 
been explored by growth economists. The suggestion that the effects 
of initial conditions eventually disappear is the basis for what is known
2. The Determinants of Economic Growth: A  Survey and Application 32
as the ‘convergence hypothesis’ in growth literature. Durlauf et al., 
(2004) in a recent review of growth econometrics observed that the 
convergence hypothesis answers two fundamental questions concerning 
per capita income differences across countries. First, are the observed 
cross-country differences in per capita incomes temporary or perma­
nent? Second, if they are permanent, does that permanence reflect 
structural heterogeneity or the role of initial conditions in determining 
long-run outcomes? Galor (1996), who coined the taxonomy ‘conver­
gence club’ explains that if the differences in per capita incomes are 
temporary, unconditional convergence - to a common long-run level- is 
occurring and if the differences are permanent solely because of cross­
country structural heterogeneity, conditional convergence is occurring.
In formalizing the the significance of initial condition in our model, 
we used the logarithm (log) level of per capita output in country i 
and time t. Our use of the log yiit rather than y^t follows the gen­
eral interest in growth literature in terms of relative versus absolute 
inequalities as argued in Temple (2000). In line with Rodrik (2003), 
we are more interested in whether the ratio of income between coun­
tries exhibit persistence rather than an absolute difference, particularly 
since sustained growth will imply that a constant level difference is of 
asymptotically negligible size when relative income is considered. We 
follow Pesaran (2004) in our transformation of the data to define con­
vergence. We associate with log yit) Xi0 and these initial condition does 
not matter in the long run if lim^oo g{logyit\\io) does not depend on 
Ai0, where p(.) is a probability measure. The above definition implies 
that countries i and j  exhibit convergence in average income level such 
that lim^oo E(logyit — logyij\\iQ, \ j Q) — 0. We use 1970 income per 
capita to represent initial income. The preference for this choice is
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because it is argued in the literature18 that by 1970 most developing 
countries were sovereign/independent states and the year also marks 
the beginning of availability of reliable national accounting data for a 
large number of developing countries.
• Hum an Capital
The growth literature suggests that human capital can promote growth 
through different channels. For example, education determines the rate 
of technological innovation or absorption and exerts a countervailing 
effect on the diminishing returns to factors of production, such as capi­
tal. Countries with higher initial stock of human capital and knowledge 
have been found to be able to forge ahead through higher growth rates. 
Benhabib et al.,(1994) have found evidence that human capital affects 
total factor productivity growth (TFPG) through its impact on the ca­
pacity of a country to innovate and the capability of using and adapting 
foreign technology. Barro (2002), also found that good level of health 
directly raise labor productivity and hence growth. In our model, we 
measure human capital as the ratio of total secondary school enrolment 
- regardless of age - to the population of the age group that officially 
corresponds to that level of education. We have drop the use of good 
health indicator - measured as United Nation index for life expectancy 
in Barro, (2000), because of its high correlation with the measure of 
‘demographic advantage’ used in the model.
2.3.3 Macroeconomic and Stabilization Factors
Macroeconomic policy variables play an important role in growth sus­
tainability. Bosworth (2003) found that growth is negatively associated
18 See Barro, (1996), Temple, (2000), Sala-i-Martin, (2003), and Acemoglu, (2006)
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with inflation, large budget deficits and distorted foreign exchange mar­
ket. Easterly, (2001) also found that macroeconomic stabilization and 
crises-related variables, such as, price inflation, parallel market pre­
mium on foreign exchange, real exchange rate over valuation, systemic 
banking and balance of payment crises, affects both cyclical output 
variability and long-term growth. In our model, we control for average 
price inflation, real exchange ra te  over-valuation and govern­
m ent consumption as macro-stabilization variables in the growth 
model.
• Inflation
A key component to stabilization policy is sustenance of macroeconomic 
stability - which requires a thorough understanding of the interplay of 
both fiscal and monetary policy tools. Generally, one of the important 
variables considered in this interplay is average inflation rate, which 
represent an indication of the quality of interplay between fiscal and 
monetary policies. In the literature, it is establish that inflation is a 
major channel through which fiscal and monetary policy distortions 
and external shocks are transmitted to other sectors of the economy. 
It is negatively correlated with long-term growth and positively corre­
lated with other indicators of macroeconomic volatility, such as, fiscal 
deficits, black market premium and exchange rate overvaluation19. As 
a measure of inflation, we used the log of annual percentage change 
in consumer price index as against GDP deflator used in some stud­
ies, because our measure allows for no identification restrictions to be 
imposed on GDP per capita and initial income for consistency of the 
model. We used lagged value of the measured inflation as instrument 
for inflation in the model that involve two-stage estimations, such as
19 See Dornbusch et al., (1995) and Durlauf, (2001).
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the GMM estimations.
• Government Consum ption
The domineering role of a state (government burden) can cause a signif­
icant drain on the private sector activities. Government consumption 
can have a positive effect on the economy, however it could be detri­
mental to growth if it inappropriately impose high tax levies to sustain 
ineffective fiscal spending, inefficient public service (bureaucratic bot­
tlenecks) and engage in over-bearing state intervention in economic 
activities thereby distorting efficient market mechanism and prices. In 
our analysis government consumption is measured as the ratio of gov­
ernment expenditure to GDP. In line with recent growth studies20, we 
assume that the government consumption variable measures expendi­
tures that do not directly affect productivity but that entails distortions 
of private sector decisions. These distortions can reflect the governmen­
tal activities themselves and also involve the adverse effects from the as­
sociated public finance. In measuring government consumption, we use 
the World Bank data classification to net out expenditure on education, 
infrastructure and defence. This filtering of government consumption 
will correct for the double-counting error associated with measuring 
government consumption in a growth regression where GDP per capita 
output growth is a dependent variable. Public expenditure on these 
three categories are positive for growth and cannot be associated with 
distortionary effects which are negative for growth.
20 See Esfahani et al., (2003)
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• Institutions
The political economy literature have stressed the role of institution 
in long-term growth. Acemoglu (2003b and 2006a and b), found that 
institutions measured in historical terms, are significant determinants 
of growth and growth volatility. The measure of institutional envi­
ronment used in our model is the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) index, which is a comprehensive index based on political, eco­
nomic and financial indicators. The indicators used to measure the 
quality of institution includes; government repudiation and expropri­
ation, corruption, rule of law, quality of bureaucracy, accountability 
and transparency, and democracy and good governance. In the clas­
sification each country is scored a ranking between 1 to 7, where 7 
is highest score representing the best quality of institution and 1 is 
the least score representing autocratic regimes and highly corrupt and 
inefficient governments.
2.3.4 Structural Factors:
• Openness
Policies that influence the structure of the economy, such as the degree 
of openness of the economy have been identified to affect long-term 
growth. Openness has been used extensively in the literature as a ma­
jor determinant of growth performance. Wacziarg et al., (2003) found 
that openness affects growth positively to the extent that it magni­
fies the benefits of international knowledge spill-over and technological 
diffusion, as well as enforcing cost discipline through import competi­
tion and the drive for export. Although the literature is divided on
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the importance of openness for long-term growth21, there are empirical 
evidences that suggest that the relationship between economic growth 
and international openness is indeed positive, and reflects the vicious 
cycle through which more openness lead to higher growth, which in 
turn lead to higher trade and more openness.
In many of the studies openness is measured as the ratio of trade to 
GDP, however, we have found this measure inappropriate for a case 
study involving oil exporting countries. Oil economies have high trad­
ing ratio reflecting partly the nature of their factor endowment rather 
than export competitiveness or factor productivity. Sachs and Warner 
(1997), defined openness as the fraction of years between the period 
1970 - 1990 in which a country is rated as open according to the fol­
lowing criteria: Non-tariff barriers covering less than 40% or more of 
traded goods; average tariff rates below 40%; a black market premium 
of less than 20%; no extreme controls in the form of taxes, quotas or 
state monopolies on exports; and the country is not considered as a 
socialist country. A value of 1 means the country has remained open to 
trade during the entire period, while a value of zero means the country 
remained completely closed. This measure of openness is quite robust 
but we could not apply the measure to a large number of developing 
countries due to data availability.
We considered a second measure of openness, which represents open­
ness as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. Several growth studies 
have suggested that openness vary according to a country’s size - such
21 While Barro (1996), found that openness is positively related to growth, Makdisi et 
al., (2000) found that openness has accounted for the negative growth performance of the 
Arab oil-rich countries
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that larger countries tends to be less open because internal trade offers 
a large market that can substitute effectively for international trade. 
In our analysis, the measure of openness filters out the relationship of 
openness to the logs of population and country size, which reflects the 
influences of government policies, such as tariffs and trade restrictions 
on international trade. We did this filtering by following the procedure 
in Barro et ah, (2001)- using a separate regression system to identify 
the relationship and thereafter using a new interaction term to control 
for the effects.
• Public Infrastructure
Another structural policy variable considered in our growth model is 
public infrastructure. The significance of efficient public infrastructure 
in generating long-term growth, most especially for developing coun­
tries, has been highlighted in many of the literature. Good and efficient 
public service infrastructure can impact positively on the economy by 
enhancing total factor productivity and boosting returns on private 
sector investment, which will facilitate fast and positive growth. There 
are several measures of public infrastructure22, but for data convenience 
and applicability, we used the total mileage of tarred road network in 
a country as a measure of public infrastructure. We used the World 
Bank Development Indicator data series and controlled for the country 
size and population by taking the ratio of the kilometers of tarred road 
network to country size (squared kilometer in land coverage) and total 
population.
• Cyclical Reversion Effect: Initial O utput-G ap
Caselli et al., and Rodrik (2005), observed that even though most panel
22 Loayza and Soto (2002) used telecommunication capacity, measured by the number 
of main telephone line per capita.
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growth model regressions attempt to explain long-term trend in eco­
nomic growth, the models use short time periods (such as five-years 
period averages) for empirical estimation and forecast. Therefore, be­
cause we use 5-years periods averages to create the panel, cyclical effects 
are likely to be important at such frequencies. We include output-gap 
at the start of the period, as a variable in the model to control for this 
cyclical effect. The inclusion of this variable also enable us to avoid 
overestimating the coefficient of lagged output per capita (initial in­
come), which determines the speed of transitional convergence or the 
catch-up effect. The output-gap is measured as the difference between 
potential and actual GDP at the start of the period. We represent the 
output-gap in the GMM model by: y^t-i — y(t~i 
where yu is log of output per capita of country i at time t , and yft is the 
trend component of output per capita obtained by using the band-pass 
filter developed in Baxter and King, (1999)23.
• External Shock: Country-Invariant (Period-Specific) Variable
Some growth models have used indicators of global shocks as a pos­
sible factor that accounts for variations in cross-country growth rates. 
We used time dummies to capture exogenous shocks that are country- 
invariant but time-specific, as a measure of period-specific variable in 
the specification of our growth model. We have used six period ranges 
that capture a period-specific global occurrence which is country in­
variant. The period 1975-79 marks the aftermath of the oil price spike 
in the early 1970s due to the production embargo by the oil cartel un­
der the umbrella of the organization of petroleum producing countries
23 The data for 76 countries was readily provided to me by Professor I. Elbadawi following 
his paper- Elbadawi (2006) and other countries were added to total 100 countries in the 
cross-country growth regression model.
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(OPEC). This period coincided with an era of global recession while 
the oil exporting countries were struggling to manage their unantici­
pated revenue boom- tagged the ‘oil windfall’. 1980-84 was the period 
marking the era of oil price fall and the recovery from the recession by 
most industrial economies while the major oil exporter face harsh eco­
nomic circumstances due to the poor management of the wind fall. The 
global recovery continued through the 1985-1989 period while evidence 
of serious growth crisis begin to manifest in most developing countries, 
most especially the oil exporting countries. Another oil price spike was 
witnessed during the 1990-1994 period and continued through to the 
end of the decade 1999. This period also witnessed tremendous global 
economic crises including the Asian financial crisis and the continued 
political uncertainties of the Middle East region. The last period be­
tween 2000-2004 saw continued and unanticipated oil price increases 
but global economic crisis has significantly moderated with some coun­
tries recording strong and positive growth and even some oil export­
ing countries resuming stable and strong growth. We have included 
these periods dummies to explain cross country growth determinants 
suggesting whether period-specific shocks are important indicators of 
long-term growth.
2.3.5 Demography, Geography and Natural Resources:
• Demography
The demography - oriented growth literature24 suggests that when a 
country enters a period of demographic transition during which the pro­
portion of working age population is increasing relative to the total pop­
ulation - a ’’demographic window of opportunity” or a ’’demographic
24 See Dhonte et al.,(2000) and Williamson et al., (2002),
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gift” is opened up for the country. These studies argued that , under 
such type of demographic transition, the high proportion of working- 
age population foster accelerated and sustained economic growth by 
increasing labor participation and savings. However, if growth level 
continue to stagnate, this potential opportunity would instead become 
a social menace of rising unemployment. The impact of demographic 
transition on growth is captured by the extent to which the rate of 
growth of the economically active Population (EAP) exceeds the rate 
of growth of the overall population. There are evidence in the litera­
ture suggesting that most developing oil-rich countries could not take 
advantage of the opened demographic window in their growth history 
and that has led to severe growth crises. We measure demography 
(EAP/POP) as the average growth of the ratio of economically active 
population (16 -64 years) over total population for the sample period 
1960 - 2004. We used this population-age classification because it is 
the format available in the WDI data series for most countries.
• Conflict
Elbadawi (2006), Acempglu (2003a) and Collier (1999) found that 
growth is affected by conflicts - either civil, regional, or international. 
Developing countries, and most especially the resource-rich developing 
countries have continued to have a large share of both civil and re­
gional crisis. For example, there is the Arab-Israeli conflict which has 
engulfed the Arab region as a whole. There has been four major wars 
in the region in the last two decades; the Iran-Iraq war, the Kuwait 
invasion, the Lebanese war and the recent US invasion of Iraq, which 
have all had devastating effect on the region. For the African region; 
there has been the Sudanese civil war which so far has counted for 36 
years of the country’s 47 years of existence; the Liberia, Sierra Leone 
and Congo civil wars and inter-tribal conflicts; the Angolan war and
2. The Determinants o f Economic Growth: A  Survey and Application 42
the militants insurgence in the Nigerian oil creeks. All these conflicts 
have had devastating effects on the regions economic activities25. Col­
lier (1999) found that while regional and international wars are likely 
to impact greatly on short-run development because they usually cause 
significant damage to physical and human capital, civil wars and eth­
nic conflicts can be more devastating to long-term growth due to the 
greater destruction of ‘social capital’. In our measure of conflict as a 
variable in the regression model, we used data from the ‘correlates of 
war and armed conflict’ data base which used the years of war fought 
by a country multiplied by war intensity - where war intensity varies 
from l(low) to 3(high).
• Geography - Ecology
Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Gallup and Sachs (1998), found that favor­
able geographical and ecological conditions - in terms of access to long 
coaster line or sea navigable rivers and temperate climate, are robustly 
associated with superior growth records. This studies suggest several 
channels through which favorable geography and ecology could pro­
mote overall economic growth. A high share of a country’s area around 
coastal lines or sea navigable rivers and high economic density along 
the coast are important determinants of competitiveness, especially for 
transaction - intensive exports, such as manufactures. A high share of 
non-tropicai (temperate) climate in a country is associated with less 
prevalence of vector-borne diseases and high agricultural productivity. 
We used two separate variables to capture the effects of geography and 
ecology respectively in our model. Using the Geographic Information 
System (GIS) data series, geography is measured as population density
25 For a detailed analysis of the economic cost of the Sudanese civil war, see Elbadawi 
(1999), and for a more general exposition see Collier (1999).
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around 100km of the coast, and ecology is measures as the percentage 
of a country’s land in temperate climate.
• N atural Resource Endowment: Oil
Sachs et al, (1997), argued to have found convincing evidence that 
countries with high initial share of natural resource exports to GDP 
in 1970 tends to grow slowly over time. They argued that natural re­
source abundance negatively affects growth through several channels, 
such that resource rich countries tend to exhibit the Dutch-disease syn­
drome in terms of overvalued exchange rates, and hence the difficulty 
to develop a viable export-oriented or import-competing manufactur­
ing sector.
The idea of incorporating natural resource abundance as a determi­
nant of economic growth is of great appeal to our research, given the 
high endowment of our countries of interest in natural resources, no­
tably oil. We have maintained from the introduction of this chapter 
that the ultimate impact of natural resource on growth is an empirical 
question which needs to be addressed with great caution in interpre­
tation and analysis. It is our objective in this research, to investigate 
whether the negative correlation between oil and economic growth, as 
evident in some growth regression is a spurious outcome which may be 
measurement or specification errors that are commonly associated with 
endogenous growth models. We have used a simple measure of natural 
resource abundance in this study. Sachs and Warner, (1997) used the 
share of exports of primary products in GNP (1970), as a measure of 
natural resource abundance in their growth model. However, since our 
primary aim is to test whether oil endowment is a significant determi­
nant of growth or not, we have used a dummy classification of 1 for a
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net oil exporting country and 0 for non-oil exporting countries26. The 
oil dummy represents an explanatory variable in our growth regression 
to account for whether the abundance of oil is important for long-term 
per capita output growth.
2.4 Em pirical Ado dels
It has been substantially established in the literature27 that empirical growth 
estimations are generally characterized by measurement and model specifi­
cation errors, as well as endogeneity and heterogeneity effects biases. In 
order to address the endogeneity and country-specific heterogeneity effects 
associated with the estimation of endogenous growth model, we have used 
the three econometric methodologies of pooled-ordinary least squares, fixed 
(within) effects and generalized method of moments estimators to control 
for these empirical problems. We have adopted the above three estimation 
methodologies because they have received the most extensive application in 
cross-country growth regression, particularly in the studies we have earlier 
reviewed. In order to address the empirical issues relating to model specifica­
tion and the significance of the parameters as the combination of regressors 
in a particular specifications changes, we conduct a sensitivity analysis tests 
to identify the persistently robust determinants of growth regardless of the 
model specification type. In applying these various methodologies we esti­
mate a dynamic endogenous growth specification of the form:
Vit =  fto y i.t-i +  o i t ( v i , t - 1 -  y j j t - 1) +  P  Xu +  rfr +  ( t +  €it  (2-9)
where
yit is the log of output per capita for country i at time t\
26 This method has been adopted in many other studies which include Elbadawi (2006)
and Lederman et al., (ed.) 2007.
27 See for example Caselli et al., (1996) and Rodrik (2005)
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yjt represents the trend component of output per capita;
(yu ~ yjt) 1S therefore the output gap at the start of the period;
X itt is the of growth determinants earlier discussed; 
r)i represents the unobservable country specific effects;
£t is the country invariant period-specific effects which captures international 
shocks that affects all countries included in the models; and 
6i>t is the disturbance term.
While we directly estimate the above endogenous growth model using pooled- 
OLS and fixed effects estimators, we re-specify the model in order to apply 
the instrumental variable GMM estimator. In this specification, we used the 
lag components of the regressors as instruments and differenced the model 
to eliminate the omitted variable bias (r]i). The differenced transformation 
is given by:
(yu yi,t—1) i yi,t—2) —
a o{y i, t - 1 ~  V i, t -2 ) +  P  ( K i t  — +  (e it — £ i , t - 1) (2 .10 )
so that:
Ayu = aoAyiit_i +  A X itp + Av^ (2.11)
We used the System-GMM estimator to simultaneous estimate the regression 
model in levels (equation 2,9) and the regression in difference (equation 2.11) 
under certain assumed moment conditions
2.4.1 Data
In the three growth estimations, we have used an unbalanced panel data 
structure of a maximum of 9 observations per country and a minimum of 
7. The sample period from 1960 - 2004 is averaged over every 5 years to 
obtain 9 period-averages for countries with complete data entries and atleast
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7 period averages for countries with missing data entries. We considered 100 
countries including the data set of the 76 countries used in Elbadawi (2006). 
We considered 13 growth determinants (including the oil variable and the 
initial income) with average GDP per capita growth rate as the dependent 
variable to be explained. The data set used in both the pooled OLS and 
fixed effects estimations are in log-level form, while the GMM estimation 
used first-differenced and log-lagged transformation as instruments in the IV 
estimations. Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics of each variable and 
provide statistical information about the distribution of the variables
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
GDP Growth rate .011 018 -.052 .076
Log Initial GDP 8.22 1.45 4.81 9.66
Initial Output gap -.006 .017 -.011 .013
AverageEAP/POP (1960-04) .006 .003 -.003 .011
Log Sec, School 6.100 .214 5.116 6.041
Openness .097 .466 -1.334 1.114
War/Conflict .221 .911 .010 9.871
Log Inflation 1.996 1.248 -1.231 6.443
Institution .711 .210 .321 1.001
Log Government 3.112 .468 .984 4.112
Infrastructure 2.433 .080 -.234 1.576
Coastal Density[(ln( 100 + x)] 4.876 .312 3.661 8.112
Climate [(In (100 + x)] 3.889 .244 3.456 7.976
Oil .062 .267 .000 1.000
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2.4.2 The Estimation Results
In table 2.3 we have shown the differences between the estimated coefficients 
of growth determinants in line with the various regression methodologies. 
These classification has shown that while there may be variations in the es­
timated degree of correlation between the growth determinants and growth, 
the pattern of correlation generally conforms with the predictions of growth 
theory in all the empirical approaches. In the exceptional cases where the 
signs of correlation contradicts the expectations of the underlining economic 
theory, country specific factors (which are not captured in the model) have 
been identified as accounting for such conditions. While recent studies28 have 
shown that we do not learn anything from growth regressions, our results pro­
vide indications that with appropriate specifications and error- correction ad­
justments, some reliable general conclusions can be drawn from cross-country 
growth estimation which will help in policy formulation and implementation.
While no particular methodology is absolutely perfect, we have shown that 
the system-GMM approach is generally more robust and consistent in esti­
mated parameters. Even though our key variables of interest are the con­
vergence indicator (Initial Income), the oil dummy and our environmental 
variables, we have also analysis the outcomes of other growth determinants 
included in the models. It is important to mention that the interpretation of 
the results is strictly based of the ‘ceteris paribus’ assumption even though 
such assumption does not hold in reality. It is also important to add that 
given that we have used period average data, our estimated parameter are 
average estimates which are more appropriately interpreted using the model 
descriptive statistics provided in table 2.2
28 For example Rodrik (2004)
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Table 2.3: The Determinants of Growth: Using Pooled-OLS, Fixed Effects, Level- 
________ GMM and System GMM estimators ________________________
Model: Pooled-OLS Fixed Effects(With-in) Levels-IV GMM Systom-IV GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Catch-up Effect
Initial GDP per capita -0.0169 -0.0379 -0.0211 -0.0075
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cyclical Output Gap -0.2661
(0.000)
-0.3004
(0.000)
Demographic Gift
EAP-POP growth (60-03) 3.1282 - 3.0134 2.2112
(0.000) - (0.000) (0.000)
Structural, Stabilization, and Institutional Factors
Human Capital -0.1644 -0.0264 0.0591 0.0744
(0.000) (0.384) (0.000) (0.000)
Openness -0.0411 0.0274 0.0024 0.0181
(0.055) (0.000) (0.511) (0.001)
Public Infrastructure 0.0010 0.0911 0.0169 0.0477
(0.072) (0.110) (0.003) (0.001)
Inflation -0.0013 -0.0056 -0.0052 -0.0144
(0.132) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000)
Institution(ICRG) 0.0764 0.0611 0.0721 0.0801
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Govt. Consumption -0.0055 -0.0215 -0.0121 -0.0364
(0.061) (0.211) (0.462) (0.000)
Real Exchange rate Overvaluation -0.2140 -0.0651 -0.0261 -0.0351
(0.001) (0.011) (0.231) 0.001)
Conflict
Intl. War 0.0001 0.0010 -0.0011 0.0010
(0.766) (0.612) (0.511) (0.460)
Geography and Ecology
Population Density(Coast) 0.0042 - 0.0011 0.0101
(0.736) - (0.866) (0.011)
Temperate Climate 0.0344 - 0.0311 0.0258
(0.000) - (0.000) (0.001)
Oil Dummy -0.341 - -0.0031 -0.0010
(0.021) - (0.695) (0.376)
External Shocks
Term of Trade Shocks 0.0021 - -
(0.511) - -
Period Dummy
1975 - 1979 -0.0163
(0.000)
1980 - 1984 -0.0141 -0.0214 -0.0152 -0.0311
(0.0041) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
1985 - 1989 -0.0133 -0.0110 -0.0111 -0.0344
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
1990 - 1994 -0.0182 -0.0211 -0.0144 -0.0361
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
1995 - 1999 -0.0321 -0.0121 -0.0221 -0.0166
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
2000 - 2004 -0.03411 -0.0012 -0.0182 -0.0513
(0.312) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept -0.4321 0.0171 -0.4331 -0.3361
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
No. Countries/Observations 100/876 100/876 100/876 100/876
Sargan Test 0.411 0.021
Serial Correlation Test
First Order 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000
Second Order 0.221 0.512 0.332 0.220
Note: Dependent variable is growth rate of GDP per capita, P-values are in parentheses.
Period 1975 - 79 was controlled for the pooled OLS, fixed effects and levels-IV GMM in order to fix tho sample size for all regressions.
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Column (1) of the results in table (2.3) show the estimation of a cross­
country growth regression using a pooled ordinary least squares estimation. 
The result shows a negative convergence coefficient of about 2% and a signif­
icant positive correlation between demography and economic growth. Open­
ness, temperate climate, human capital and institutions are positively and 
significantly correlated with growth, while inflation and government con­
sumption are negatively correlated with growth but not significantly so. 
However, there is a significant negative correlation between exchange rate 
overvaluation and economic growth. This negative correlation has been em­
phasized in many studies - including Eastwood and Venables (1982) to have 
accounted for the poor growth episode of oil abundant economies partic­
ularly during the oil boom period. These Dutch-disease theorists have also 
argued that the mis-alignment of currency pricing in developing resource rich 
countries have accounted for the non-attractiveness of the domestic export 
sectors in favor of import dependence - which has subsequently resulted in 
the poor performance of the manufacturing sector and hence the poor and 
slow economic growth of those countries.
Infrastructure, wars and population density around the coast have shown 
very moderate positive correlation with growth suggesting in that they are 
not necessarily important determinants of cross country long-term growth. 
Except for infrastructure, coastal density and war are not significant at both 
5% and 1% level of significant, given the p-values of 0.736 and 0.766 respec­
tively. The endogeneity and unobservable country difference factors may 
account for the non significance of the infrastructure and ecological vari­
ables, suggesting that the variable may have been captured in institutions 
and demography.
The key variable of consideration in this regression is the oil dummy which
2. The Determinants o f Economic Growth: A Survey and Application 51
controls for resource abundance. The result shows a very significant nega­
tive correlation between oil abundance and economic growth. Many of the 
previous studies we have mentioned have relied on this correlation to explain 
why developing oil-rich countries have experienced poor and negative growth. 
There are different explanations for this negative correlation, ranging from 
the exchange rate overshooting model to the Dutch disease model and the 
political economy perspective.
Column (2) of table 2.3 shows the regression results using fixed (within) 
effects estimator. The key strength of the fixed effects (within-group) esti­
mators is the ability to address the problem of unobserved heterogeneity - 
such that any omitted variables that are constant over time will not bias the 
estimates, even if the omitted variables are correlated with the explanatory 
variables. In this result, we find a negative convergence coefficient of around 
4% compared to the 2% when using pooled-OLS - suggesting that (ceteris 
paribus) countries with lower initial per capita income in 1960 grow a lot 
faster than predicted, when we control for differences amongst the countries 
the model.
Other variables that have negative correlation with growth are Inflation 
rate, Government consumption and exchange rate over-valuation, suggesting 
that these policy variables are important determinants of long-term growth. 
The measure of institutional environment (ICRG) was found to be positively 
and significantly associated with growth while other non-traditional variables 
such as demography, ecology and geography are found to be unimportant in 
explaining growth in the model. Oil, temperate climate, demographic ad­
vantage and navigable coastal lines, which were assumed to be exogenous 
variables in the model were dropped in the regression. One likely explana­
tion for these outcome is that the exogeneity assumption is in-valid, as these
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variables are presumably endogenous to growth and other determinants of 
growth including education, institution and lagged initial income. Therefore 
it is possible that the effects of these non-traditional exogenous variables on 
current growth rate cannot be separated from the effects due to initial income 
and human capital. Even though the fixed effects procedure is an improve­
ment over the pooled OLS estimations because it correct for the individual 
heterogeneity which is ignored in the pooled-OLS, the model still suffers from 
endogeneity problems and measurement errors.
Columns (3) and (4) of table 2.3 shows the results of the two variants of 
the GMM estimation. Particularly in column (4), the system-GMM29 es­
timator which combines regressions in difference (2 .11) and regressions in 
levels (2.9) is based on the following moment conditions:
E [ ( y itt-1 -  y i )t- 2)x (r ) i + £*,*)] = 0 (2.12)
The dependent variable is not correlated with the unobservable individual 
effects and the error term - no serial correlation;
E[(Xi,t-i ~ X i)t- 2 )x(Vi + £i,t)J =  0 (2.13)
The explanatory variables are not correlated with the individual effects and 
the error term - endogeneity bias.
E\(yi,t—s&(£i,t ~ £i,t— i)] =  0 (2-14)
The lagged dependent variable is not correlated with the instrumental error 
term.:
~ £i,*-i)] — 0 (2.15)
29 developed in Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)
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for s > 2; t — 3, ....,T The explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the 
instrumented disturbance term30.
Based on these conditions, the system-GMM estimator controls for both 
country-specific heterogeneity effects and model endogeneity problems si­
multaneously and the results are more reliable and consistent compared to 
the level-GMM estimatiom which accounts for endogeneity but ignores the 
country-specific effects and the fixed (within) effects estimation which ac­
counts for country heterogeneity but ignores endogeneity, and the Pooled- 
OLS estimator which ignores both endogeneity and country heterogeneity 
problems. Because the system GMM estimator accounts for both problems 
of endogeneity and heterogeneity simultaneously, we have adopted the model 
as our preferred estimator in this research.
While the level GMM estimation shows a negative convergence coefficient 
of around 2%, the system GMM shows a coefficient of around 1%- which 
significantly contradicts a convergence speed of 10% reported in Caselii et 
al.,(1996) using a level GMM estimation. They justify their high rate of 
convergence by arguing that most economies are very near to their steady 
state equilibrium, and that the differences in per capita income levels across 
countries are only explained by differences in their steady state values. Our 
result is in line with Loayza and Soto (2002) and El-badawi (2006), which 
show a convergence speed of less than 1% suggesting that the number of years 
required to half the income difference between two growing economies solely 
due to convergence effect is indeed longer than predicted in previous studies, 
including Barro and Sala-i-Martins (2004), and Mankiw et al., (1992). If we 
simultaneously control for both heterogeneity and endogeneity in a growth 
regression, the convergence speed is significantly reduced suggesting that the
30 Arellano (2003) shows that the system-IV GMM estimator can still generate consistent 
estimated parameters even with a first-order serially correlation.
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parameters reported for initial income in the level-GMM and the fixed effects 
models, which both account for individual heterogeneity may still be biased 
and inconsistent due to model endogeineity.
The cyclical output gap variable has a significant negative coefficient, sug­
gesting that the cyclical reversion effects are indeed present in panel data, 
such that a cyclical boom (recession) at the start of the period will be fol­
lowed by lower (higher) growth rate. The demographic factor shows a signif­
icant positive correlation with growth. This outcome suggests that countries 
that aptly utilized their labor transition advantage have enjoyed positive and 
strong growth. Makdisi, et al.,(2000) found that many Arab countries could 
not take advantage of this window of opportunity such that the labor boom 
era was characterized by severe unemployment, labor unrest and negative 
growth.
Human capital, openness, public infrastructure and institution have shown 
positive correlation with growth in both the level and system GMM estima­
tion. In the system GMM we found that all variables are significantly im­
portant for growth, including openness, compared to the level GMM where 
openness is not significant. In both estimations, institution is an impor­
tant and significant determinant of long-term growth. Inflation, government 
consumption and exchange rate overvaluation are negatively correlated with 
growth, although in the level GMM, government consumption and exchange 
rate overvaluation are not significant. In the system GMM all variables are 
significant with high coefficients and robust p-values suggesting that these 
variables could provide important explanation for the growth experience of 
developing oil-rich economies as suggested in the literature.
We found that in the level-GMM estimation, conflicts, population density
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around the coast and oil resource endowment are particularly not important 
for growth, even though they are negatively correlated with growth as pre­
dicted in the theory. Temperate climate is positively correlated with growth 
in both regression. In the level GMM, the oil dummy, though negatively 
correlated with growth, is not an important determinant of growth (very 
low coefficient), but in the system GMM where it is important for growth, 
the p-value shows that the estimated coefficient is not robust at 1% level 
of significance. This result may suggests that after all, oil endowment may 
not necessarily be an important explanatory factor to why oil-rich developing 
countries experience poor growth as popularly argued in the literature31. The 
period-specific dummies all show negative correlation with growth suggest­
ing that country invariant period specific external shocks are detrimental to 
growth. In both estimations, the Sargan test which test the null hypothesis 
that the instruments are not correlated with the error term suggests that 
the instruments used in the model are valid, while the serial correlation test 
suggests that there is no evidence of either first-order or second-order serial 
correlation in the system-GMM estimation model.
31 We further investigate this outcome in another regression, using a data sample of only- 
developing oil-rich countries to see the results within developing oil-rich economies.
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2.4.3 The Determinants of Growth Using Data Sample of Developing
Oil-Producing Countries
In this section we considered a smaller data sub-sample of only 20 developing 
oil exporting countries. We used only the GMM estimation procedure based 
on the earlier specified moment conditions. Even though the economies con­
sidered have similar unique macroeconomic characteristics, we still control 
for individual effects. Since all economies in this data group are oil exporters, 
we used a measure of the ratio of crude oil export to GDP32 instead of oil 
dummy to capture the effect of resource endowment on growth. All other 
variables remained as defined in the previous estimations. We estimate model 
2.9 and 2.11 using system GMM and also report the results for level-GMM 
estimation. The regression resuits are reported in table (2.4) below.
The use of this homogenous data sample in a cross-country growth regression 
is a unique contribution of this research. We are not aware of any study that 
have estimated a dynamic endogenous growth model using an instrumental 
variable estimator for our group of developing oil exporting countries. While 
we agreed that the inclusion of country-specific effect in cross-country growth 
model could control for the omitted variable effects, the policy implications of 
such growth regressions may have limited relevance to certain economies that 
are characterized by less matured institutions, less productive human capital 
endowment and unique environmental externalities. We have investigated, 
in this specification, the significance of the so called growth determinants in 
a cross-country growth regression of developing oil-exporting countries
32 As suggested in Sachs and Warner (1999)
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Table 2.4: Determinants of Growth in Developing Oil-exporting Countries: GMM 
 Approach. ____________________________
Model type: Level IV-GMM System IV-GMM
Variables Coefficient p-values Coefficient p-values
Catch-up effect
Initial Income -0.0011 0,000 -0.0001 0.001
Initial/cyclical output gap -0.3261 0.000 -0.8714 0.000
Demographic gift
EAP/POP (avg. 1960-04) -0.1624 0.000 -0.0671 0.000
Structural and stabilization factors
Secondary school enrollment -0.0152 0.0412 0.0056 0.551
Openness -0,0325 0.012 -0.0012 0,002
Public infrastructure 0.0648 0.000 0.0361 0.001
Inflation -0.0036 0.002 -0.0026 0.000
Institution(ICRG) 0.1572 0.000 0.2364 0.000
Government consumption -0.2471 0.001 -0.1646 0.000
Real exchange rate overvaluation -0.0020 0.543 0.0041 0.712
Conflict, Ecology and Geography
International wars -0.0011 0.6922 -0.0001 0.461
Population density at coast 0.0021 0.6832 0.0001 0,466
Temperate climate 0.0012 0.374 0.0001 0.622
Oil 0.0461 0.001 0.0321 0.005
Time-specific external shocks
1975-79 -0.3252 0.000 -0.2661 0.000
1980-84 -0.2114 0.002 -0.1448 0.001
1985-89 -0.0063 0.001 -0.0041 0.002
1990-94 -0.0622 0.044 -0.0211 0.0364
1995-99 -0.0051 0.022 0.0015 0.001
2000-04 0.0014 0.001 0.0052 0.000
Intercept -0.2331 0.000 -0.2664 0.000
Number of countrie/obsorvation 20/122 20/122
Sargan test 0.044 0.032
Serial correlation test
First-order 0.007 0.004
Second-order 0.003 0.001
Note: Oil is measured as the % ratio of crude oil export to GDP - weighted by country size
The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the instruments
arc not correlated with the residuals.
The null hypothesis of the serial correlation test is that the errors
in the first-difference regressions exhibit no nth-order serial correlation.
The developing oil-exporting countries include: Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Congo Democratic Republic,
Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia , Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria,
Oman, Qatar, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirate, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.
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The regression results using a homogenous data sample of only developing 
oil exporting countries reflect some differences in the outcome and signs of 
the coefficients. The Sargan test statistics show that the instruments used in 
the GMM model are valid since the null hypothesis of 110 correlation between 
the instrument and the error term cannot be rejected - the critical value of 
the test is 5.65 compared to the test statistics of 0.044 and 0.032 for the level 
GMM and system GMM respectively. The null hypothesis that the differ­
enced error term does not exhibit an nth-order serial correlation cannot be 
reject either - given that the test statistics are far below the critical values. 
These statistics suggest that the estimated parameters in the model are un­
biased and consistent.
In the regression results, the speed of convergence is significantly lower in 
both the level and system GMM compared to the previous estimations using 
all countries - suggesting that even though these countries started at a rel­
atively lower income level, they have not grown particularly faster over the 
period as predicted in the conditional convergence theory. This also means 
that initial level of income at the start of the period (1970) has not been an 
important determinant of growth rate in developing oil exporting countries. 
The result shows that the cyclical reversion effect of using panel data plays 
an important role in growth estimation such that the business cycles ‘highs’ 
and ‘lows’ can determine whether an economy will grow faster or slower at 
the next period. The result also shows that ‘demography advantage’ mea­
sured by the ratio of economically active population to total population is 
negatively correlated with growth in the case of developing oil economies sug­
gesting that as the proportion of the active labor force increases, economic 
growth declines. This relationship contradicts the fundamentals of growth 
theory. However some studies have found that because some developing oil 
economies could not absorb the growing labor supply in productive employ­
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ment, such manpower upsurge became societal menace in the forms of in­
crease crime rates, social conflicts and welfare compensations. These factors 
are negatively correlated with growth and that may explain why there is a 
negative relationship between the proportion of economically active popula­
tion and economic growth in developing oil exporting countries compared to 
a strong positive relationship reported in the global growth model estimation.
In terms of structural and policy variables, we found that human capita, 
measured by the level of secondary school enrolment is not an important 
determinant of growth in this sub sample. In the level GMM estimation 
the result shows a negative correlation between human capital and growth. 
Similar result was reported in Barro and Sala-i-Martins (2004) and the ex­
planation in that analysis was that the outcome was due to measurement 
errors in the definition of human capital and its correlation with other demo­
graphic factors such as fertility and population growth. We also suspect that 
the relationship may be due to the functionality of the education system in 
these countries and how it contributes to the productivity of labor. These 
economies are particularly state-driving with very little contribution from 
the private or real sectors - such that the state is the main employer of labor 
(tagged ‘state burden’). Robinson et al., (2006) have shown that the public 
sector is by design generally inefficient and unproductive33.
The result shows that openness is negatively correlated with growth in de­
veloping oil-rich countries suggesting that trade liberalization may not nec­
essarily be good for growth for these economies - as suggested in Makdisi 
et al, (2000). While in the general sample data regression we found that
33 We showed in chapter 4, how the public sector is a major channel through which 
political leaders share resources to buy the electorates patronage and guarantee their 
probability of remaining in power and controlling economic resources.
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openness is positively correlated with growth as predicted in the theory and 
as shown in Sachs and Warner (1997), using a data sample of only developing 
oil exporting countries, we found that openness is negatively correlated with 
growth in developing oil-exporting countries. Studies have shown that trade 
liberalization has deterred the emergence of viable domestic industries and 
weakened local production in developing countries. The non-competitiveness 
of the economies of developing countries compared to their trading partners 
(developed economies) and the heavy dependence on revenue from oil export 
as against non-oil export goods have eroded the anticipated benefits of trade 
openness to these economies. The openness has further facilitated the vulner­
ability of these economies to global crises and deteriorating macroeconomic 
imbalance. These factors may explain the negative correlation between open­
ness and growth in oil-rich developing countries.
The result shows that public infrastructure is positively correlated with 
growth and institution positively correlated with growth. Inflation, gov­
ernment consumption and real exchange rate overvaluation are negatively 
correlated with growth. However, we found that real exchange rate over val­
uation is not a significant determinant of growth given the coefficient and the 
associated p-value. The exchange rate mis-alignment factor is emphasized in 
the Dutch-disease hypothesis to account for why resources and factor of pro­
duction are relocated from the tradeable sector to the non-tradeable sector 
there by leading to poor long-run growth. The result shown here suggests 
that this is not a valid explanation of the growth dilemma of oil economies, 
given that exchange rate factor is actually not an important determinant of 
growth in these economies. It has been argued in recent studies34, that the 
Dutch-disease syndrome does not effectively explain the poor growth perfor­
mance of oil exporting countries as predicted.
34 See Eifert et al., (2003) and Rodrik,(2006).
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Government expenditure and inflation rates are strongly and negatively cor­
related with growth in this model compared to the general model. We have 
seen very strong point estimates suggesting that these variables are more im­
portant to growth in this specific model than predicted in the general model. 
Particularly, the result shows that government consumption is strongly detri­
mental to growth even more than inflation suggesting that government spend­
ing habits accounts to a great extent why oil rich countries have experienced 
poor and volatile growth over the period. The point estimates for inflation 
in both the level GMM and system GMM estimations are not particularly 
strong, indicating the weak financial deepening or shallow monetary sectors 
that characterized these economies. Makdisi, et al.,(2000), show that mon­
etary policy instruments are not efficient policy tools in controlling macroe­
conomic stability in Arab oil-economies.
Wars, population density at the coast and temperate climate have shown 
weak correlation with growth in the result, suggesting that these variables 
do not significantly account for the growth performance of oil-rich economies. 
However oil endowment is positively and significantly correlated with growth. 
This is quite an important outcome, given that it contradicts our earlier re­
sults and negates any existing growth regression results we know. Even 
though the results using a global data sample show that oil dummy is not 
particularly significant in growth determination it maintained a negative cor­
relation between growth and resource endowment. Our result has shown that 
using data sample of only oil exporting countries, resource abundance could 
be advantageous for growth as against been a ‘curse’ as predicted in a regres­
sion model containing many countries of which some are oil exporter while 
others are not, and of which some are developing or poor while other are 
developed and super rich. The implication of this result is that the pooling
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of heterogenous groups in a growth regression in order to identify universal 
growth determinants that are common to all countries irrespective of their 
heterogeneity is fundamentally misleading.
Therefore, because there is a negative correlation between resource abun­
dance and economic growth in a growth regression model, does not preclude 
that oil abundance accounts for why oil rich countries have grown slowly. 
There is a need to be cautious in generalizing the outcome of a standard 
growth regression given the empirical irregularities associated with individ­
ual heterogeneity and the interdependence of the explanatory variable. Ar­
guably, resource abundance or oil endowment may not be bad for growth, 
however it could be strongly correlated with other factors that are bad for 
growth. In chapter three we further investigate the fact that, since oil may 
not be necessarily bad for growth, whether oil price shocks or government 
expenditures shocks accounts for why oil rich economies have persistently 
experienced poor growth over the years.
All growth regressions, within the framework of the estimation of an endoge­
nous growth model, are sensitive to the combination of variables in the model 
- such that there are no consistently significant determinants of growth. This 
fundamental problem has received extensive attention in the growth litera­
ture. Learner (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) provided a robustness 
criteria to test whether a particular growth determinant is important regard­
less of the model specification methods. We followed the modification of the 
rather strict variant of the sensitivity test using the extreme bound analysis 
proposed in Learner (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) to adopt the Sala- 
i-Martin, (1997) variant to test the robustness of the growth determinants in 
our regressions.
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2.5 R obustness Test: E x trem e  B ound  A na lysis
In order to further ascertain the true determinants of growth and to buttress 
our regression results, we subjected the growth estimations to a sensitivity 
analysis. The purpose of this analysis is to test the robustness of the determi­
nants of growth across the various specifications we have followed. We used a 
least-squared based Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) as proposed in Learner, 
(1983) and developed by Levine et al., (1992) and Sala-i-Martin, (1997). In 
(Learner, 1983), a growth determinant is robust if its statistical significance 
in the growth regression is not conditional on the choice of information set 
- for example on whether other variables are added to or excluded from the 
regression model. A robust variable must be significant in the bivariate re­
gression and remains significant upon inclusion of various combinations of 
additional variables. The general EBA framework follow the specification:
Y  = P J  +  ft nM + pzZ + y  (2.16)
where Y  is GDP growth rate, I  is a vector of growth determinants that are 
common to all growth regressions, M  is the growth determinant we want 
to test for robustness and Z  is a vector of control variables included in the 
model. As Pm, and Pz are parameters to be estimated.
We examine the sensitivity of the coefficient An °n the various combinations 
of Z. For each M -variable we run a basic bivariate regression without includ­
ing any Z-variables. We add from one of three of the ^-variables in every 
possible combination into the equation and compute the ‘extreme bounds’ of 
An from the estimated An- The upper extreme bound is the highest (maxi­
mum) estimated coefficient of An plus 2 times its standard error
/□max I o ^ f
Pm  + 2(7 (Pm )
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and the lower extreme bound is the lowest (minimum) estimated coefficient 
of Pm minus 2 times its standard error
/ ? r  -  M P T )
An M-variable is considered as a robust growth determinant if all estimated 
Pm are statistically significant and the extreme bounds are of the same sign.
Using the above extreme bounds test, we could not find any variable that 
is able to meet this criteria of robustness in our model in both the general 
and specific data sample regressions. Sala-i-Martins (1997) suggested a more 
realistic variant of the EBA test which employs the entire distribution of 
the estimated Pm using the fraction of the cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) lying on each side of zero. The larger of the two areas will be called 
(CDF(0)’ regardless of whether the area is above zero or below zero. Hence 
CDF(O) will always be a number between 0.50 and 1. Because the exact form 
of the cumulative distribution is unknown, he constructed the CDF based on 
either the normal distribution and non-normal distribution, or weighted and 
non-weighted assumptions. In the construction, if at least 95% of the density 
function for pm lies on either side of zero, then there is strong likelihood that 
Pm  is robust. We adopted the variant with non-weighted normal CDF and we 
regard a variable as robust if it passes the initial EBA test or if its CDF(O) is 
< 99% and the estimated pm are significant in at least 95% of the regressions.
We estimate equation 2.16 and allow each model to have at least 7 vari­
ables in each model. The I- variables, which are fixed for all specifications 
include: Initial Income, Population(EAP-POP) and Human Capital. We test 
each of the 13 variables included in the growth regressions we have estimated. 
Each of these variables is considered as our variable of interest (M-variable) 
and combined with the 3 fixed /-variables, with a set of 3 /-variables chosen
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from the pool of the remaining (13-3-1 = 9) 9 variables. We first estimate the 
baseline regression which contains a combination of the 3 fixed /-variables 
and 1 M -variable as explanatory variables while GDP per capita growth rate 
remains the dependent variable in all regressions. In order to compute the 
maximum and minimum extreme bounds, we regress various combinations of 
the set of Z-variables to the baseline model. We multiply 2 by the standard 
error of the highest (3m coefficient and add it to the coefficient to obtain the 
upper (maximum) extreme bound. The lower (minimum) extreme bound 
is obtained by multiplying 2 to the standard error of the lowest (3m coeffi­
cient and subtracting it from the coefficient. We combine the group of 17 
^-variables in sets of 3 variables with each M-variable and the 3 /-variables 
to estimate a total of M = models in this analysis. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 
report the sensitivity results for growth regression using a data sample of all 
100 countries, while tables 2.7 and 2.8 show the sensitivity test result using 
a data sample of 20 developing oil exporting countries.
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Table 2.5: Robustness Test of Determinants of Growth: Extreme Bound Analysis
M-variablo
(1) (2)
Am
(3)
Standard
Error
(4)
Extremo
Bounds
(5)
%
of Significance 
(6)
CDF(0)
(7)
Robustness/
Fragile
(8)
Initial Income Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.043
-0.014
-0.026
3.056
2.239
2.824
4.464
-5.674
97.63 .100 Robust
Output Gap Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.126
-0.046
-0.198
2.347
2.672
2.110
5.298
-4.418
76.24 .8872 Fragile
Demography (EAP/POP) Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
0.065
0.524
0.026
3.442 
2.675
2.442
5.874
-4.859
78.87 .8691 Fragile
Human Capital Basoline
Maximum
Minimum
0.661
1.224
0.173
1.789
1.447
2.523
4.118
-4.873
80.11 .9121 Fragile
Openness Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
0.32G
0.781
0.057
3.116
2.871
2.446
6.523
-4.835
70.23 .8620 Fragile
Public Infrastructure Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
0.067
0.204
0.007
1.897
1.884
2.664
3.972
-5.321
23.44 .9026 Fragile
Inflation Basclino
Maximum
Minimum
-0.061
-0.024
-0.076
3.481
3.261
2.886
G.546
-5.848
87.66 .9079 Fragile
Institution Basoline
Maximum
Minimum
0.074
0.128
0.023
2.881
2.211
2.863
4.550
-5.703
98.62 .9988 Robust
Government Consumption Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.072
-0.022
-0.110
2.472
2.749
3.462
5.476
6.814
80.44 .9162 Fragile
Real Exchange rate O/V Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.008
-0.026
-0.035
1.872
2.114
2.348
4.202
-4.731
98.75 .9995 Robust
Dependant variable is growth rate of per capita GDP.
The baseline /3m is the estimated coefficient from tlio regression with the M-variables and the I-variable only (without any Z-variable)
The Robust/ Fragile designation indicates whether the variable of interest is robust or fragile
The % of significance indicates whether the estimated /3m is significant in at least 95 % of the regressions
CDF(O) follow Sala-i-Martin (1997) calculations - with non-weighted normal distribution assumption
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Table 2.6: Robustness Test of Determinants of Growth: EBA (Cont.)
M-variablo
(1) (2)
0m
(3)
Standard
Error
(4)
Extreme
Bounds
(5)
%
of Significance 
(6)
CDF(0)
(7)
Robustness/ 
Fragile 
. (8)
Intl. War Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.003
-0.001
-0.012
2.664
2.872
3.114
5.743
-6.240
10.38 .8466 Fragile
Coastal Pop. density Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
0.016
0.062
0.004
4.225
3.447
2.886
6.956
-5.768
44.63 .8941 Fragile
Temperate Climate Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
0.056
0.164
0.024
4.416
3.427
3.208
7.018
-6.440
71.88 .8676 fragile
Oil Dummy Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.165
-0.114
-0.186
3.611
3.862
3.276
7.610
-6.738
16.78 .8961 Fragile
Trade terms Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
0.007
0.016
0.002
0.345
0.274
0.117
0.564
-0.232
12.90 .9072 Fragile
Time Dummy(75-79) Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.032
-0.014
-0.046
0.118
0.151
0.096
0.288
-0.238
60.87 .7963 Fragile
Time Dummy(80-84) Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.012
-0.006
-0.021
0.765
0.221
0.187
0.436
-0.399
78.80 .9096 Fragile
Time Dummy(85-89) Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.064
-0.023
-0.046
0.087
0,091
0.096
0.159
-0.238
78.23 .9572 Fragile
Time Dummy{90-94) Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.064
-0.036
-0.086
0.076
0.089
0.049
0.142
-0.184
77.23 .9616 Fragile
Time Dummy(95-99) Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.006
-0.003
-0.010
0.093
0.071
0.077
0.139
-0.164
47.64 .8352 Fragile
Time Dummy(00-04) Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.021
-0.012
-0.038
0.063
0.055
0.064
0.098
-0.166
55.87 .9244 Fragile
Depondent variable is growth rate of per capita GDP.
Tho baseline 0m is the estimated coefficient from the regression with the M-variables and tho I-variablc only (without any Z-variable)
The Robust/ Fragile designation indicates whether the variable of interest is robust or fragile
The % of significance indicates whether tho estimated <0m is significant in at least 95 % of the regressions
CDF(O) follow Sala-i-Martin (1997) calculations - with non-weighted normal distribution assumption
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Table 2.7: Oil Economies Sub-Sample - Robustness Test of Determinants of 
________ Growth: Extreme Bound Analysis_____________________________
M-variable
0) (2)
Pm
(3)
Standard
Error
(4)
Extreme
Bounds
(5)
%
of Significance 
(6)
CDF(0)
(7)
Robustness/
Fragile
(8)
Initial Income Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
- 0.003 
-0.001 
-0.00G
1.887
1.022
0.987
2.043
-1.980
33.48 .9165 Fragile
Output Gap Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.042
-0.031
-0.067
1.662
1.224
1.064
2.417
-2.195
80.24 .9172 Fragile
Demography (BAP/POP) Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.144
-0.057
-0.264
2.534
2.718
3.602
5.379
-7.468
86.77 .9034 Fragile
Human Capital Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
0.048
0.974
0.021
0.886
1.002
0.996
2.978
-1.971
90.23 .9378 Fragile
Openness Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.018
-0.011
-0.042
1.066
1.462
1.302
2.913
-2.646
91.44 .9512 Fragile
Public Infrastructure Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
0.228
0.437
0.116
0.679
0.960
0.734
2.357
-1.352
96.88 .9721 Fragile
Inflation Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.172
-0.131
-0.197
1.076
1.311
1.422
2.491
-3.041
96.72 .9781 Fragile
Institution Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
0.2G8
0.418
0.211
1.022
1.447
0.486
3.312
-0.7G1
99.96 .9998 Robust
Government Consumption Basolinu
Maximum
Minimum
-0.187
-0.072
-0.226
0.327
0.887
0.427
1.702
1.080
95.67 .9299 fragile
Real Exchange rate O/V Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.024
-0.005
-0.042
1.331
0.864
1,003
1.723
-2.048
98.99 .9999 Robust
Dependent variable is growth rate of por capita GDP.
The Robust/ Fragile designation indicates whether the variable of interest is robust or fragile
The baseline 0m is the estimated coefficient from the regression with the M-variables and the I-variable only (without any Z-variable) 
The % of significance indicates whether the estimated 0m is significant in at least 95 % of the regressions 
CDF(O) follow Sala-i-Martin (19D7) calculations - with non-wcighted normal distribution assumption
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Table 2.8: Oil Economies Sub-Sample - Robustness Test of Determinants of 
Growth: EBA (Cont.)
M-variable
0) (2)
Am
(3)
Standard
Error
(4)
Extreme
Bounds
(5)
%
of Significance
(G)
CDF(O)
(7)
Robustness / 
Fragile 
(8)
Intl. War Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.010
-0.012
-0.031
1.442
1.326
1.075
2.872
-2.181
94.44 .9374 Fragile
Coastal Pop. density Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
0.014
0.048
0.011
2.364
1.011
1.0G7
2.070
-2.123
96.48 .9732 Fragile
Temperate Climate Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
0.026
0.063
0.016
2.114
1.884
1.643
3.831
-3.270
90.64 .9185 fragile
Oil Dummy Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
0.224
0.362
0.032
1.314
1.287
2,331
2.936
-4.630
98.67 .100 Robust
Trade terms Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
0.024
0.034
0.014
0.874
0.776
0.846
1.586
-1.678
95.86 .9633 Fragile
Time Dummy(75-79) Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.047
-0.022
-0.053
2.385
2.237
2.874
4.452
-5.801
93.54 .9733 Fragile
Time Dummy(80-84) Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.039
-0.024
-0.064
2.227
2.486
2.114
4.948
-4.292
96.77 .9996 Robust
Time Dummy(85-89) Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.036
-0.021
-0.053
1.874
2.032
2.430
4.043
-4.913
96.47 .9662 Fragile
Time Dummy(90-94) Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.044
-0.029
-0.063
2.178
2.745
2.374
5.461
-4.811
96.49 .9439 Fragile
Time Dummy(95-99) Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.014
-0.010
-0.018
2.336
1.841
2.138
3.672
-4.294
92.74 .9680 Fragile
Time Dummy(00-04) Baseline
Maximum
Minimum
-0.018
-0.014
-0.021
2.271
2.630
2.338
5.246
-4.697
89,87 ,9182 Fragile
Dependent variable is growth rate of per capita GDP.
The baseline Am >s the estimated coefficient from the regression with the M-variables and the I-variable only (without any Z-variable)
The Robust/ Fragile designation indicates whether the variable of interest is robust or fragile
The % of significance indicates whether the estimated Am is significant in at least 95 % of the regressions
CDF(O) fallow Sala-i-Martin (1997) calculations - with non-weighted normal distribution assumption
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2.5.1 EBA: Interpretation of Results
We have used two robustness criteria in the sensitivity test: The Learner 
(1983) criterion and Sala-i-Martin (1997) criterion. In the Learner (1983) 
variant, the variable of interest (M) is robust if the lower and upper extreme 
bounds are of the same sign. Using the Learner approach, the results in 
tables 2.6 and 2.7 show that all the M-variables failed the robustness test 
except government expenditure. Column (5) in both tables show that, in all 
cases, the lower extreme bound is negatively signed while the upper extreme 
bound is positively signed except for government expenditure which has pos­
itive signs for both the lower and upper extreme bounds. Learner (1983) 
found that all growth determinants common to most growth regressions are 
fragile. Renelt and Levine (1992) also found that all variables considered in 
their analysis are fragile to small changes in the conditioning information set 
except for a robust correlation between growth and the share of investment 
in GDP. In our result, variables such as initial income, human capital, in­
flation, institution and oil dummy failed the robustness test suggesting that 
these variables are only significant determinants of growth if they are condi­
tioned on selected control and environmental variables.
Using the test criteria suggested in Sala-i-Martin (1997), we found that more 
variables are robust at both 99% CDF(O) and 95% level of significance. Col­
umn (7) in tables 2.6 and 2.7 show the normal un-weighted cumulative dis­
tribution function of the estimated j3m coefficient for all M-variables. If we 
use 99% CDF(O) we find that initial income and real exchange rate over­
valuation and institution are robust, even though the variables failed the 
Learner’s EBA robustness test. If we use 95% CDF(O) we find that period 
specific shocks (1985-89 and 1990-94) are robust, however they are not sig­
nificant in atleast 95% of the regressions- which is the second condition- and 
therefore failed the robustness test.
2. The Determinants o f Economic Growth: A  Survey and Application 71
Considering the sub-sample of developing oil exporting countries and ap­
plying the Learner’s EBA test, we find in tables 2.8 and 2.9 (column 5) that 
only government expenditure was robust and all other variables failed the 
robustness test - because their upper and lower extreme bounds are differ­
ently signed. However using the Sala-i-Martin CDF(O) test at 99% CDF 
(0) and 95% level of significance, we find in column (7) that institution, oil, 
exchange rate over-valuation and external shock (1980-84) are robust. We 
also find that the oil variable is robust and positively correlated with growth. 
This finding corroborates our main argument in the thesis that for the oil 
exporting countries oil has actually helped positive growth rather than deter­
ring growth as suggested in the literature. If we used a 95% CDF(O), we find 
that public infrastructure, inflation, population density at the coast, terms 
of trade and the period-specific shock (1985-89) are robust.
The robustness test has helped substantiate our result in the cross-country 
growth regression where we found that using a global data sample, the oil 
dummy is not a significant determinant of growth and hence the negative 
correlation coefficient has not helped explain why developing oil exporting 
countries have grown slowly. The sensitivity test also suggests the effect of 
heterogeneity or country specific factors in the global data sample, such that 
almost all the variables in that regression are fragile to alterations in the 
conditioning information set. However for the oil-economies data sample the 
robustness test shows that many of the growth determinants considered in 
that model are robust.
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2.6 S u m m a ry  and Conclusions
In this chapter we have looked at issues relating to the estimation of cross­
country growth regression models and the validity of the intuitions that follow 
from the generated results. We are particularly interested in whether the out­
comes of growth regressions relating to the important determinants of long­
term economic growth sufficiently explains why resource rich oil economies 
have experienced poor and volatile growth as suggested in the literature. 
We developed a link between the theoretical foundations of economic growth 
and the procedures of growth econometrics. These procedures have become 
the convention in the literature for explaining why countries have grown dif­
ferently a.nd what factors have accounted for the differentials. Using this 
framework, many studies have investigated why developing countries, par­
ticularly those with abundant natural resources such as oil, have not grown 
appreciably and what factors have accounted for such developments. Recent 
studies have questioned the robustness of the underlining assumptions asso­
ciated with these growth estimators and the implications of such robustness 
on the degree of consistency of the estimated parameters. Our contribution 
to the literature in this research is related to the robustness of cross-country 
growth regression parameters.
We linked the estimated results of previous growth regressions to their model 
specification and estimation methodologies and the associated empirical weak­
nesses of such procedures and methodologies. We particularly emphasize the 
flaws in pooling together an heterogenous sample of countries in a cross coun­
try growth regression without controlling for the effects of such heterogenous 
intercepts in the general outcomes of the regression results. Using a panel 
data approach, we identified four variants of panel estimation procedures of 
cross-country growth model in line with existing literature. Compared to any
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existing study known to us, we have used a larger and updated data sample 
of 100 countries and 21 variables from the period 1960 to 2004. In addi­
tion to the well known and theoretically supported growth determinants in 
Levine et al,,(1992) and Barro, (2002), we have adopted other inter-temporal 
growth correlates in Loayza et al., (2002) and El-badawi, (2006). The four 
sequential methodologies adopted include: the pooled ordinary least squares 
estimator which ignore both individual effects and regressors endogeneity; the 
fixed effects estimator which controls for individual effects but ignores endo­
geneity; the level generalized method of moments estimator which controls 
for measurement errors and endogeneity but ignores unobservable individ­
ual effects; and the system generalized method of moments estimator which 
simultaneously controls for country-specific effects, measurement error and 
endogeneity. Each of these methods has been popularized in the literature 
following advancements in growth econometrics and growth theories. An im­
portant innovation in this research is the estimation of cross-country growth 
regression using an homogenous data sample of developing oil rich countries 
in order to explain the factors that are important for growth in these specific 
economies as compared to the standard growth regression of heterogenous 
group of countries.
Adopting the pooled-OLS estimation method, we found that the abundance 
natural resource, such as oil, is negatively correlated with long-term growth. 
However, we show that this estimator is biased and inconsistent in parame­
ters. If we control for the unobservable country-specific heterogeneity (which 
is not accounted for in the method) by using a fixed effect estimation, we 
found that the natural resource variable is not a significant determinant of 
long-term growth even though it is negatively correlated with growth. The 
result contradicts the argument that the negative correlation between oil and 
growth is an important factor in explaining why oil economies are poor, given
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that other factors such as inflation, government consumption, exchange rate 
overvaluation have recorded stronger negative correlation with growth in the 
fixed effects model. The empirical shortcoming of the fixed effects model is 
that even though it corrects for differences amongst countries, the model does 
not guarantee that such individual effects would not be correlated with the 
disturbance term of the model leading to serial correlation. The fixed effects 
model also does not control for the effects of the correlation between the 
dependent variable (GDP per capita growth) and the explanatory variables, 
and the autocorrelation amongst the explanatory variables included in the 
model. These endogeneity and serial correlation problems may substantially 
bias the estimated parameters of the fixed effects model such that the applied 
intuitions following from the estimated coefficient may be inconsistent and 
misleading .
In controlling for model endogeneity, we followed the generalized method of 
moment approach by using instrumental variables that are correlated with 
the regressors but not correlated with the lagged initial output and the model 
residuals. This instrumentation process which involves using the first differ­
ence forms of the regressors as valid instruments for the regressors guarantees 
the weak exogeneity of the regressors and the relative consistency of the es­
timated parameters. The system GMM estimation combines the regression 
equation of the form in the level GMM which controls for fixed effects and 
the first difference instrumental version which accounts for endogeneity. The 
results of the GMM estimation shows further that in a cross-country growth 
regression, oil endowment is not a significant determinant of growth. The 
results also show that other factors such as human capital, public infrastruc­
ture and quality of institutions are positively correlated with growth, while 
inflation, government consumption and exchange rate over-valuation are neg­
atively correlated with growth.
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However, adopting the GMM approach in a sub-sample data of develop­
ing oil exporting countries, we found that the oil endowment - measured as 
the ratio of crude oil export to GDP - is positively correlated with growth 
and significantly so, suggesting that the resource endowment may have facil­
itated growth in these economies. We found that trade openness is negative 
for growth in developing oil-rich countries while human capital measured in 
terms of secondary school enrolment is actually not an important determinant 
of growth. Public infrastructure and institutions are strongly and positively 
correlated with growth, while government consumption assumes a stronger 
negative correlation with growth. Demographic advantage shows a negative 
correlation with growth contrary to the results in Elbadawi (2006). Other 
inter-temporal factors such as temperate climate, navigable coastal area and 
international wars have shown no significant correlation with growth. We also 
observed that real exchange rate over-valuation, which is argued in the Dutch 
disease hypothesis to be the channel through which resource abundance im­
pact negatively on growth, is negatively but insignificantly correlated with 
growth in the model. Bjornland (1998) have found that the Dutch disease 
hypothesis does not hold in the case of United Kingdom and Norway because 
the oil boom contributed positively to the growth of the manufacturing sec­
tor.
This chapter shows that the argument that developing oil rich countries 
continue to experience poor and slow growth because there exist a negative 
correlation between oil endowment and growth is by no means conclusive nei­
ther does it provide a comprehensive intuition to the poor growth episode of 
these countries. Because we have found that oil endowment is positively cor­
related with growth. Given the attended empirical problems associated with 
the appropriate specification and estimations of growth models, we conduct
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a sensitivity test of the growth model to various combinations of growth de­
terminants using the extreme bound analysis methods. We found that while 
many of the variables failed the robustness test, quality of institution and 
real exchange rate over valuation, remained significant.
In this chapter, we have learnt that, while results of growth regressions have 
vary significantly amongst the various modelling approach, the instrumental- 
variable GMM estimation approach provides more consistent and unbiased 
parameters of long-run growth determinants. We found that, regardless of 
the data set used or the model specification adopted, initial income, institu­
tion and real exchange rate over-valuation are robust determinants of long- 
run growth differentials amongst countries. Therefore, contrary to the radical 
conclusion in recent studies 35 that we do not gain anything from growth re­
gressions where we regress policy variables on GDP per capita growth rate, 
we show that we can identify robust and consistent determinants of long­
term growth within the framework of a dynamic endogenous growth model 
using appropriate moment conditions. These findings enable us to suggest 
reliable policy recommendations from a cross-country growth regressions and 
appropriately explain why oil-rich countries have experienced poor or slow 
growth.
In the next chapter, we explore further why oil rich countries experience poor 
growth by analyzing the implications of oil shocks and government expen­
ditures shocks on growth. We investigate the causality between oil revenue 
shocks and government consumption and the impact of oil price shocks on 
the determinants of growth. We hope to identify the mechanism or channel 
through which the oil factor can contribute to poor growth or be associated 
with the poor growth performance.
35 See for example Rodrik (2004)
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2.7 A p p e n d ix  to C hapter 2
2.7.1 Appendix 1: Definitions and Sources of Variables
Table 2.9: Definitions and Sources of Variables
Variables Definitions Sources
GDP Growth Log difference of per capita GDP (1995 USSPPP) WDI(2006), Heston et al., 2006
EAP/POP (1965 - 2004) Average growth of the ratio of economically 
active population (16 -65) over total population WDI(200G), Authors’ Calculations
Initial GDP gap Difference between log of actual GDP and 
of potential GDP around the start of the 
period - using Baxter-King Filter decomposition Authors’ Calculations
Gross secondary school 
enrollment
Ratio of total secondary school 
regardless of age, to the population of 
the age group that officially 
corresponds to that level of education WDI{2006)
Government Consumption Ratio of government consumption to GDP WDI(2006)
Openness The volume of trade over GDP adjusted for 
the size of the country (area and population), 
for whether it is an oil exporter, and for the 
percentage of the country’s population 
living within 100km of the coast WDI(2006), and Authors’ calculations
Institution(ICRG) First principal components of four indicators: 
prevalence of rule of law, quality of bureaucracy, 
absence of corruption, transparency and accountability PRSG, Polity IV, 1800 - 2005
Infrastructure Ratio of percentage of tarred road network(in km) 
total km of interstate road network WDI(2006)
Inflation Consumer Price Indcx(CPI)-Annual percentage 
change in the cost to the average consumer WDI(2006)
Cyclical volatility of GDP Standard deviation of Output gap for the period Authors’ calculations
Real Exchange rate 
Overvaluation
Real effective exchange rate, with the
level adjusted such that the average for 1980 - 2000 equals 
Dollar’s index of overvaluation - based on the ratio of actual to 
income-adjusted Heston et al PPP comparison WDI(2006), Dollar et al.,(1986)
Population density at Coast Population density around 
100km of the coast Geographic Information System(2004)
Temperate Climate percentage of country land in temperate climate Geographic Information System
Resource Abundance (Oil) Takes a value of 1 for countries that are
net oil exporters or OPEC member, and 0 otherwise OPEC (2006)
Terms of Trade Shocks Standard deviation of the first 
log-difference of the terms of trade multiply 
by average share of total trade, over GDP WDI (2006),Authors’ calculations
War/Conflict Years of International wars fought by 
a country multiply by war intensity 
War intensity varies from l(low) to 3(high) War and Arms conflict database(2004)
Period-specific shift Time Dummy variable Authors’ calculation
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Table 2.10: List of CountriesCountry Country Country Country
Algeria Haiti Nicaragua Zambia
Angola Honduras Nigeria Zimbabwe
Argentina Iceland Norway Bahrain
Australia India Pakistan Oman
Austria Indonesia Panama Saudi Arabia
Bangladesh Iran Paraguay United Arab Emirate
Belgium Qatar Peru Botswana
Bolivia Ireland Philippines South Korea
Brazil Israel Portugal Hong Kong
Cameroon Italy Rwanda Djibouti
Canada Jamaica Senegal
Chile Japan Sierra Leone
China Jordan Singapore
Colombia Kenya South Africa
Costa Rica Korea Spain
Cote d'Ivoire Kuwait Sri Lanka
Cyprus Libya Sudan
Denmark Luxembourg Sweden
Dominican Rep. Madagascar Switzerland
Ecuador Malawi Tanzania
Egypt Malaysia Thailand
El Salvador Mali Trinidad and Tobago
Ethiopia Malta Tunisia
Finland Mauritius Turkey
France Mexico Uganda
Germany Morocco United Kingdom
Ghana Mozambique United States
Greece Myanmar Uruguay
Guatemala Netherlands Venezuela
Guyana New Zealand Zaire
2.7.2 Appendix 2: List of countries used in the ‘general ’ growth regressions
3 .  O I L  S H O C K S  A N D  E C O N O M I C  G R O W T H :  A  V E C T O R  
A U T O R E G R E S S I V E  A P P R O A C H
3.1 In troduction
The fact that developing oil rich countries have experienced poor and volatile 
growth over the past decades is not in doubt. However, contrary to the 
general conclusions in the literature, we have found that oil is positively 
correlated with growth, particularly for the oil-exporting countries. There­
fore oil endowment could not have directly accounted for the poor growth 
performance of the developing oil exporting countries. The question now is 
what factors could be associated with oil endowment that may have indi­
rectly accounted for the poor growth trend peculiar to the oil-rich countries. 
Some analysis of the Dutch-Disease hypothesis have argued that the shock of 
unanticipated resource boom in terms of unexpected revenue windfall from 
oil exports could account for the poor and volatile growth performance of the 
oil exporting countries. Others have argued that the uncontrolled and inef­
ficient spending of the accrued revenue by the government have negatively 
impacted on other macroeconomic factors which have resulted in poor and 
volatile growth. In this chapter we investigate the impact of oil revenue and 
government expenditure shocks on economic growth in developing oil export­
ing countries. The chapter addresses our research question on whether it is 
oil revenue shock that causes growth decline or it is the associated govern­
ment expenditure shock that may account for the growth decline.
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The approach we adopt in this chapter is particularly important given that 
we have found in chapter two that both government expenditure and external 
shocks are negatively correlated with growth, although we could not distin­
guish these effects from the effects of other growth determinants in a cross 
country growth regression. This chapter, even though following-up on the 
findings of chapter two, narrows down the scope of our analysis from observ­
ing the relationships between several macroeconomic factors with growth, 
to observing the channels through which oil related shocks affect growth 
on an individual country analysis. Using a time series data of individual 
oil-exporting countries, we will be able to see how oil revenue shocks have 
effected developing oil exporting countries and whether there are common 
trends amongst the countries that will suggest a country-invariant effect of 
why developing oil exporting countries have experienced poor and volatile 
growth. In order to investigate the impact of government expenditure shocks 
on growth, we first establish whether there is a causality between oil revenue 
and government expenditure, and the investigate how such link are impacted 
negatively on growth in oil exporting countries.
The chapter is organized as follow: The next section addresses the character­
istics of oil revenue and the associated macroeconomic policy implications for 
developing oil-exporting countries. Section 3 looks at the causality between 
oil revenue and government expenditure while section 4 estimates a structural 
vector autoregressive model of the impacts of oil revenue and government ex­
penditure shocks on economic growth in developing oil exporting countries. 
In section 5 we interpret the impulse response and variance decomposition 
forecast results and section 6 concludes.
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3.2 Oil R evenue and M acroeconom ic Policies
Katz et al., (2004) found that macroeconomic policy coordination in de­
veloping oil economies faces significant challenges arising from the unique 
characteristics of oil revenue. These characteristics include that: 1). oil rev­
enue is more volatile than revenue from other export commodity because of 
international market conditions; 2). oil revenue is a foreign exchange inflow, 
and its use can have large effects on macroeconomic stability and economic 
structure; and 3). oil is an exhaustible resource with finite revenue stream. 
The challenge of macroeconomic policy in the oil economies is to stabilise 
budgetary expenditure and sterilise excess revenue inflows within the frame­
work of sustainable budgetary constraints, in order to provide an enabling 
macroeconomic environment for long-term growth. We discuss below these 
three characteristics and their associated policy challenges for developing 
oil-exporting countries.
3.2.1 Oil Revenue Volatility
Engel et al., (2000) found that oil prices are more volatile than prices of 
other exporting commodities and therefore very difficult to predict. They 
suggested that fiscal policy, in oil economies, have to be able to insulate 
the rest of the economy from the volatility of oil revenue inflows, because 
frequent upward or downward adjustments of fiscal expenditure are costly. 
Barnett et al., (2002) show that volatility in budgetary spending hurts the 
economy through uncertainty about aggregate demand and through costs 
associated with factor reallocation. The ‘boom-bust’ cycles induced by fre­
quent adjustments of budgetary expenditure are not conducive to private 
sector activities. If expenditure becomes entrenched, spending adjustments 
may be lagging and prioritising budgetary cuts may become increasingly dif­
ficult. It is common practice in oil economies that when spending cannot
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be cut sufficiently in adjustment to revenue inflows, governments resort to 
borrowing at exorbitant cost.
Government attempts at moderately stabilizing budgetary expenditure in 
the oil economies have significantly suffered because oil price projections are 
extremely unreliable. In fact, previous studies, for example Hamilton (1996), 
have shown that the profile of oil prices over the past three decades can best 
be described as a random walk process. Given the high uncertainty about 
future oil prices, fiscal policy reforms in the oil economies have attempted to 
provide stabilization reserves in periods of excess revenue for use in future 
period of low oil prices. Another adjustment mechanism adopted in recent 
times is to broaden the revenue base of the economy through diversification 
and procurement of financial assets to hedge against oil price fluctuations.
3.2.2 Oil Revenue and the Foreign Exchange Inflow
The extraction and production of crude oil is such that it is highly capital in­
tensive and employs highly sophisticated technology that are not necessarily 
linked to other sectors of the domestic economy. In most cases, a significant 
volume of the produced oil is exported and the export proceeds are denom­
inated in foreign currency (US dollar) and the government’s share of these 
proceeds are in the form of foreign exchange inflow into the economy. The 
domestic use of the foreign exchange inflow generally leads to an appreciation 
of the real effective exchange rate and a loss of competitiveness in the non-oil 
tradable sectors of the economy1. Fiscal policies designed to keep domestic 
demand stable in the face of fluctuating oil revenues tend to dampen real 
exchange rate appreciation which affects the international competitiveness
1 See Eifert et al., (2003) description of the Dutch-disease effect through exchange rate 
over-valuation
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of the manufacturing (tradables) sector of the economy.
The policy implications are such that if stability of government spending 
and domestic demand can be maintained, the need for supply-side adjust­
ment will diminish correspondingly, and short-to medium term reallocation 
cost will be minimized. Economic principles suggest that fiscal policy should 
be targeted at long-term sustainability, such that assets accumulated during 
the boom period ensures that the foreign exchange inflow compatible with 
current consumption and production pattern continues even during the pe­
riod of low revenue inflow. The need to limit real exchange rate appreciation 
supports the suggestion that governments should initiate investment incen­
tives of acquiring income-yielding foreign assets in boom periods in order to 
sterilise the foreign exchange inflow from oil export in the domestic economy.
3.2.3 Oil Revenue and Resource Depletion
Campbell (2000) has severally argued that convectional crude oil is a nonre­
newable fossil fuel which is depletable2. It constitutes a national wealth that 
can be approximated by the present value of the rent earned in its production 
which is the proceeds from projected future sales net other costs. Applying 
the ‘Ramsey optimality theory’ in the context of the principle of intergen- 
erational equity, it is argued that the wealth from oil should be used in a 
manner that will leave future generations at least as well off as the current 
generation. However, the uncertainty over reserves, future oil prices, returns 
of hedging assets and the social discount rate makes it extremely difficult to 
estimate how much should be saved during the life of the oil reserve.
2 Adelman (1995), argued that mineral oil are inexhaustible and will never be depleted 
- the reserves are constantly been renewed as they are extracted , so how much was in the 
ground at the start and how much will be left at the end are unknown and irrelevant.
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Several studies including Sala-i-Martin, (2003) have argued that rather than 
government to invest oil proceeds in financial assets, they should use such 
proceeds to finance public expenditures that ‘crowd in’ private investment 
and reduce taxes in order to reduce distortions and disincentives. This is 
particularly important in developing countries where there is an urgent need 
to provide public infrastructure and social amenities. Such policy direction 
would support non-oil export and create a larger revenue base in the future. 
While the present generation would use up the oil reserve, it will leave to the 
future generations compensating man-made wealth. The weak absorptive 
capacity which exist in many of the oil economies combined with inefficiency 
public spending would suggest that offshore investments in financial capitals 
would rather be a more prudent strategy. However, one could argue that 
the widespread poverty and poor human development indicators in many 
developing oil economies would suggest that the upgrading of existing public 
infrastructure and increase in provision of public services as a medium to 
improving the quality and productivity of physical and human capital would 
be a more prudent policy initiative.
3.3 The Rela tionship  Betw een Oil R evenue and G overnm ent
E xp en d itu re
In the past three decades, public expenditure in oil producing countries have 
symmetrically followed the increasing trend in net oil export inflows (table 
3.1). However, regardless of the expanding public spending, most of the 
countries still record significant budget surpluses, which in some cases, were 
invested in foreign assets or reserve in dedicated accounts or even ’sterilized’. 
The reserved windfall proceeds were used to sustain government increased 
spending during the periods of oil price falls and dwindling revenue inflows
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Table 3.1: % Changes in Total Government Expenditure and Revenue (1975-2000)
1975-80 1980-86 1986-90 1990-94 1994-96 1996-98 1998-2000
Kuwait: Change in Expenditure 108.6 28.0 -3.7 46.3 4.8 -9.6 0.7
Current - 37.5 19.2 57.4 7.0 -11.7 5.0
Capita) - 38.8 -43.3 -3.0 -10.5 8.3 -29.8
Change in Rovenue 153.9 -31.6 0.2 -23.2 29.7 13.1 31.8
Ratio change in expenditure/revenue 0.7 -0.9 -18.5 -2.0 0.2 -0.7 0.0
Saudi Arabia: Change in Expenditure 223.9 -40.4 47.9 -17.9 15.7 -4.1 23.9
Current - -7.7 90.6 -26.2 16.4 -0.1 21.7
Capital - -70.4 -19.5 -18.0 12.0 -29.0 43.8
Change in Revenue 261.4 -77.0 88.6 -14.7 38.7 -21.0 64.4
Ratio change in expenditure/revenue 0.9 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.4
U.A.E.: Change in Expenditure 788.1 -9.0 49.8 6.3 40.2 -3.2 13.8
Current - 21.8 72.9 -3.1 61.2 -11.9 33.4
Capital - -19.6 -5.6 103.5 -12.6 36.3 -19.7
Change in Revenue 821.5 -59.2 101.7 36.0 18.1 -2.2 54.4
Ratio change in expenditure/revenue 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.2 2.2 1.5 0.3
Nigeria: Change in Expenditure 236.8 -5.3 26.2 -3.7 -34.1 9.4 9.8
Current - 31.6 38.4 6.3 -44.4 -23.1 13.8
Capital - -28.2 -16.5 38.8 -23.9 13.1 -28.4
Change in Revenue 528.2 -32.3 202.5 48.7 38.2 6.4 78.8
Ratio change in expenditure/revenue 0.4 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.9 1.5 0.1
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (2005) and Authors’ calculations.
in order to sustain growth in the real non-oil sectors of the economy. With 
increasing policy reforms and structural transformations, a new government 
spending pattern has begin to emerge among some oil producing countries, 
particularly among the countries in the Middle East oil producing region. In 
the late 90s and the beginning of 2000, public spending remained stable even 
in the face of increasing revenue. After the oil price fall in the 1990s, some oil 
exporting countries cut spending modestly while many of the sub-Saharan 
African countries continued to record huge fiscal deficits and unsustainable 
public spending.
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3.3.1 Some Time Series Plot of Oil Revenue and Government Expenditure
To investigate the relationship between oil revenue and government expen­
diture, we observe whether there is any long-run co-movements between the 
two variables. In this observation, we used a time series data of oil rev­
enue and government expenditure for four randomly selected oil-exporting 
countries which includes - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Nigeria and United Arab 
Emirates and over at least 30 years period for each country. Government ex­
penditure is measured as the log of total real annual government expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP and oil revenue is measured as the log of total real 
value of oil export as percentage of total value of export earning. We plot the 
two series for each country in figures 3.1 to 3.4. and observed that prior to 
the 1990s there is strong co-movement between oil revenue and government 
expenditure but thereafter the countries have moderate spending pattern 
regardless of the movements in oil revenue. An exception to this adjust­
ment trend in government expenditure with regards to increase oil revenue 
is Nigeria where government expenditure has remained more volatile that 
oil revenue and increasing even in periods of declining oil revenue. Kuwait 
has sustain a moderate government expenditure pattern since the mid-1970s 
with huge budget surpluses. However, the kuwaiti government incurred sig­
nificant budget deficits in the 1990s during Iraq invasion war. In general, 
there is no evidence of strong positive correlation between oil revenue and 
government expenditure and therefore no uni-directional causality from oil 
revenue to government expenditure in Kuwait. In the case of Saudi Arabia, 
there is clear indication of positive co-movement between oil revenue and 
government expenditure trend with persistent budget deficits, particularly 
up to the mid-1980s. Since the early 1990s, the Saudi economy has curtailed 
excessive spending and has sustained increasing budget surpluses.
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Figure 3.1: Kuwait: Oil Revenue and Government Expenditure Trend
Kuwait
Oil Revenue  Government Expenditure
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Figure 3.2: Saudi Arabia: Oil Revenue and Government Expenditure Trend
Saudi Arabia
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Oil Revenue  Government Expenditure
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The United Arab Emirate has been the most diversified economy amongst 
the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East. Government expenditure pat­
tern has not followed the continued increases in oil revenue inflows such that 
there is a huge gap between increases in oil revenue and increases in gov­
ernment expenditure. However, in the case of Nigeria, we find indications of 
high volatility in both oil revenue and government expenditure with signifi­
cant variations in the correlation. Since the mid-70s, government expenditure 
have sometimes surpass oil revenue inflows with persistent budget deficits up 
to the early 2000s. While many oil-rich economies have managed to separate 
government expenditure from oil revenue thereby reducing the dependence 
on oil exports, the Nigeria economy has continued to depend oil revenue with 
less diversification towards non-oil export and industrialization.
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Figure 3.3: United Arab Emirate: Oil Revenue and Government Expenditure 
Trend
United Arab Emirate
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Oil Revenue  Government Expenditure
3. Oil Shocks and Economic Growth: A Vector Autoregressive Approach 91
Figure 3.4: Nigeria: Oil Revenue and Government Expenditure Trend
Nigeria
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Oil Revenue —  Government Expenditure
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3.4 T he Im pacts  o f Oil R evenue Shocks on Econom ic Growth: 
A  Vector Autoregressive Approach
Over the past years oil prices have increased sharply, and more importantly, 
with high volatility. The unpredictable nature of the rapid and volatile 
changes in the oil prices generally bring about adverse macroeconomic con­
sequences that affects the entire world economy. These consequences lead 
to a slow down in global output growth, higher inflation rates, deterioration 
in balance of payment and downward pressure on exchange rate, reduced 
non-oil demand and lower investment, and increased interest rates and in­
puts cost. However, the impact of the higher oil prices on any particular 
country depends on several factors, such as: the magnitude of the shock; the 
duration of the shock (persistence); the dependency of the economy on oil 
(energy fuel mix and intensity); the immediate policy response to the shock; 
and the state of the economy before the shock.
In order to address these adverse consequences of oil price volatility, there is 
the need for policy makers to understand the dynamics and magnitude of the 
shocks and the channels through which the effects are transmitted to other 
key sectors of the economy. There are several arguments as to the relation­
ship between oil price shocks and economic performance. While Hamilton
(2003) argued that the asymmetric relationship between oil price shock and 
output growth is dependent on the particular definition of oil price changes, 
Kilan (2005) argues that the results of the relationship between oil price 
shocks and business cycles developments are usually characterised by severe 
statistical errors and attenuation bias. The non-linearity of the effects of oil 
price changes - which shows that an increase in the price of oil have more 
negative impact on growth than a decrease, particularly for the oil-importing 
country, has been argued by Barsky et al., (2002) to account for why policy
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responses to oil price shocks have contributed more to the negative conse­
quences than the shock itself. Bernanke et al., (1997) found that majority of 
the real effects of oil price shocks are not caused directly by the shock but by 
the subsequent tightening of monetary policy. Batini (2004) argued that the 
expansionary monetary policy response that follow the oil shocks in the early 
1970s accounted for the majority of the growth disaster of many developing 
oil-producing countries rather than the oil price collapse.
Much of the research on the the impact of oil has been on the effect of oil price 
shocks on growth and business cycles for the oil importing countries, partic­
ularly the United States. The research on the effects of oil revenue shocks 
on oil-exporting countries have been minimal and mostly of theoretical sim­
ulations or political economy approach. Empirical research on analysing the 
impacts of oil revenue shocks on growth and growth indicators in develop­
ing oil-exporting countries has received little attention until recently. Given 
that we are interested in explaining the poor growth performance developing 
oil-exporting countries, we have focussed our attention on forecasting the 
dynamic effects of oil revenue shocks and government expenditure shocks on 
other determinants of growth. This perspective will enable us identify the 
channels through which these shocks affect growth and how these channels 
could be linked to the historical trend in the development process of the 
developing oil-exporting countries. We have avoided the theoretical and po­
litical economy modeling approach because we want to relate our empirical 
investigations to the real economic situations of the countries we have stud­
ied to find a synergy between the data generation process and the estimated 
statistics. These key objectives informed our choice of a vector autoregressive 
structural model in the analysis of the impacts of oil revenue and government 
expenditure shocks on the economies of developing oil exporting countries.
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3.4.1 Model: A Vector Auto Regressive Estimation
A Vector Autoregression (VAR) model consists of a system of reduced form 
equations relating each endogenous variables to its lagged component and the 
lagged components of all other endogenous variable in the model. Lutkepohl 
(2005) described VAR model as the evolution of a set of endogenous variables 
measured over the same sample period as a linear function of only their past 
evolution, and that a VAR model is a linear approximation of a non-linear 
structural model which could be estimated by ordinary least squares. Econo­
metricians found that the dynamic characteristics of the economy could be 
revealed by the dynamic functional specification of a VAR model. A major 
and unresolve concern with the validity of a VAR prediction is the concern for 
the identification of shocks in a serially correlated model. Even though sev­
eral criticisms follow the underlying assumptions of a VAR estimator, the ap­
proach has been popularly applied to forecast the impacts of oil price shocks 
on the economy. Given the parameter identification concerns, Blanchard et 
al., (1989a) proposed the use economic theory to transform a reduced-form 
VAR model into a system of structural equations where the parameters are 
estimated by imposing contemporaneous structural restrictions. This ap­
proach enable VAR models to generate reliable impulse response functions 
and forecast-error variance decompositions that could show the macroeco­
nomic impacts of oil price shocks to the economy.
In the literature, there are several ways of specifying restrictions on a VAR 
model to achieve identification of the structural parameters. One procedure 
for determining appropriate restrictions to identify a structural VAR model is 
to use the restrictions that are implied from a fully specified macroeconomic 
model. For example, the structural VAR model estimated by Blanchard et 
al., (1989a) used economic theory to incorporate short run restriction and 
Blanchard et al., (1989b) also used economic theory to justify the inclusion
3. Oil Shocks and Economic Growth: A  Vector Autoregressive Approach 95
of long-run restrictions. Faust (1998) used economic theory to justify the in­
clusion of both short-run and long-run restrictions to identify the structural 
parameters of a VAR model. The most common approach is to choose the set 
of variables and identification restrictions that are broadly consistent with the 
preferred theory and prior empirical research. The metric used to evaluate 
the appropriateness of the variables and restrictions is whether the behaviour 
of the dynamic responses of the model is consistent with the preferred the­
oretical view of the expected response. The approach has been described 
as an informal method to applying more formal prior belief to econometric 
modeling. Brischetto et al., (1999) shows that there are still several concerns 
with the identification restrictions that have been applied to structural VAR 
models, such that it affects the robustness of the conclusions of a model to 
alternative reasonable identification restrictions and the difficulty of clearly 
interpreting what aspects of the model arise from restrictions imposed on the 
model and what arise from the data.
We belief that a rather more straightforward identification method in VAR 
estimation is the Cholesky decomposition adopted in Sims, (1980). The pro­
cedure, which is standard in many econometric software packages, requires 
that the system of equations in the model follow a recursive structure of a 
Wold-causal representation. A Cholesky decomposition may coincide with 
the prior theoretical view of the appropriate model structure and such case 
can be viewed as a special case of a more general approach. Roubini et al.,
(2004) and Pesaran et al., (2006) argued that there are some circumstances 
when restrictions resulting from Cholesky decomposition could be unreason­
able, such as when there are contemporaneous interaction between variables. 
In such circumstance, if for instance monetary policy is implemented accord­
ing to an explicit policy rule, such as a Taylor’s rule, the Cholesky decom­
position would not enable private sector responses, such as the responses of
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GDP, to shocks of foreign variables and of monetary policy in a small open 
economy to be differentiated.
Renee Pry (2004) showed that structural restrictions imposed on VAR model 
to identify the parameters of the model have not contributed to improving 
the reliability or consistency of the model but rather distorts the link be­
tween the data generation process and the estimated parameters. He argued 
that the original unrestricted VAR model developed in Sims, (1980) has more 
consistent parameters than predicted in most structurally identified models. 
We combined the use of an unrestricted VAR estimation, rather than an 
over-identified structural VAR model, with a non-recursive zero-sum param­
eter identification procedure in our analysis. This approach has been used in 
many recent studies, such as Dungey et al.,(2007).
3.4.2 The Model
We construct an unrestricted VAR model, ignoring deterministic elements 
such as trend and intercept terms as:
Vt — Aii/t-i + A2j/t_2+ ,  j +Apyt- p + pt (3.1)
where:
yt is an (n x 1) vector containing n endogenous variables,
Ai(i = 1, 2 , ....,p) are (n x n) matrices of coefficients, 
jilt is an (n x 1) vector containing error terms, and
fit ~  Hd N(0,9l) - independent and identically distributed error terms with 
zero mean and contemporaneous covariance matrix 0  is positive definite. 
Given that there are pn2 parameters in the A matrices and using a lag oper­
ator L, defined by Lkxt — Xt-k the equation can be rewritten as:
A(L)yt = fit (3.2)
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where
A ft)  = A0L° -  ArLl -  A2L2 - ..... -  APLP
A0 = I  is an identity matrix.
In order to choose the variables that will enter the VAR model (in the vector 
yt), we select from the identified key growth determinants from our regres­
sions in chapter two, and also based on the general approach in the literature3, 
we include activity variables, price variables, financial variables, policy vari­
ables and the oil variable. On account that most resource curse hypotheses 
anchor on the negative effects of oil on the tradable sector, we have included 
manufacturing output as an additional variable in the model. The vari­
ables that we have considered in the model include; GDP per capita growth, 
inflation rate, money supply, government expenditure, terms of trade, man­
ufacturing output and oil revenue. The number of variables included in each 
model vary according to the availability of enough time series data for the 
country.
3.4.3 Data and Statistical Transformations
We used an annual time series data sample from 1960-2004 for 8 countries: 
Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Ara­
bia and Venezuela. Oil revenue is measured as the annual value of crude 
oil export as a percentage of GDP4. Manufacturing output is measured as 
annual total manufacturing value-added as a percentage of GDP.
Given the asymptotic bias that may arise from using non-uniform filters
3 See Sims (1980), Peron (1989), Kilan (2005) and Dungey (2007).
4 The value of total crude oil export for OPEC member countries are obtained from the
OPEC statistical bulletin. However given that OPEC calculation is based on OPEC pro­
duction quota calculation, we compare the figure to the WDI calculation of total earnings 
from oil export and picked the higher of the two.
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of different time series, we used seasonally-unadjusted time series data for 
all the countries. As a preliminary step towards estimating the VAR mod­
els, we perform unit root tests for each of the endogenous variables entering 
the model. We use both the augumented Dickey Fuller(ADF) test5 and the 
Phillips-Peron test6. In the choice of the truncation lag length required for 
the unit root test, we rely on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the 
Modified AIC (MAIC)7, as well as, Hannan-Quinn and Schwarz information 
criteria. In choosing the lag levels of variables in the VAR model, we used the 
values of the pth which yield the minimum value of the information criterion 
and in the cases where the different criteria do not yield the same outcome, 
we consider the dynamic relationships between the error terms in the VAR 
models. In such cases, system-wide Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistics are 
computed with a chi-square test of the specific order of autocorrelation and 
the preferred order of the VAR model is the order for which there is the least 
evidence of serially correlated errors8.
In order to gain the confirmation that the dynamics of the VAR models 
are correctly specified, we perform single-equation tests for each of the mod­
els. These tests include the Breusch-Godfrey test for auto correlated distur­
bance terms, the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity test, and the 
Jarque-Bera test for normally distributed error terms. We also compute the 
Wald chi-square statistics in order to conduct exclusion tests for endogenous 
variables that have common lag lengths - especially for data series of the 
developing oil exporting countries. Because we want to understand the dy­
5 See Dickey and Fuller (1979) and (1981).
6 See Phillips and Peron (1988).
7 The MAIC was suggested in Ng and Peron (2001) on account of the failure of the
established information criteria to reflect accurately the cost of underfitting.
8 We followed Buckle et ah, (2002) which used this method in their VAR model of New
Zealand Business cycle.
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namic impact of temporary shocks around a long-run growth path in this 
analysis, we detrend all the response variables in VAR model using the H-P 
filter9. All 1(1) variables entered the model in first-difference transformation.
3.4.4 Model Identification Procedure
Given that our objective in the VAR estimation is to obtain a non-recursive 
orthogonalization of the error terms for impulse response and variance de­
composition analysis which is an alternative to the recursive Cholesky orthog­
onalization pre-programmed into the E-View (6,0) econometric software, we 
describe below the non-recursive orthogonalization we input into the software 
program to enable us identify the orthogonal (structural) components of the 
error terms which represent our shocks:
We create a named ‘pattern’ squared and non-singular matrices A and B  in 
the number of equations equals to the number of endogenous variables in the 
model.
If we assume yt to be a ^-element vector of the endogenous variables in our 
model and E == E[utdt] to be the residual covariance matrix, the program 
will implement an identification which follow the form:
Avt =  Bybt
where vt and are vectors of length k, vt is the observed residuals and fit 
is the unobserved structural innovations. A and B are k x k matrices to 
be estimated. The innovations in pt are assumed to be orthonormal- i.e. 
its covariance matrix is an identity matrix E[fitf4] — /-This orthonormal 
assumption of allows us to impose identifying restrictions on A  and B:
AEA' =  BB'
9 See Hodrick and Prescott, (1997)
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Suggesting that the expressions on either side of the above identity are sym­
metric. However because we are only interested in oil shocks and government 
expenditure shocks in our VAR specification, we do not need to identify all 
the structural shocks except for only the two. The identification of the oil 
shock is straight forward because the variables are not contemporaneously 
affected by shocks to other endogenous variables in the model. Since the or­
thogonalisation involves the assignment of contemporaneous correlation only 
to specific series, we choose an ordering for the variables in the system. Thus, 
the first variable in the ordering is not contemporaneously affected by shocks 
to the remaining variables, but shocks to the first variable do affect the other 
variables in the system; the second variable affects contemporaneously the 
other variables (with the exception of the first one), but it is not contempo­
raneously affected by them.
The identifying short-run restrictions on the A and B matrices are simply the 
zero exclusion restrictions. Any element in the matrix that we want to shock 
is assigned a missing value ‘NA’ and all non missing values in the matrix will 
be held fixed at the specified values. Using our 7-variables VAR model (k 
= 7), we restrict A to be a lower triangular matrix with ones on the main 
diagonal and B  to be the diagonal matrix. The VAR procedure will estimate 
the model in the exactly identified form as:
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 \
NA 1 0 0 0 0 0
NA NA 1 0 0 0 0
NA NA NA 1 0 0 0
NA NA NA NA 1 0 0
NA NA NA NA NA 1 0
NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 /
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/ N A 0 0 0 0 0 0 \
0 N A 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 N A 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 N A 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 N A 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 N A 0
V 0 0 0 0 0 0 N A /
Using the above identification restrictions we ordered the variables as follow: 
o il revenue, government expenditure, money supply, inflation, manufacturing 
output, trade and GDP per capita. O il revenue is ranked as an exogenous 
variable which has immediate impact on government expenditure and the 
la tte r is then allowed to feed into changes in  money supply, in fla tion rate, 
manufacturing output, trade and GDP growth rate. The firs t equation iden­
tifies the oil revenue shock while the second equation identifies government 
expenditure shocks. This identification restriction allows tha t while o il rev­
enue shock affects government expenditure, government expenditure does not 
affect o il revenue - such tha t all other shocks affect GDP per capita growth 
rate. This is s tric tly  a short-run identification restriction.
3.5 R esu lts
3.5.1 Impulse Response Functions and E rror Variance Decomposition
We have selected a sample of 8 countries to cover a fair regional spread of de­
veloping oil exporting countries: Algeria in  the North A frican region, Nigeria 
in the sub-sahara African region, Indonesia in the South-East Asia region, 
Venezuela in the South American region and Iran, Kuwait, UAE and Saudi 
Arabia in  the Middle-East region. A ll these countries have responded to oil 
revenue and government expenditure shocks differently both across region
3. Oil Shocks and Economic Growth: A  Vector Autoregressive Approach 102
and w ith  region. However, in all the countries oil revenue shocks has led to 
an in itia l increase in government expenditure, except for Saudi Arabia. In 
the case of Algeria, figures 3.5 and 3.6 (in the appendix)10 show tha t a one 
standard deviation shock to oil revenue boosted GDP growth rate sharply 
after the in itia l firs t period decline and increased government expenditure 
and money supply. Manufacturing output and trade responded positively to 
o il revenue shock, while in fla tion rate was stable over the firs t two periods. 
Government expenditure shock, on the other hand, reduced manufacturing 
output and GDP growth rate moderately at the in itia l period, even though 
infla tion and money supply declined over the same period. The variance de­
composition result (table 3.2) shows tha t money supply and manufacturing 
output account for about 50% of the variations in  GDP growth rate, while 
o il revenue accounts more than 50% of variations in manufacturing output.
In  the case of Indonesia and Iran, while o il revenue shocks led to an in i­
tia l decline in  GDP growth rate in  both countries, government expenditure 
shock boosted GDP growth in Indonesia but led to a decline in  GDP growth 
in Iran over the same period. The variance decomposition results for both 
countries (tables 3.3 and 3.4) shows tha t in fla tion rates and o il revenue ac­
counts for a significant proportion of the variations in GDP growth rate in 
both countries. However, while o il revenue has no significant effect on infla­
tion rate in Indonesia, i t  accounts for close to 50% of its variation in Iran. 
In  the case of the other M iddle East countries, oil revenue shocks has had 
very moderate but positive in itia l effect on all variables in the kuwait model, 
negative effect on GDP growth in Saudi Arabia and significant positive effect
10 The dotted red lines in the graph represent the 2± standard error band, while the 
blue line-shows the asymptotic (analytical) impulse response. Because we have used annual 
time series, each forecast period represents 4 quarters (1 year) and the forecast impulse 
begins at time t — 1.
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on GDP growth rate in the United Arab Emirate. On the other hand, gov­
ernment expenditure shocks has had a negative effects on GDP growth rate, 
trade and manufacturing output, over the entire forecast period for Kuwait, 
while i t  has positive effect for GDP growth rate for Saudi A rabia and neg­
ative effect for GDP growth rate and trade for United Arab Emirate. The 
variance decomposition results for the same countries show tha t while o il 
revenue accounts for significant variations in GDP growth rate and inflation 
rate in  Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, i t  has no significant effects on variation in 
GDP growth rate in United Arab Emirate.
In  both Nigeria and Venezuela, oil revenue shocks and government expendi­
ture shocks led to a decline in  GDP growth rate in the firs t period. Gov­
ernment expenditure shocks also led to a decline in manufacturing output 
in both countries. However, while GDP growth rate persistently declined in 
response to government expenditure shock over the entire forecast period for 
Nigeria, i t  increased after the th ird  year for Venezuela. Both countries ex­
perienced high vo la tility  of response to both shocks over the forecast period. 
The variance decomposition results show tha t while manufacturing output 
and inflation rate accounts for a significant variation in GDP growth rate in 
Venezuela, they have lit t le  or no effects GDP growth rate in  Nigeria. Man­
ufacturing output actually has lit t le  effects on ail variables in  the Nigerian 
model, but quite im portant in  the Venezuelan model. In  both countries in­
flation rate plays an im portant role and o il revenue accounts for a relatively 
reasonable proportion of variations in  inflation rate. Over 75% of the vari­
ations in government expenditure are unexplained in the Nigerian model, 
while in fla tion rate and oil revenue accounts for over 50% of the variations 
in government expenditure in Venezuela.
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter shows the effects of o il revenue and government expenditure 
shocks on the economies of developing oil-exporting countries using a struc­
tu ra l vector autoregressive model approach. To understand the dynamic 
impacts of o il revenue and government expenditure shocks, we p lo t the time 
series co-movement between the o il revenue and government expenditure in 
order to establish whether increases in  o il revenue is necessarily followed by 
increased government expenditure as argued in the literature. There were 
indications tha t most developing oil-exporting countries followed an exces­
sive spending spree after the o il revenue boom of the early 1970s. In  some 
cases, the governments could not appropriately adjust the excessive spending 
during period of declining oil revenue and continued to carry high budget 
deficits and huge external debts. Recent studies have associated the poor 
growth experience of the oil-rich economies to this inefficient government ex­
penditure and fiscal policies rather tha t the revenue windfall. Since the late 
1990s, many of these developing o il exporting countries which have adopted 
economic reforms and structura l adjustment programs have been able to 
effectively curta il the over dependence on oil revenue. These trend has sig­
nificantly reduced the negative impacts of o il revenue shocks on economic 
growth, particularly for the o il exporting countries of the M iddle East and 
North A frican region. For these group of countries, government expenditure 
shocks have been beneficial for growth, while for the sub-saharan African oil 
exporting countries government expenditure shocks have led to high infla­
tion, manufacturing output decline and GDP per capita growth rate decline.
In  the empirical analysis, we developed a multiple-variable vector autore­
gressive model which consists of activ ity  variables, price variables, finan­
cial variables, policy variables and o il revenue for each country considered.
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These variables included GDP per capita growth rate, manufacturing output, 
money supply, in fla tion rate, government expenditure, trade and o il revenue. 
In  each model we impose a simple zero-sum non-recursive identification re­
strictions to identify each equation in  the system. Because the diagonal 
m atrix  of the variance-covariance m atrix  of the residual parameters of the 
model is an identity m a trix  of ones, each equation is exactly identified in line 
w ith  the cholesky decomposition procedure. We used this moving-average de­
composition of the structura l parameters of the VAR model to generate the 
impulse response functions of oil revenue and government expenditure shocks 
and the error-forecast variance decomposition of each innovation. The fore­
cast error variance and response functions are generated by imposing a one 
standard deviation shock to oil revenue or government expenditure w ith in  a 
2 ±  standard error confidence interval.
The results show tha t responses to oil revenue shocks vary remarkably amongst 
the individual countries w ith  some countries recording positive growth in the 
in itia l period while others record growth decline. Generally, in  many of 
the cases government expenditure shock has negative effect on GDP growth 
rate, manufacturing output, money supply and inflation, while in some of the 
cases oil revenue shock has positive effect of GDP growth rate. For exam­
ple, United Arab Emirate result shows tha t while oil revenue shock increased 
GDP per capita growth rate and manufacturing output, government expen­
diture shocks reduced GDP per capita growth rate and manufacturing output 
, as well as increased infla tion rate and reduced trade. In  the case of Nigeria, 
both oil revenue and government expenditure shocks have negative impacts 
on GDP per capita growth rate and money supply. Government expenditure 
shock led to a persistent decline in  GDP growth rate and manufacturing out­
put as money supply, in fla tion rates and government expenditure increased.
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W hile o il as a share of to ta l export or natural resource abundance in  a par­
ticu lar country has had no significant effect on growth in the cross-country 
growth regressions, shocks associated w ith  oil revenue have significant effects 
on government expenditure, in fla tion rate, trade and manufacturing output 
which are im portant determinants of growth. Therefore while we claimed in 
chapter two tha t o il endowment is positive correlated w ith  growth in oil-rich 
economies, oil revenue shocks have had negative consequences for growth, 
particu larly through government expenditure shocks. This outcome provides 
a partia l explanation to the likely causes of the poor growth performance of 
developing oil-exporting countries. However, even though we have shown how 
oil revenue shocks could impact negatively on growth, we have not explained 
in  all our analysis here why oil revenue shocks and the associated govern­
ment expenditure effects could account for the poor growth performance of 
developing o il exporting countries. The question is why w ill governments or 
politica l leaders be instrumental to negative growth outcomes. In  the next 
chapter we analyze and discuss the fundamental causes of why governments 
could not translate resource advantages to  growth prospects and how this 
fundamental cause has explained the poor growth performance of developing 
o il exporting countries.
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A lgeria: I m p u lse  R e s p o n s e  to  Oil P r ice  S h o c k .
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Figure 3.5: Algeria: Responses to Oil Revenue Shock.
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Figure 3.6: Algeria: Responses to Government Expenditure Shock.
3. Oil Shocks and Economic Growth: A  Vector Autoregressive Approach 110
Table 3.2: Algeria: Porecast-Error Variance Decomposition
Period Std. error GDP Govt, Consumption Inflation Manufacturing Money Supply Trade Oil Revenue |
GDP growth rate
1 5.64 53.36 4.62 0.94 3.91 24.58 3.50 9.102 8.65 35.86 3.76 1.82 8.17 32.04 3.38 14.963 9.98 28.13 3.44 2.01 20.43 27.97 2.58 15.44
4 10,35 26.18 3.60 2.07 24.27 26.02 2.81 15.04
5 10.40 26.06 3.83 2.17 24.36 25.80 2.78 15.00
6 10.46 26.11 3.82 2.55 24.08 25.68 2.94 14.82
7 10.49 26.22 3.80 2.54 24.00 25.69 2.99 14.75
8 10.52 26.16 3.78 2.61 24.01 25.66 2.98 14.81
a 10.53 26.10 3.77 2.61 24.08 25.62 2.98 14.84
10 10.54 26.08 3.77 2.61 24.12 25.60 2.98 14.83
Government Consumption
1 8.74 0.00 81.90 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.02
2 10.80 0.21 75.3G 2.40 7.92 0.03 0.23 13.843 11.75 1.18 64.93 3.28 10.93 5.36 2.25 12.074 12.29 1.68 58.68 3.24 10.66 10.22 2.68 11.83
5 12.67 1.74 56.81 3.52 14.03 9.64 2.96 11.31
6 12.85 2.18 55.23 3.53 14.19 10.40 3.49 10.99
7 12.91 2.19 54.74 3.81 14.25 10.55 3.46 11.00
8 12.97 2.23 54.23 4.09 14.41 10.45 3.55 11.05
9 12.99 2.29 54.08 4.08 14.42 10.49 3.62 11.02
10 13.00 2.29 53.96 4.16 14.40 10.54 3.61 11.06
Inflation
1 9.64 0.00 0.00 86.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.66
2 12.84 1.56 5.92 55.93 3.96 24.65 0.25 7.73
3 14.66 2.76 5.23 50.09 13.79 21.63 0.41 6.10
4 17.15 6.31 4.23 37.53 10.56 32.18 1.63 7.57
5 18.14 G.46 4.09 33.59 15.44 31.50 1.50 7.43
6 18.65 6.19 4.20 32,22 18.21 30.20 1.86 7.12
7 18.69 6.21 4.37 32.08 18.13 30.14 1.85 7.22
8 18.77 6.18 4.33 32.34 18.08 29.95 1.91 7.21
9 18.79 6.24 4.34 32.31 18.04 29.88 1.93 7.25
10 118.81 6.25 4.34 32.36 18.00 29.83 1.93 7.28
Manufacturing Output
1 1.47 0.00 1.52 0.50 37.56 0.09 0.00 60.33
2 1.65 0.07 4.71 0.81 30.09 6.39 3.79 54.14
3 1.81 5.03 4.92 3.04 25.23 10.74 4.21 46.82
4 1.95 6.15 5.75 2.74 24.13 14.55 4.25 42.42
5 2.01 5.80 5.87 2.59 27.15 14.29 4.17 40.13
6 2.02 5.75 5.90 2.GO 27.13 14.75 4.23 39.64
7 2.02 5.74 5.89 2.65 27.16 14.73 4.26 39.57
8 2.03 5.78 5.90 2.83 27.08 14.71 4.29 39.42
9 2.03 5.81 5.90 2.84 27.08 14.70 4.29 39.39
10 2.03 5.80 5.90 2.89 27.05 14.69 4.29 39.39
Money Supply
1 4.16 0.00 1.08 34.75 0.00 43.74 0.00 20.43
2 5.85 1.70 1.40 22.34 0.05 62.13 1.03 11.35
3 6.75 1.99 2.09 22.42 0.29 59.83 1.64 11.734 7.13 3.72 2.32 21.20 1.26 57.66 1.72 12.135 7.33 3,52 2.27 20.04 5.89 54.55 2.01 11.72
6 7.38 3.48 2.43 20.20 5.83 54.12 1.99 11.94
7 7.40 3.46 2.42 20.23 5.83 54.11 2.03 11.91
8 7.41 3.49 2.44 20.37 5.82 53.92 2.03 11.939 7.42 3.51 2.44 20.42 5.83 53.87 2.03 11.9110 7.42 3.50 2.44 20.41 5.82 53.83 2.02 11.97
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Table 3.3: Indonesia: Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition
Period Std. error GDP Govt. Consumption Inflation Manufacturing Money Supply Trade Oil Revenue
GDP growth rate
1 4.52 29.40 0.05 60.46 3.30 0.37 4.86 1.55
2 5.34 23.74 1.48 63.39 2,96 2.84 3.88 1.70
3 5.71 21.97 1.77 55.51 5.04 3.62 4.33 7.76
4 5.93 21.06 5.65 52.52 6.09 3.37 4.03 7.29
5 6.12 20.21 5.37 50.36 5.71 3.43 3.80 11.13
6 6.18 20.42 5.95 49.76 5.64 3.37 3.74 11.12
7 6.22 20.66 5.88 49.43 5.57 3.55 3.71 11.21
8 6.25 20.55 6.11 49.17 5.66 3.52 3.71 11.28
9 6.26 20.48 6.09 49.14 5.73 3.52 3.70 11.34
10 6,27 20.41 6.07 49.06 5,73 3.51 3.71 11.52
Inflation rate
1 0.04 0.00 0.00 99.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10
2 1.14 0.13 0.03 93.42 2.60 1.84 0.48 1.51
3 1.20 0.14 0.63 92.02 2.60 2.25 0.46 1.90
4 1.23 1.17 2.31 88.47 3.10 2.10 0.43 2.42
5 1.25 1,65 2.31 86.26 3.99 2.12 0.59 3.09
6 1.25 1.63 2.41 86.18 3.93 2.22 0.59 3.04
7 1.26 1.92 2.66 85.57 3.95 2.26 0.G2 3.02
8 1.27 1.96 2.70 85.34 4.04 2.29 0.65 3.01
9 1.27 1.96 2.74 85.23 4.05 2.29 0.66 3.07
10 1.27 1.96 2.74 85.20 4.05 2.29 0.67 3.08
Money Supply
1 0.87 0.00 6.05 46.56 0.00 38.31 0.00 9.07
2 1.05 0.01 6.88 48.29 4.19 34.21 0.96 5.45
3 1.16 1.67 15.81 40.27 5.23 28.48 3.36 5.19
4 1.25 2.10 15.19 39.21 5.46 27.55 5.62 4.88
5 1.30 2.53 17.38 36.28 5.32 25.45 5.29 7.76
6 1.33 2.79 16.68 35.70 5.17 24.14 5.13 10.40
7 1.35 2.79 16.46 36.08 5.10 23.78 5.08 10.70
8 1.36 2.97 16.43 36.00 5.09 23.78 5.07 10.66
9 1.37 2.96 16.51 36.05 5.11 23.70 5.07 10.62
10 1.37 2.95 1G.47 36.05 5.13 23.65 5.06 10.69
Oil Revenue
1 11.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100
2 13.07 10.49 0.47 13.16 0.49 0.58 1.82 72.99
3 13.37 10.24 0.42 24.40 0.40 4.13 1.64 58,77
4 13.82 10.69 1.40 29.03 0.37 5.09 1.45 51.98
5 14.10 10.30 2.92 29.01 0.41 5.01 1.64 50.70
6 14.14 9.82 2.82 30.05 0.46 5.1G 1.68 50.02
7 14.18 9.79 3,06 29,93 0.46 5.32 1.67 49.78
8 14.24 9.72 3.22 29.94 0.65 5.32 1.79 49.36
9 14.25 9.70 3.26 30.13 0.65 5.32 1.81 49.14
10 14.26 9.67 3.32 30.04 0.66 5,30 1.80 49.20
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Indonesia: Impulse R e s p o n se  to  Oil R evenue S hock
GDP per capita Growth rate G overnm ent Expenditure
Manufacturing Output M oney Supply
Trade Inflation rate
Figure 3.7: Indonesia: Responses to Oil Revenue Shock.
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Indonesia: Impulse Response to Government Expenditure Shock
GDP per capita Growth rate Money Supply
Manufacturing Output Inflation rate
Trade
Figure 3.8: Indonesia: Responses to Government Expenditure Shock.
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Table 3.4: Iran: Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition
Period Std. error GDP Trade Manufacturing Money Supply Govt. Consumption Inflation Oil Revenue |
GDP growth rate
1 6,86 46.28 15.53 0.18 15.50 0.20 19.71 2.59
2 7.12 42.92 14.85 0.46 14.95 1.63 21,70 3.49
3 7.74 36.37 12.76 1.25 18.08 2.24 18.41 10.89
4 8.30 34.58 11.09 1.10 18.33 3.63 21.74 9.53
5 8.77 31.24 10.93 1.05 16.79 3.59 22.76 13.64
G 8.91 31.07 10.83 1.02 17.86 3.51 22.07 13.64
7 8.98 31.01 10.80 1.06 18.17 3.68 21.84 13.43
8 9.04 30.64 10.97 1.12 17.95 3.64 21.55 14.13
9 9.08 30.81 11.01 1.11 17.82 3.79 21.35 14.12
10 9.16 30.62 10.81 1.23 17.81 3.98 21.26 14.30
Manufacturing Output
1 1.07 0.00 0.00 79.36 1.16 5.09 7.45 6.95
2 1,25 7.54 5.54 57.29 1.19 3.68 6.88 17.88
3 1.29 7.30 7.47 54.01 1.88 4.96 7.59 16.81
4 1.33 7.75 8.13 51.36 2.03 6.38 7.87 16.47
5 1.34 7.97 8.65 50.66 2.01 6.30 7.78 16.64
G 1.36 7.76 8.41 48.99 2.73 6.26 7.66 18.19
7 1.36 7.78 8.34 48.54 3.21 6.23 7.83 18.07
8 1.37 7.76 8.37 48.36 3.19 6.21 7.91 18.21
9 1.37 7.78 8.43 48.20 3.35 6.18 7.89 18.16
10 1.37 7.78 8.44 48.13 3.44 6.18 7.90 18.14
Inflation
1 13.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 53.42 46.58
2 16.97 1.84 0.30 2.99 3.31 4.69 52.32 52.32
3 17.56 3.18 1.39 3.16 4.17 6.14 33.06 48.90
4 18.38 3.59 2.16 2.99 4.20 7.40 30.35 49.31
5 18.53 3.57 2.13 3.04 4.14 7.61 30.08 49.42
6 18.67 3.81 2.19 3.10 4.14 7.50 30.12 49.15
7 18.69 3.80 2,20 3.10 4.13 7.50 30.14 49.13
8 18.74 3.85 2.21 3.18 4.18 7.49 30.03 49.07
9 18.75 3.86 2.21 3.17 4,18 7.48 30.01 49.09
10 18.77 3.86 2.22 3.17 4.21 7.47 30.05 49.02
Money Supply
1 5.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.51 0.49 0.42 18.58
2 6.21 0.58 2.53 0.02 79.12 0.87 0.39 16.49
3 7.11 5.39 16.37 3.23 60.63 1.01 0.60 12.76
4 7,59 7.48 18.44 3.35 56.18 1.36 8.94 12.24
5 7.96 7.28 17.05 4.20 54.94 1.65 1.63 13.25
6 8.24 8.20 15.98 4.17 52.57 1.85 2.92 14.30
7 8.34 8.27 16.17 4.07 51.34 1.92 3.27 14.95
8 8.48 8.00 15.97 4.08 51.10 1.98 3.87 15.00
9 8.52 8.00 15.86 4.09 51.21 2.01 3.98 14.85
10 8.54 8.12 15.91 4.09 51.00 2.03 3.99 14.85
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Iran: Impulse R e s p o n se  to  Oil Price/Revenue Shock. 
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Figure 3.9: Iran: Responses to Oil Revenue Shock.
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Iran: Im pulse R e s p o n s e  to  G o v ern m en t  Expenditure S h o c k  
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Figure 3.10: Iran: Responses to Government Expenditure Shock.
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Table 3.5: Kuwait: Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition
Period Std. error GDP Manufacturing Govt. Consumption Inflation Money Supply Trade Oil Revenue
GDP growth rate
1 7.91 55.94 6.06 1.25 18.99 11.05 2.01 4.70
2 13.59 26.99 2.96 1.89 12.17 4.24 6.46 45.29
3 14.93 22.42 4.62 3.81 10.29 3.71 5.40 49.75
4 15.70 20.64 5.73 6.89 11.15 4.15 6.40 45.03
5 16.37 19.20 5.67 10.89 12.17 4.73 5.89 41.45
6 16.49 19.28 5.61 10.88 12.10 4.67 5.86 41.60
7 17.45 17.92 5.01 13.19 10.81 4.26 5.27 43.53
8 17.91 17.40 4.79 15.15 10.35 4.20 5.01 43.09
9 17.97 17.32 4.85 15.29 10.38 4.30 5.06 42.79
10 18.01 17.32 4.97 15.36 10.38 4.28 5.04 42.64
Inflation rate
1 3.90 0.00 0.00 23.76 38.33 0.00 0.00 37.91
2 4.08 3.65 0.81 22.98 33.16 0.04 3.09 36.26
3 4.32 7.45 0.80 21.72 31.31 0.22 3.58 34.93
4 4.38 7.01 0.92 22.87 29.82 0.35 5.23 33.80
5 4.47 8.07 0.95 26.39 26.76 1.51 4.64 31.68
6 4.55 9,69 0.91 25.27 24.98 1.49 4.96 32.69
7 4.57 9.68 1.09 25.20 24.83 1.50 5.13 32.57
8 4.58 9.93 1.54 25.07 24.58 1.48 5.13 32.26
9 4.58 10.43 1.68 24.80 24.42 1.46 5.29 31.93
10 4.60 10.59 1.67 24.60 24.25 1.47 5.25 32.18
Money Supply
1 43.58 0.00 0.00 39.14 0.90 8.71 0.00 51.25
2 54.76 0.00 0.35 38.85 1.63 8.96 0.28 49.93
3 56.48 0.07 0.57 33.26 1.63 10.99 2.70 50.78
4 58.23 0.08 0.58 32.64 1.59 10.57 3.51 51.03
5 61.85 1.21 0.93 32.52 1.54 10.65 4.03 49.12
6 64.11 1.66 0.93 31.27 1.53 10.60 4.22 49.79
7 64.47 1.66 1.05 31.25 1.53 10.56 4.32 49.63
8 64.81 1.66 1.17 31.19 1.62 10.51 4.49 49.36
9 65.27 1.67 1.18 31.44 1.66 10.48 4.46 49.10
10 65,61 1.71 1.17 31.36 1,66 10.45 4.48 49.17
Oil Revenue
1 4.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100
2 6.14 0.17 1.40 0.80 2.26 1.23 0.50 93.63
3 6.30 2.49 2.39 1.13 2.10 4.72 1.73 85.44
4 6.77 2.27 2.07 3.05 1.96 8.64 1.74 80.27
5 7.04 2.47 2.21 3.37 1.94 8.50 2.27 79.23
6 7.27 2.49 2.21 3.39 2.05 8.47 2.52 78.87
7 7.30 2.46 2.20 4.24 2.05 8.45 2.56 78.04
8 7.34 2.46 2.24 4.34 2.06 8.47 2.58 77.86
9 7.45 2.45 2.22 4.54 2.04 8.41 2.57 77.76
10 7.49 2.45 2.22 4.57 2.04 8.41 2.59 77.73
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Kuwait: Response to Oil Revenue Shock 
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Figure 3.11: Kuwait: Responses to Oil Revenue Shocks.
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Kuwait: Response to Government Expenditure Shock 
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Figure 3.12: Kuwait: Responses to Government Expenditure Shocks.
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Nigeria: Im pulse R e s p o n se  to  Oil R evenue S hock  
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Figure 3.13: Nigeria: Responses to Oil Revenue Shock.
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Nigeria: Response to Government Expenditure Shock
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Figure 3.14: Nigeria: Responses to Government Expenditure Shock.
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Table 3.6: Nigeria: Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition
Period Std. error GDP Govt Expenditure Inflation Manufacturing Output Money Supply Oil Revenue Trade
GDP growth rate
1 9.20 70.48 3.94 0.00 0.09 16.76 6.44 2.29
2 9.54 69.43 4.44 0.93 0.30 15.59 7.14 2.18
3 10.21 65.77 6.36 1.64 1.54 15.62 6.89 2.17
4 10.45 64.84 6.77 1.76 1.74 14.95 7.11 2.84
5 10.62 62.98 6.64 2.33 3.02 14.50 6.94 3.59
6 10.71 62.70 6.69 2.30 2.98 14.71 7.00 3.62
7 10.87 60.90 6.58 2.68 3.60 14.84 6.86 4.56
8 10.91 60.71 6.53 2.70 3.60 14.90 6.97 4.59
9 11.01 59.68 6.46 2.79 3.81 15.12 7.23 4.90
10 11.04 59.54 6.44 2.86 3.84 15.06 7.19 5.06
Government Expenditure
1 2.86 0.00 99.44 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00
2 3.04 0.02 88.67 1.26 5.90 0.37 3.76 0.02
3 3.48 0.21 70.94 7.62 4.54 8.62 7.16 0.91
4 3.65 1.16 64.77 7.61 4.32 10.26 7.93 3.94
5 3.68 1.67 64.12 7.53 4.27 10.22 8.26 3.92
6 3.74 2.10 62.12 7.93 4.22 10.43 8.98 4.22
7 3.74 2.12 62.05 7.91 4.21 10.43 8.97 4.30
8 3.76 2.37 61.62 7.90 4,18 10.35 9.26 4.32
9 3.76 2.37 61.44 7.95 4.19 10.42 9.28 4.36
10 3.76 2.38 61.41 7.95 4.19 10.44 9.28 4.36
Money Supply
1 2.53 0.00 8.51 37.97 0.00 34.76 18.76 0.00
2 2.80 3.17 8.64 32.50 0.86 28.61 26.12 0.12
3 3.12 4.98 12.58 26.27 4.74 29.38 21.58 0.46
4 3.19 4.90 13.72 26.11 5.85 28.19 20.65 0.58
5 3.26 4.84 13.26 26.47 6.32 27.28 19.81 2.03
6 3.32 4.68 13.19 25.64 6.27 29.01 19.24 1.98
7 3.36 4.58 13.46 25.05 6.98 28.33 19.06 2.54
8 3.37 4.90 13.41 24.82 6.98 28.22 19.15 2.51
9 3.40 4.84 13.21 24.71 7.08 28.22 19.09 2.84
10 3.40 4.94 13.20 24.65 7.06 28.24 19.07 2.84
Inflation
1 19.85 0.00 0.00 89.46 0.00 0.00 10.54 0.00
2 26.07 11.30 1.15 62.49 3.74 5.68 13.56 2.08
3 28.09 11.72 1.55 55.28 6.00 9.63 13.64 2.18
4 29.57 14.31 2.13 51.20 5.49 12.75 12.31 1.98
5 30.21 15.27 2.04 49.10 6,53 12.59 11.81 2.67
6 30.59 15.07 2.22 47.95 6.39 14.07 11.59 2.71
7 31.02 14.97 2.17 46.72 7.30 14.38 11.49 2.97
8 31.10 15.00 2.18 46.47 7.27 14.64 11.47 2.98
9 31.40 14.72 2.13 45.77 7.56 14.98 11.57 3.28
10 31.45 14.82 2.13 45.67 7.55 14.96 11.54 3.33
Manufacturing Output
1 0.89 0.00 6.69 25.48 59.60 0.56 1.69 0.00
2 1.10 15.14 4.93 19.44 43.36 6.03 10.90 0.19
3 1.26 11.82 4.72 15.09 33.45 20.96 9.68 4.284 1.31 12.30 4.67 14.12 32.88 20.04 8.94 7.06
5 1.34 12.60 4.56 14.01 31.64 19.83 10.12 7.25
6 1.38 12.33 4.34 13.61 30.56 21.38 10.22 7.56
7 1.39 12.50 4.44 13.49 30.47 21.23 10.14 7.72
8 1.40 12.24 4.35 13.35 30.04 21.49 10.72 7.81
9 1.41 12.29 4.32 13.41 29.81 21.45 10.69 8.02
10 1.41 12.27 4.29 13.40 29.73 21.49 10.81 8.01
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Table 3.7: Saudi Arabia: Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition
Period Std. error GDP Govt. Consumption Inflation Manufacturing Money Supply Oil Revenue Trade
GDP growth rate
1 6.22 34.57 4.58 13.97 0.41 9.68 2.26 34.53
2 C.80 34.01 3.87 19.85 1.36 10.04 1.89 28.99
3 7.75 29.98 4.58 21.03 1.93 10.06 4.97 27.45
4 8.23 33.23 5.92 19.27 2.93 9.31 4.92 24.40
5 8.47 34.57 5.81 19.10 3.15 8.95 4.71 23.71
6 8.63 34.49 5.80 18.87 3.39 8.76 5.62 23.07
7 8.72 34.55 6.16 18.68 3.33 8.79 5.75 22.74
8 8.78 34.77 6.08 18.49 3.29 8.69 5.86 22.82
9 8.82 34.75 6.02 18.30 3.2G 8.60 6.09 22.99
10 8.84 34.76 5.99 18.23 3.25 8.56 6.12 23.09
Inflation
1 17.30 0.00 0.00 21.48 0.00 0.00 78.52 0.00
2 32.37 0.28 1.28 13.75 0.00 0.08 35.91 48.70
3 40.13 2.53 0.89 11.83 1.83 0.78 23.36 58.78
4 41.19 3.44 3.26 11.31 1.83 0.76 22.18 57.23
5 42.43 3.26 3.23 12.67 3.76 2.20 20.91 53.96
6 43.08 3.36 3.66 12.97 4.09 3.01 20.35 52.57
7 43.28 3.48 3.95 12.90 4.10 2.98 20.43 52.16
8 43.32 3.48 3.98 12.89 4.09 2.98 20.51 52.07
9 43.34 3.52 3.97 12.91 4.09 3.00 20.49 52.02
10 43.36 3.59 3.97 12.92 4.09 3.00 20.47 51.96
Money Supply
1 4.04 0.00 21.10 0.01 0.00 17.76 61.13 0.00
2 4.81 0.14 27.32 0.09 0.42 16.37 49.59 6.06
3 5.17 0.18 29.92 2.49 2.09 14.91 44.83 5.58
4 5.23 0.22 29.25 2.55 2.06 15.44 44.89 5.58
5 5.28 0.44 29.33 2.55 2.74 15.31 44.13 5.49
6 5.31 0.50 29.35 2.54 2.86 15.28 43.99 5.49
7 5.31 0.52 29.35 2.54 2.86 15.27 43.97 5.49
8 5.32 0.55 29.30 2.54 2.87 15.33 43.92 5.49
9 5.32 0.59 29.29 2.54 2.87 15.32 43.91 5.49
10 5.32 0.59 29.28 2.54 2.87 15.32 43.92 5.49
Trade
1 10.13 0.00 6.55 27.70 0.07 5.85 0.14 59.69
2 14.06 4.78 5.54 23.91 6.01 3.06 2.33 54.37
3 14.55 7.66 5.17 22.33 5.62 2.86 2.06 53.71
4 14.96 8.08 5.35 22.07 6.73 3.37 2.90 51.49
5 15.38 8.24 6.58 21.99 6.64 4.51 2.77 49.26
0 15.52 8.71 6.71 22.07 6.55 4.57 2.94 48.45
7 15.59 8.85 6.84 21.88 6.49 4.53 3.36 48.05
8 15.62 8.92 6.86 21.81 6.47 4.54 3.45 47.95
9 15.64 9.07 6.85 21.79 6.46 4.54 3.45 47.85
10 15.65 9.18 6.83 21.77 6.45 4.53 3.47 47.76
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Saudi Arabia: R e sp o n se  to  Oil S h ock  
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Figure 3.15: Saudi Arabia: Responses to Oil Revenue Shock.
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Saudi Arabia: Response to Government Expenditure Shock 
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Figure 3.16: Saudi Arabia: Responses to Government Expenditure Shock.
United Arab Emirate: R e sp o n se  to  oil S h ock
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Figure 3.17: United Arab Emirate: Responses to Revenue Shock.
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United Arab Emirate: Response to Government Expenditure Shock 
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Figure 3.18: United Arab Emirate: Responses to Government Expenditure Shock.
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Table 3.8: United Arab Emirates: Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition
Period Std. orror GDP Govt. Consumption Inflation Manufacturing Money Supply Oil Revenue Trade j
GDP growth rate
1 8.55 35.17 5.42 33.57 0.00 7.31 16.53 2.012 10.85 34.05 3.37 21.91 6.76 21.53 10.85 1.52
3 12.13 33.39 9.50 17.69 5.85 17.76 8.80 7.00
4 12.98 31.93 12.47 15.69 6.36 15.82 9.77 7.96
5 13.19 32,39 12.49 15.56 6.17 15.99 9.47 7.93
6 13.51 31.87 11.90 15.33 5.96 17.10 9.43 8.407 13.61 31.40 12.12 15.79 6.01 16.87 9.52 8.288 13.77 30.71 11.85 15.55 6.38 16.53 9.34 9.63
9 13.82 30.54 11.84 15.45 6.72 16.41 9.30 9.74
10 13.91 30.18 11.69 15.24 6.74 16.24 9.22 10.68
Government Consumption
1 2.06 0.00 49.50 0.85 0.00 0.00 49.65 0.00
2 2.40 3.00 37.50 6.16 15.17 0.15 36.58 1.44
3 2.57 12.34 32.G4 5.54 14.93 0.48 32.66 1.40
4 2.74 15.14 29.87 5.12 15.16 4.01 29.02 1.69
5 2.82 16.21 28.72 5.80 14.75 4.00 27.93 2.59
G 2.87 16.53 27.80 5.71 14.34 4.67 27.65 3.31
7 2.89 16.29 27,44 6.73 14.21 4.63 27.37 3.33
8 2.94 15.82 26.72 6.54 14.06 4.66 26.57 5.63
9 2.95 15.69 26.54 6.65 14.23 4.62 26.41 5.84
10 2.98 15.38 26.06 6.53 14.09 4.53 26.05 7.35
Inflation
1 5.61 0.00 0.00 81.47 0.00 0.00 18.53 0.00
2 8.73 0.24 0.12 49.16 16.20 17.52 8.23 8.53
3 9.41 2.67 0.10 43.15 20.42 16.64 7.55 9.47
4 11.00 2.46 0.15 33.03 15.48 12.27 11.90 24.71
5 12.02 3.02 0.13 27.67 16.59 10.66 15.36 26.57
6 12.50 3.25 0.92 26.06 16.94 9.89 14.46 28.47
7 12.69 4.14 0.93 26.48 16.53 9.G1 14.22 28.09
8 12.83 4,26 1.43 26.23 16.21 9.40 14.05 28.43
9 12.89 4.41 1.63 26.09 1G.08 9.34 14.15 28.29
10 13.03 4.80 1.80 25.77 15.75 9.18 14.13 28.57
Money Supply
1 4.66 0.00 2.49 8.64 0.00 36.84 52.02 0.00
2 5.88 0.01 1.57 19.59 19.65 23.15 33.02 3.01
3 6.72 1.51 5.27 25.35 18.06 19.62 27.13 3.06
4 6.99 1.63 5.06 24.53 16.66 18.55 25.59 7.98
5 7.25 2.14 5.78 23.23 18.45 17.86 24.72 7.82
6 7.53 3.02 6.74 22.00 17.10 16.65 22.93 11.56
7 7.61 2.98 7.17 21.71 17.27 16.33 22.50 12.04
8 7.66 3.04 7.10 21.72 17.53 16.16 22.46 11.99
9 7.70 3.00 7.19 22.13 17.36 15.97 22.26 12.09
10 7.73 3.09 7.15 21.97 17.25 15.87 22.16 12.51
Manufacturing
1 0.70 0.00 17.49 8.20 70.57 1.10 2.63 0.00
2 0.96 9.82 16.64 8.07 42.62 0.76 1.41 20.70
3 1.05 10.88 21.54 6.99 39.94 0.64 1.42 18.60
4 1.11 11.06 20.10 7.63 37.85 3.09 2.82 17.46
5 1.16 10.28 18.53 13.35 34.80 2.84 2.73 17.48
6 1.19 10.33 17.62 12.72 33.18 2.80 2.60 20.75
7 1.20 10.25 17.56 12.65 33.34 2.89 2.67 20.64
8 1.24 9.64 17.74 11.85 31.21 2.72 2.87 23.96
9 1.25 9.59 17.89 11.74 31.36 2.70 2.87 23.85
10 1.25 9.53 17.86 11.77 31.17 2.71 2.85 24.12
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Venezuela: Response to Oil Shock 
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Figure 3.19: Venezuela: Responses to Oil Revenue Shock.
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V en ezu ela :  R e s p o n s e  to  G o v ern m en t  Expenditure S h o c k  
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Figure 3.20: Venezuela: Responses to Government Expenditure Shock.
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Table 3.9: Venezuela: Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition
Period Std. error GDP Govt. Consumption | Inflation j Money Supply | Manufacturing Output | Oil Revenue |
GDP growth rate
1 6.71 11.10 1.51 35.75 1.44 49.54 0.65
2 8.26 8.62 1.04 35.80 10.74 38.48 5.31
3 10.08 5.90 1.33 34.77 9.03 40.56 8.41
4 11.10 6.38 1.19 37.29 7.58 40.62 6.93
5 12.25 8,60 2.G7 34.94 6.43 40.82 6.54
G 12.93 7.75 2.56 33.65 7.22 42.91 5.91
7 13.50 7.28 2.56 35.07 6.64 42.78 5.67
8 14.10 7.28 2.36 32.79 6.46 45.51 5.61
9 14.61 7.49 2.49 34.43 6.25 43.62 5.72
10 15.17 7.08 2.32 32.03 6.49 46.60 5.48
Government Consumption
1 13.54 0.00 44.35 36.51 0.00 0.00 19.14
2 24.81 0.03 24.47 44.16 1.63 5.29 24.42
3 25.34 0.12 23.50 42.57 1.80 5.19 26.82
4 25.94 1.07 22.43 40,64 1.73 7.61 26.52
5 26.36 1.55 21.83 39.64 2.94 7.44 26.59
6 26.93 1.49 20.98 38.23 3.28 10.43 25.59
7 27.14 1.56 20.66 38.75 3.32 10.41 25.31
8 27.69 2.07 19.92 37.51 3.21 12.76 24.53
9 29.92 2.09 19.59 37.76 3.51 12.79 24.25
10 28.32 2.11 19.08 37.16 3.53 14.52 23.GO
Inflation
1 23.29 0.00 0.00 86.40 0.00 0.00 13.60
2 25.04 8.36 0.97 74.80 8.11 1.03 15.09
3 26.64 0.60 1.70 67.40 8.90 2.88 18.52
4 27.95 2.83 2.94 61.90 8.40 4.15 19.78
5 28.6G 4.92 3.74 59.28 8.16 4.94 18.96
G 28.89 5.41 3.76 58.38 8.47 5.16 18.82
7 29.08 5.53 3.71 58.00 8.49 5.33 18.95
8 29.24 5.86 3.74 57.36 8.42 5.59 19.04
9 29.38 6,08 3.78 57.21 8.46 5.56 18.90
10 29.47 6.06 3.76 56.84 8.55 5.99 18.80
Money Supply
1 17.14 0.00 19.31 3.97 0.00 76.22 0.00
2 25.27 0.41 9.50 32.12 2.26 43.40 12.32
3 27.74 0.84 8.62 28.71 2.10 39.00 15.77
4 31.53 2.05 6.77 28.20 1.96 30.69 26.79
5 32.89 1.94 6.37 29.19 1.94 29.30 27.70
6 35.05 2.50 5.92 29.10 2.05 26.05 31.56
7 35.90 2,48 5.72 29.33 2.05 25,27 32.55
8 37.32 2.96 5.72 30.12 2.06 23.38 33.50
9 38.12 2.88 5.49 29.72 2.04 22.81 34.86
10 39.04 3.01 5.49 30.93 2.04 21.75 34.69
Manufacturing Output
1 13.33 0.00 4.97 63.06 0.08 24.12 7.77
2 20.86 0.22 4,20 67,78 0.28 14.08 13.43
3 21.84 0.79 4.45 61.84 0.27 15.04 17.61
4 22.33 1.00 4.29 60.77 0.26 16.79 16.89
5 22.81 1.99 4.73 58.91 0.91 17.23 16.22
G 23.38 1.92 4.77 56.18 1.53 19.64 15.96
7 23.68 1.87 4.65 56.64 1.54 19.44 15.85
8 24.29 2.28 4.45 53.82 1.65 22.35 15.44
9 24.68 2.44 4.39 54.18 1.82 21.76 15.42
10 25.20 2.45 4.24 51.97 2.05 24.46 14.83
4. INSTITUTIONS AND GROWTH: A SURVEY AND
APPLICATION
4.1 In troduction
The findings and conclusions of chapters two and three suggest tha t oil is not 
necessarily bad for growth and that developing oil-exporting countries have 
responded differently to o il revenue and government expenditure shocks. This 
chapters , this chapter identifies the underlying factor tha t may determine 
whether resource abundance or unexpected o il revenue boom may be good or 
bad for growth and how this factor can be used to explain the growth and de­
velopment experience of developing oil exporting countries. We have seen in 
our empirical simulations tha t when responses to o il revenue shocks include 
increases in  in fla tion rate, money supply and government expenditure, then 
GDP growth rate and manufacturing output declines. The question that 
follows w ill be whether these d istortionary macroeconomic policy indicators 
account for the poor growth performance and i f  so, why have such policy re­
sponses been peculiar to developing o il exporting countries and persistently 
so? In  this chapter, we explore the role of states and institu tiona l structures 
in  shaping macroeconomic policy process towards the achievement of positive 
development outcomes. W ith in  this framework, we model the relationship 
between institutions, macroeconomic policy outcomes and economic growth 
in  order to identify the channels through which institutions could impact 
negatively on economic growth.
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The perspective we want to explore in  this chapter is tha t the poor and 
volatile growth performance of developing oil-exporting countries may re­
flect not only, or not even primarily, the effect of d istortionary macroeco­
nomic policies, but the chronic institu tiona l causes leading to the emergence 
of particular macroeconomic policies. Acemoglu et al,,(2003) have shown 
tha t once we control for the effect of institutions on economic outcomes, dis­
tortionary macroeconomic policy variables, often blamed for economic crises 
such as the resource curse, play a relatively m inor role. This finding suggests 
tha t standard macroeconomic variables, such as those considered in  chapter 
three, are not the major causes of the poor growth performance of oil-rich 
economies, bu t are more likely symptoms of underlying institu tiona l prob­
lems. However, i t  is im portant to understand whether there macroeconomic 
variables are necessarily the mediating channels through which institutions 
may impact negatively on growth outcomes.
The term institu tion  is quite complex and can be defined or measured in 
several ways, depending on an ind iv idua l’s research objectives, method of 
analysis and scope of analysis. The question then is, what institutions mat­
ter? and because there may be reverse causality between the measures of 
ins titu tion  and economic growth, how do we identify institu tion  in  a growth 
estimation? Several studies have addressed these issues. For example, while 
Mehlum et al (2006) predicts tha t ‘private sector institu tions’, such as rule 
of law and bureaucratic efficiency tha t guarantee the p ro fitab ility  of produc­
tive enterprise are institu tiona l qualities tha t matter, Robinson et al (2006) 
suggests ‘public sector institu tions’ such as public sector accountability tha t 
governs the extraction and d istribution  of public sector resources are insti­
tu tiona l qualities tha t matter. Kolstad (2007) tested these two theories of 
institutions simultaneously and found tha t private sector institutions tha t
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protect property rights and the risk of expropriation and repudiation of in­
vestments are institu tiona l qualities tha t m atter for avoiding resource curse. 
Acemoglu et al (2001 and 2003b) suggests tha t politica l institutions which 
imposes constraints on the executive ( politicians and elites ) and guarantee 
the emergence of economic institutions tha t facilitate the efficient d istribution 
of resources are institu tiona l qualities tha t matter. We have surveyed in de­
tails some of these key po litica l economy theories of institutions and resource 
curse and empirically test, w ith in  a general cross-country growth regression 
framework whether after controlling for institu tion, macroeconomic policy 
variables are im portant in explaining resource curse or the poor growth per­
formance of developing oil exporting countries.
Given tha t almost all the developing oil-exporting countries considered in 
our research were previously European colonies, we have closely adopted the 
classification in  Acemoglu (2003b) using former colonies and the rest of the 
world data sample, to control for the role of institutions and distortionary 
macroeconomic policies in  growth vo la tility  and crises in  developing oil ex­
porting countries. In  the next section we provide a survey of the literature 
on political economy theory of institutions and resource curse. Section 3 
discuss the relevance and applicability of these perspectives to our research 
objectives. In  section 4 we estimate a model of institutions, growth vo la tility  
and growth crises and section 5 concludes.
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4.2 L itera ture Survey
4.2.1 Political Economy Theories o f Institu tions and Growth: A  Survey o f
Selected Models
Several studies, using politica l economy models, have looked at the political 
incentives tha t resource boom creates and how such incentives have affected 
the economic policy choices of po litica l leaders in resource rich countries1. 
These models suggest tha t a permanent resource boom generates an incentive 
for the politic ian to efficiently extract the resource in a socially sub-optimal 
way. This is because the incumbent politic ian loves being in power and hence 
w ill discount the future resource rent very low. In  a democratic setting the 
incumbent w ill discount the future by the probability of being re-elected the 
second period. In  order to guarantee his re-election, he redistributes the re­
source rent inefficiently by providing patronage to members of his winning 
coalition in  the form of public sector employment, lump-sum transfers and 
tax subsidies. Because the public sector is presumably inefficient relative to 
the private sector, the overall p roductiv ity  of the economy is undermined and 
hence poor growth.
An im portant factor tha t constraints the inefficient d istribution of resource 
by the political leaders (executives) is the type of institutions tha t governs al­
location of public resources. Robinson et al., (2006) shows tha t in  economies 
where there are weak institutions, resource booms have led to poor growth 
while where there are strong (quality) institutions, resource booms have led 
to increased growth. In  reality, good governance is not a prerequisite for 
re-election in most of the developing countries, however, strong institutions
1 For example: Acemoglu et al., (2003a and b), Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003), Melhum 
et al., (2006), and Robinson et al.,(2006)
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can guarantee the election of good leaders tha t abide by the rule of law, and 
employ transparency and accountability in the conduct of governance.
4.2.2 The Selectorate Theory Model
Bueno De Mesquita et al., (2003) constructed a provocative theory on the se­
lection of politica l leader and present a formal ‘Selectorate model’ tha t shows 
how the politica l leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting 
the leaders create incentives for leader to pursue good and bad public pol­
icy. The theory sets out a framework of how institutions influence economic 
policy and politica l survival. The combination of a w inning coalition2 and 
the selectorate3 influence a plethora of politica l phenomena and economic 
policy strategies - including taxation, transfers and wages. The theory em­
ploys a game theory model of two players: incumbent politica l leaders who 
want to retain politica l power and the opposition party who wishes to regain 
politica l power. The incumbent leaders stay in  power by raising government 
revenue through taxation and spending such revenue discrim inately between 
the provision of pubic-goods tha t benefits the society and private rewards 
(transfers) tha t go exclusively to members of his winning coalition 4.
The model and its theoretical framework sets out a chain of reactions in
2 A subset of the political loyalists (patrons) whose support is critical if the leader is to 
remain in power.
3 A small group of people that has a formal role of expressing a preference over the
selection of the leadership that rule them.
4 A detailed description of the game, players pay-off, equilibrium conditions and solu­
tions as developed in the Bueno De Mesquita et al., (2003) text, are replicated in appendix 
4.6 of this chapter.
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a repetitive game played between incumbent politicians, opposition po liti­
cians and the electorates. The model shows tha t the size of the winning 
coalition determines whether policies have a public or private focus. Ins titu ­
tions and politica l selection processes determine the kind of po litica l systems 
that emerge in  any society. In  societies where there are institu tions tha t 
provide constraints on the activities of the politica l leaders, there is a high 
probability tha t politica l leaders w ill focus on economic policies tha t ben­
efit the larger public, rather than preferential benefits to a small coalition 
group. Generally, developing oil-rich countries are characterized by politica l 
systems and regimes tha t strive solely on clienteism and a small privileged 
elite group tha t natura lly grab a ll available national resources, through var­
ious corrupt means, for their use and perpetuation of the grip of political 
power. This kind of institu tiona l setup, provides a framework for inefficient 
economic policies and processes tha t lead to high income inequality, lack of 
a productive or entrepreneurial private sector, and invariably poor economic 
growth, even w ith  increase revenue inflows, such as oil booms.
4.2.3 The Probabilistic Voting Theory Model
Another class of political-eeonomy theory based model which is related to 
the selectorate theory framework is the ‘probabilistic voting theory’ model 
developed in Robinson et al., (2006). The probability of the re-election of 
an incumbent politica l leader or the election of an opponent po litica l rival 
determines the kind of economic policies pursued by the executives. The 
politica l objectives of power acquisition determines the direction of economic 
policies. However, because politica l objectives are not necessarily synony­
mous w ith  socially sub-optimal societal goals, a conflict of desire emerge 
between the public and the leaders. This conflict or lack of synergy can be
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truncated in  favor of the larger society, i f  there are strong institutions tha t 
curta il the excesses of politica l leaders and assures the efficient allocation 
of public resources. Where the election of the executive is determined by 
the larger society through balloting (democracy), the political leader adopts 
policies tha t are beneficial to the general public, but where the probability 
of re-election is determined by a small elite group, the politica l leader adopts 
policies tha t favour this small group at the detriment of the larger society. 
Where there are high stakes, like in  resource rich economies, and the access 
to such stake is determined by access to politica l power, then the desire to 
acquire or retain politica l power is very high.
The approach of this model focusses on the political incentives generated 
by resource boom and how i t  influences the development path of an econ­
omy. The model suggests tha t resource price boom improves the efficiency of 
its extraction by politica l leaders because i t  increases the politic ians’ value 
of being in power and retaining power in future. The probability tha t the 
politic ian w ill retain power is dependent on provision of patronage to mem­
bers of his group in the form of public sector employment, transfers and tax 
subsidies. The politic ians’ po litica l incentives which are generated by the 
resource boom informs his choice of economic policies. These policies which 
enhances the politicians probability  of re-election, leads to both inefficient 
extraction of the natural resources and misallocation of labour. The po lit­
ical incentives generated by the resource boom also leads to the inefficient 
redistribution of the resource rent in  the in itia l period because the p o liti­
cian discount the future resource rent too much. These deviations from the 
socially optim al efficiency path of resource extraction, or rent redistribution 
and labour allocation leads, in the long-run, to lower overall to ta l income 
and economic growth.
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This model is also developed w ith in  a game theory framework, where the 
players in the game are the politicians (incumbent and opposition) and the 
voters (in support of the incumbent or against). Because the strategy is to­
wards re-election, the game is played over two periods ( before the election 
and after the election). This theoretical model is very im portant to our re­
search because the model incorporates the role of natural resource abundance 
and its price changes (revenue) in the desire of the politic ian and the choice 
of strategies to accomplish those desires5.
4.3 T he Relevance o f  Political E conom y Theories to  Resource
Curse A nalysis
The Selectorate and probalistic voting models provide an im portant p o liti­
cal foundation for understanding why resource rich developing oil-exporting 
countries have been characterised by weak institutions and how such insti­
tutions have been critica l to the growth outcomes of the economies. These 
perspective of analysis strongly shows tha t i t  is im portant to go beyond the 
interactions of macroeconomic policy variables in explaining growth dynam­
ics but rather to explore the dynamics of the underlying socio-political struc­
tures tha t determines the macroeconomic policy outcomes. The introduction 
of political economy dimension to explaining the poor growth performance 
of developing oil-exporting countries emphasize the critica l role institutions 
play in the resource curse phenomenon.
In  all the empirical analyses we have done in this research in the previ­
ous chapters, we have not found a robust and convincing evidence that the
5 The detail description of the model and the proofs of the suggested propositions as 
discussed in Robinson et al., (2006) are replicated in appendix 4.7 of this chapter.
4. Institutions and Growth: A  Survey and Application 140
abundance share of o il or the huge revenue inflow from its export has caused 
significant decline in  economic growth in oil-exporting countries. However, 
i t  is obvious tha t oil-exporting countries have collectively witnessed declin­
ing economic growth in  the past years, even though of different magnitudes. 
These dilemma, therefore, presupposes tha t there is an underlying factor, 
which is not effectively captured in  the estimations but common to these 
group of countries, tha t may accounted for their common growth experience. 
The thrust of the politica l economy models discussed in this chapter is tha t 
institutions and institu tiona l features are paramount to avoiding the growth 
dilemma of developing countries. Even though we have included institu tion  
as a variable tha t determines growth in  our cross-country growth regressions 
and found tha t i t  is actually im portant, we have not understood how certain 
types of institutions emerged and how they have affected growth outcomes, 
particularly in  developing countries. The politica l economy models have pro­
vided a succinct insight in  this direction and therefore provided an im portant 
clue to our unexplained research question.
Because of this renewed emphasis on the im portant role of institutions and 
particularly, ins titu tiona l characteristics, we have re-examined the correla­
tion between the various measures on institutions and distortionary macroe­
conomic policies and growth outcomes in a cross-country growth model. 
In this framework we focus on whether after controlling for institutions, 
other macroeconomic policy variables are im portant for explaining economic 
growth? In this analysis, the institutions we are interested are a cluster of so­
cial arrangements tha t includes constitutional and social lim its  on politicians 
and elites power, the rule of law, provisions for mediating social cleavages, 
strong property right enforcement, access to good education etc. This clus­
ter determines whether there w ill be significant swings in  the politica l and 
social environment leading to crises, and whether politicians w ill be induced
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to pursue unsustainable policies in  order to remain in  power in  the face of 
deep social cleavages. However, we choose to be relatively loose on what 
are the fundamental institu tiona l problems, and instead isolate the histori­
cally determined component of these institu tiona l differences. This approach 
leads us to the conclusion tha t cross-country differences in growth vo la til­
ity, crises and growth performance have institu tiona l causes and both poor 
macroeconomic performance and distortionary macroeconomic policies are 
symptoms rather than causes. The logical im plication of this conclusion is 
tha t developing oil-exporting countries experienced poor and volatile growth 
because they have had weak institutions and therefore emphasis should be 
placed on strengthening both political and economic institutions rather than 
addressing distortionary macroeconomic distortions.
4.3.1 Em pirical Methodology
The analogy so far demonstrates how we m ight expect both institu tiona l 
differences and differences in  macroeconomic policies to cause differences in 
macroeconomic performance, especially in  growth vo la tility  and crises. In  
this section, we construct a simple empirical model to distinguish between 
these two sources of differences in  growth vo la tility  and growth crises.
=  o +  +  MnYht-i +  (4.1)
where:
t is a set of macroeconomic outcomes of interest to country (i) between 
times t and t  — 1. The three outcomes considered are: Growth V o la tility  
(measured as standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate); severity 
of crises (worst output decline); and Average GDP per capita growth rate6.
6 All variables are averaged over the entire sample period ( 1970- 2005) for each country, 
so that we have one observation per country.
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Pi t - i t  18 a vect ° r of macroeconomic policy measures for country i  between 
t  and t  — 1. The three policy measures considered are: Average size of Gov­
ernment Expenditure; Infla tion rate; and Real Exchange rate over valuation.
I i,t=o is a measure of institutions at the beginning of the sample period (1970). 
We used an index of the constraint on the executive in  the Polity IV  dataset. 
This index measures the extent to which constitutional lim its  are imposed on 
the exercise of a rb itra ry power by the executive. The Polity dataset reports 
a qualitative score between 1 and 7 for every independent country - where 1 
indicates lowest constraints (dictatorship regime) and 7 indicates strongest 
constraints (democratic regimes).
( f i t - i  t is a set  ° f  other control variables and InY ^t-i is the log of in itia l 
income per capita, which is used to control for the convergence effects.
t is the disturbance term.
The key parameters of interest in this model are A and ip, which identify 
the effects of macroeconomic variables and institutions. The simplest ap­
proach to estimate this model w ill be Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regres­
sion. However, there are two empirical problems w ith  the use of OLS in 
this estimation: 1. Institu tions and macroeconomic policy variables are both 
endogenous, such tha t we may be capturing reverse causality, or the effect of 
some om itted characteristics on both policy (or institutions) and economic 
outcomes. 2. Both institutions and policy variables are measured w ith  er­
ror, or in the case of institutions, available measures correspond only poorly 
to the desired concepts - for example while in reality institutions are m u lti­
dimensional, our measure of ‘constraint on the executive’ only measures one 
of these dimensions, and tha t quite imperfectly.
4. Institutions and Growth: A Survey and Application 143
These two empirical problems may suggest tha t ordinary least squares re­
gressions may give results tha t do not correspond to the causal effect of insti­
tutions and policy variables on economic outcomes. So we adopt7 to estimate 
equation 4.1 using two-stage least squares (2SLS) w ith  d istinct and plausi­
ble instruments for both macroeconomic policy variables and institutions. 
Theoretically, these instruments should be correlated w ith  the endogenous 
regressions and orthogonal to any other om itted characteristics, and uncor­
related w ith  the macroeconomic outcomes through any other channel except 
through their effects on the endogenous regressors. We adopt the strategy of 
instrumenting for institutions using the historically determined component 
of institutions, arising from the colonial experience of former colonies8. To 
the extend tha t the instrument is valid, i t  w ill solve the endogeneity, omitted 
variable bias and the measurement error problems and we can estimate the 
effect of institutions on economic outcomes, the parameter ip, consistently in 
models tha t exclude the macroeconomic policy variables.
Furthermore, there could also be the problem tha t d istortionary policy may 
m atter for macroeconomic variables, bu t we may be unable to detect this 
because we are taking averages over th ir ty  fiver-year periods. For example, i f  
some of the countries go through a period of about 5 - 1 0  years of high infla­
tion or an overvalued exchange rate, causing major crises, but during other 
periods they have offsetting low in fla tion and undervalued exchange rates, 
making their average policies sim ilar to those in other countries. In  order 
to deal w ith  this problem, we estimate a variation of our basic regression in 
equation 4.1 using an unbalanced panel of 5-year averages for each country
7 This approach was followed in Acemoglu (2003b) for the same reasons.
8 Because all the developing oil-exporting countries included in the model were also for­
mer colonies, this measure captures a unique characteristic of our target research sample.
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between 1970 and 2005 (or shorter periods for some of the macro variables), 
w ith  the following specification:
K iit- i, t  — ^ o  +  +  8lnYitt-1 +  r t- i >t +  (4.2)
where all variables are defined sim ilarly to equation (4.1), except tha t we now 
have a fu ll set of time effects r t~ i,t for every five-year period. Equation (4.2) 
s till uses I i tt=o, ins titu tion  measured at the beginning of the sample period, 
which is the historically determined component of institutions and not the 
variations in institutions from year-to-year. The use of this component of 
institu tion  means tha t the regression does not account for the sets of country- 
specific dummies. However, since there are more than one observation per 
country, and one of the key regressors vary only by country, we cluster the 
standard errors by country using the ’STATA’ robust standard errors. I f  
some countries have volatile macroeconomic policies tha t m atter only when 
they reach extreme values, this specification should show a greater role policy 
variables than the cross-sectional regression.
4.3.2 Sources of Variations in Institutions
Acemoglu (2001 and 2003b) shows tha t tha t the set of former European 
colonies provide an attractive sample for isolating the historically determined 
component of institutions, because the institutions in  almost all developing 
oil-exporting countries have been heavily influenced by their colonial experi­
ence. The author compares ’institutions of private property’ , which protect 
the property rights of a broad spectrum of the society, and ’extractive institu ­
tions’, which lack constraints on elites and politicians and argued tha t insti­
tutions of private property, which correspond to effective constraint on elites 
and rulers, were more likely to arise when Europeans settled in  large num­
bers, and set up institutions protecting their own rights. The ’Neo-Europes’, 
the United States, Canada, Austra lia  and New Zealand, are perhaps the best
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examples of the high European settlement associated w ith  the development 
of good institutions. In  contrast, extractive institutions emerged when Eu­
ropeans pursued a strategy of extracting resources from the colonies w ithout 
settling and w ithout developing partic ipatory institutions. He argued tha t 
while there are many determinants of the exact colonization strategies pur­
sued by the European powers, an im portant determinant is natura lly whether 
European could settle or not, since where the could not settle, the extractive 
strategy was much more likely. Therefore , in  colonies where the disease 
environment was not favorable to  European health and settlement, there is 
there is the formation of extractive states , and today the presence of weak 
institutions, as these extractive institutions persist.
This reasoning suggests tha t the proxies for m orta lity  rates expected by the 
European settlers in  the colonies could be an instrument for current institu ­
tions in these countries. Based on this reasoning and in line w ith  Acemoglu, 
we use data on the m orta lity  rates of soldiers, bishops and sailors stationed 
in  the colonies between the 17th and 19th centuries which gives a god indica­
tion of m orta lity  rate faced by settler9. A  major concern w ith  the va lid ity  of 
this instrument has to do w ith  the correlation between European m orta lity  
raves over 100 years ago and the health of the current population or climate, 
and the effect of current health and climate on current economic outcomes. 
These concern was also addressed by the author.
4.3.3 Results
9 We received, with many thanks, a copy of this data and other samples used in this 
regressions from Daron Acemoglu .
4. Institutions and Growth: A Survey and Application 146
Excolonies
sample
(1)
Excolonics 
above median 
world income 
(2)
Excolonies 
without Africa 
(3)
Excolonios
sample
(4)
Ex colonies 
above median 
world income 
(5)
Excolonics 
without Africa 
(6)
Panel A: Dependent variable: log of GDP per capita (1995)
Two-stage least squares
Initial constraint on Exec. 0.59 0.51 0.61
(0.0000) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Log settler mortality -0.62 -1.22 -1.33 -0.87 -1.23 -1,31
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0031) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0036)
ii2 0.31 0.57 0.38 0.52 0.51 0.33
Hotoroscedasticity LM test 3.22(0.042] 2.42(0.462] 3.18(0.062] 4,G3[0.001] 4.66(0.000] 3.03(0.042)
Jarque-Bera Normality test 3.14(1.002] 4.11(0.021] 5.26(0.000] 4.48(0.002] 5.11(0.000] 4,89(0.001]
No. of obs. 68 24 36 64 24 36
Panel B: Depondent variable: average annual growth GDP per capita, 1970 - 2005
Two-stage least squares
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Initial Constraint of Exec. 0.66 0.44 0.38 1.46 0.77 1.22
(0.0012) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0032) (0.0039)
log of GDP per capita(1970) -1.66 -3.01 -1.66
(0.0750) (0.1090) (0,0670)
Log settler mortality -1.02 -1.33 -1.28 -0.62 -1.03 -1.03
(0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Log of GDP per capita(1970) 0.76 0.98 0.58
(0.0025) (0.0110) (0.0130)
R2 0.46 0.53 0.42 0.54 0.61 0.44
Breusch-Pagan Heteroscedasticity test 4.11(0.000] 3.44(0.002] 4.21(0.004] 6.11(0.000] 5.24(0.001) 3.42(0.026]
Jarque-Bera Normality test 1.077(0.543) 3.56(0.042] 4.66(0.013) 5.21(0.001] 2.42(0.065] 4.23(0.025]
No. of obs. 68 24 36 64 24 36
P-valuo are in parentheses and square bracket for test statistics.
All regressions are cross-sectional with one observation per country.
Data are from Acemoglu (2003b), World Bank (2006), Polity IV (2006), and Summers-Heston (2006).
Measure of Institutions is instrumented using log settlers mortality before 1850 (where mortality is per 1000 per annum with replacement .
The Null hypothesis of the J-B Normality test is that the sample is generated from a normal distribution.
The Null hypothesis of the B-P Heteroscedasticity test is that there is no hotoroscedasticity
i.e the error term has a constant variance or the model is Homoscedastic.
Table 4.1: Income, Growth and Institutions
4. Institutions and Growth: A  Survey and Application 147
Table (4.1) shows the relationship between the historically determined 
component of institutions and current economic outcomes. The relationship 
between the measure of institutions used in this analysis and settler m ortal­
ity, reflect the causal effect of colonial policies on current institutions - which 
by extension, serves as a useful source of variation for identifying the effect 
of institutions on macroeconomic outcome. Column (1) shows the effect of 
ins titu tiona l differences on (log) GDP per capita (using 1995 base year). The 
results for a measure of ins titu tion  using constraints on the executive shows 
a strong and significant positive correlation w ith  current per capita growth 
- meaning the higher the score of the constraint on the executive (strong in­
stitu tion), the higher the current output per capita growth rate of a country. 
Using settlers m orta lity  as an instrument for institu tion , the result shows a 
strong and significant negative correlation - meaning the higher the settler 
m orta lity  rate, the lower is current income per capita growth rate.
The results reported in panel (B), columns (7) to (12), shows the regres­
sion of average growth rate between 1970 - 2005, on historically determined 
component of in itia l ins titu tion  (average of 1970, 1985 and 2005) - log settler 
m ortality, and in it ia l income. Column (7) shows a robust positive relation­
ship - meaning countries w ith  strong in itia l institutions grow faster in  sub­
sequent years. The coefficient of the in itia l ’constraint on the executive’ on 
growth becomes larger where the model controls for in itia l income in column 
(10). This outcome of weak long-run correlation between current output 
growth and historically determined component of institu tion , when control­
ling for in itia l income, is not surprising because of the strong collinearity 
between in itia l income and institutions.
We also observe in  the model, whether the relationship between the historically- 
determined component of institutions and economic outcomes is driven prin­
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cipally by the contrast between a former colony or not, or between been an 
African country or not. The results show tha t variation in growth due to 
institu tiona l differences is country invariant and hence the model controls 
for country-specific heterogeneity effects.
4.3.4 Institutions, Macroeconomic Policies and Macroeconomic Outcomes
In  this section we look at the effect of institutions and macroeconomic policies 
on growth vo la tility , and on the severity of growth crises and growth. We 
first observe the relationship between institutions and macro variables, and 
then investigate their relative influences on volatility. We also investigate the 
robustness of the relationship between institutions and volatility. In  order 
to show the relationship between institutions and the three macroeconomic 
policy variables, as well as the macroeconomic outcomes, we run a regression 
of the form: ,
where P  denotes the macroeconomic policy variables, X  denotes the measures 
of vo la tility  and crises, and I c,t=o is a measure of constraint on the executive 
at the beginning of the sample period (using the average constraint on the 
executive in  1970, 1985 and 2005).
Using equation 4.3, table (4.2) shows the results of the regression between 
ins titu tion  and the various policy variables, while equation (4.4) shows the 
results of the regression between institu tion  and economic outcomes, after 
controlling for the effects of in itia l income. In  table (4.2), the results show 
tha t weaker institutions are associated w ith  larger government sector, higher
(4.3)
and
(4.4)
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in fla tion rate, more overvalued exchange rate , while table (4.2b) shows even 
stronger negative correlation between institu tion  and growth vo la tility  and 
growth crises after controlling for in itia l. Table (4.3), show the results af­
ter repeating the same specifications in  equations (4.3) and (4.4), but using 
instrument for ins titu tion  (log colonial settler m orta lity). This method is 
to enable us establish the causal effect of institutions on macroeconomic 
distortions and volatility. The results, though similar to the previous one, 
shows stronger coefficients. The higher the institu tiona l score the lower are 
macroeconomic distortions and adverse economic outcomes. This result sup­
ports the argument, tha t weak institutions preclude distortionary policies 
and outcomes rather than the other way round - tha t is, societies pursue 
distortionary macroeconomic policies, such as , high inflation, large govern­
ment consumption and overvalued exchange rates, because they have weak 
ins titu tion  or have had weak institutions.
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Estimation: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 1970 - 2005
Dependent Variables:
Govt. Consumption Infla tion FX- Overvaluation
Institu tion: -0.0160 -0.0720 -5.890
(0.0010) (0.0340) (0.0720)
R 2 0.23 0.10 0.31
B-P Heteroscedasticity test 2.33[0.123] 3.12(0.473] 2.66(0.611]
J-B Norm ality test 4.21 [0.004] 5.22(0.002] 4.69(0.001]
Number of observations 71 70 66
Estimation: Two stage Least Square 1970 - 2005
Dependent Variables:
Govt. Consumption Infla tion FX-Overvaluation
Institu tion  (IV ) - 0.20 -0.92 -14.10
(0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0722)
R2 0.37 0.41 0.39
B-P Heteroscedasticity test 3.45(0.021] 4.41(0.003] 3.26(0.010]
J-B Norm ality test 2.31(0.321] 2.62(0.261] 2.54(0.317
Number of observations 71 70 66
Table 4.2: Institutions and Macroeconomic Policies.
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Estimation: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 1970 - 2005
Dependent Variables:
GDP V o la tility Growth Crisis
Institu tion - 0.61 -1.41
(0.0011) (0.0100)
In itia l Income 0.19 0.08
(0.0101) (0.0310)
R 2 0.31 0.37
B-P Heteroscedasticity test 3.42[0.023] 3.78(0.026]]
J-B Norm ality test 3.11(0.021] 4.16(0.000]
Number of observations 66 66
Estimation: Two Stage Least Square 1970 -2005
Dependent Variables:
GDP V o la tility Growth Crisis
Ins titu tion  (IV ) - 2.01 - 5.23 !
(0.0021) (0.0310)
In itia l Income 1.61 5.22
(0.0230) (0.0540)
R 2 0.38 0.37
B-P Heteroscedasticity test 3.42(0.042] 3.78(0.023]
J-B Norm ality test 5.41(0.001] 4.41(0.011]
Number of observations 66 66
Table 4.3: Institutions and Macroeconomic Outcomes.
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The results in tables (4.4) to (4.6) show the regressions tha t include both 
institu tion  and macroeconomic policies in  the equation where growth vo la til­
ity  is the dependent variable. This is to test whether the effects of institu tion  
on vo la tility  is channeled through the macroeconomic policies. Except for 
real exchange rate overvaluation, the results show tha t macroeconomic poli­
cies does not suggest a systematic channel via which ins titu tion  impact on 
volatility. The results show a robust effect of institutions, and no significant 
effects from government consumption or inflation. This supports the argu­
ment tha t standard macroeconomic policy variables play m inor role relative 
to institu tiona l causes in the determination of growth outcomes. Overvalua­
tion of exchange rate appears to be a channel through which institutions can 
affect growth vo la tility  and growth crises.
Table (4.4) show the effects of government consumption and ins titu tion  on 
growth vo la tility  when controlling for in it ia l income. Table (4.5) repeat the 
regression using log average infla tion and table (4.6) consider real exchange 
rate overvaluation. These regressions are repeated using growth crises as 
dependent variable, and the same conclusion were derived. Generally, in  all 
specifications tha t includes the in it ia l income, the significant level of the coef­
ficient of institu tion  is always less, suggesting tha t the historically determined 
component of ins titu tion  is a good predictor of income in 1970, making in­
stitutions variable and log GDP per capita (1970) highly collinear. However, 
in all of the models, the in itia l income parameter is not as significant as the 
institu tion  parameter, suggesting tha t ins titu tion  have a first-order effect far 
above the influence of in itia l income on growth volatility.
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Dependent Variable: Growth Volatility
5-year panel regression: 1970-2005
Sample: Sample:
World Former Colonies Former Colonies
Macroeconomic
Variables
only
Macroeconomic
Variables
only
Macroeconomic 
Variables 
and Institution
Govt. Consumption 7.77
(0.0780)
7.84
(0.0300)
2.98
(0.0690)
Institution -0.49
(0.0011)
R 2
B-P Heteroscedasticity test 
J-B Normality test 
Number of observations
0.10
4.62(0,002]
3.42(0.021]
99
0.14
4.45(0.002]
4.11(0.016]
70
0.09
4.76(0.001]
5.23(0.000]
66
Dependent Variable: Growth Volatility.
Sample: Sample:
World Former Colonies Former Colonies
Macroeconomic
Variables
only
Macroeconomic
Variables
only
Macroeconomic 
Variables 
with Institution
Govt. Consumption 3.11
(0.0014)
6.01
(0.0650)
5.01
(0.0761)
Initial Income -0.90
(0.0011)
-0.46
(0.0013)
0.38
(0.0031)
Institution -0.72
(0.000)
R 2
B-P Heteroscedasticity test 
J-B Normality test 
Number of observations
0.31
6.11(0.000]
5.71(0.001]
99
0.18
5.42(0.000]
4.23(0.010]
66
0.10
5.34(0.000]
3.58(0.011]
66
Table 4.4: Volatility and Government Consumption.
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Dependent Variable: Growth Volatility
5-year panel regression: 1970-2005
Sample: Sample
World Former Colonies Former Colonies
Macroeconomic Macro economic Macroeconomic
Variables Variables Variables
only only with Institution
Inflation 0.26 0.16 0.16
(0.000) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Institution -0.66
(0.0003)
R 2 0.11 0.10 0.09
B-P Heteroscedasticity test 3.11(0.042] 3.67(0.031] 4.23(0.021]
J-B Normality test 3.41(0.024] 3.67(0.022] 4.45(0.011]
Number of observations 99 66 66
Dependent Variable: Growth Volatility
Sample: Sample:
World Former colonies Former Colonies
Macroeconomic Macroeconomic Macroeconomic
Variables Variables Variables
only only with Institution
Inflation 0.18 0.21 0.11
(0.000) (0.0001) (0.0013)
Initial Income -0.74 -0.74 0.21
(0.0001) (0.0021) (0.0031)
Institution -0.84
(0.0020)
R 2 0.15 0.18 0.11
B-P Heteroscedasticity test 5.21(0.001] 4.28(0.021] 4.14(0.022]
J-B Normality test 3.64(0.003] 4.18(0.002] 4.22(0.002]
Number of observations 99 66 66
Table 4.5: Growth Volatility and Inflation.
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Dependent Variable: Growth Volatility
5-year panel regression: 1970-2005
Sample: Sample:
World Former Colonies Former Colonies
Macroeconomic Macroeconomic Macroeconomic
Variables Variables Variables
only only with Institution
Exchange rate 0.11 0.19 0.03
Overvaluation (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institution -0.40
(0.0002)
R 2 0.26 022 0.20
B-P Heteroscedasticity test 4.18(0.022] 4.78(0.002] 5.11(0.000]
J-B Normality test 3.17(0.021] 4.42(0.011] 3.84(0.016]
Number of observations 99 66 66
Dependent Variable: Growth Volatility
Sample: Sample:
World Former colonies Former Colonies
Macroeconomic Macroeconomic Macroeconomic
Variables Variables Variables
only only with Institution
Exchange rate 0.02 0.03 0.01
Overvaluation (0.000) (0.000) (0.00)
Initial Income -0.67 -0.21 0.32
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0021)
Institution -0.72
(0.0012)
R 2 0.17 0.14 0.20
B-P Heteroscedasticity test 6.21(0.000] 5.47(0.001] 5.22(0.002]
J-B Normality test 5.14(0.021] 5.62(0.026] 3.91(0.034]
Number of observations 99 66 66
Table 4.6: Growth Volatility and Real Exchange rate Overvaluation.
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter presents a politica l economy analysis of the poor growth perfor­
mance of developing oil-exporting countries. In  the presentation the of the 
chapter, we surveyed key political-economy models tha t have been adopted 
to explain the role of politica l incentives in economic policy and how such 
relationship has led to certain economic outcomes such as growth vo la tility  
or growth crises. In one of such theories, Robinson et al. (2006) proposed 
a model of clientelism which explains why politicians engage in  inefficient 
redistribution by employing people in  the public sector in order to influence 
the outcomes of elections. This model is integrated w ith  a model of natural 
resource extraction and shows how politica l incentives is generated by re­
source rents and resource booms. The results show tha t the resource boom 
tends to create inefficiency in the rest of the economy because they encour­
age politic ian to engage in inefficient redistribution to influence elections and 
this inefficient redistribution translates to distortionary macroeconomic pol­
icy tha t leads to adverse growth outcomes and development. However, the 
extent to which this phenomenon leads to actual resource curse depends on 
the quality of institutions.
Mehlum et ai. (2006) also show tha t the quality of institutions determines 
whether a country could avoid resource curse or not. Using the rule of law 
as a measure of ins titu tiona l quality, they show tha t the Dutch disease ex­
planation of the resource curse is inadequate because i t  is not related to 
quality of ins titu tion  . They established tha t producer friendly institutions 
rather than grabber friendly institutions help countries to take fu ll advantage 
of their natural resource abundance. Combining the Mehlum ’s rent-seeking 
model and the Robinson’s patronage model of resource curse, Kolstad (2007), 
empirical tests whether the institutions governing the private sector (rent-
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seeking model) or the institutions governing the public sector (patronage 
model) are more im portant. He found tha t institutions governing the private 
sector m atter more for economic growth and development.
Building on these theoretical foundation and adopting the empirical approach 
in  Acemoglu et al. (2003b), established tha t many developing oil-rich coun­
tries experienced slow growth or high growth vo la tility  and crises over the 
past decades, not because they have followed unsustainable and distortionary 
macroeconomic policies, but fundamentally, because they have had weak in­
stitutions. Instrumenting for ins titu tion  using historically determined com­
ponent (m orta lity  of European settlers), our investigation shows a strong and 
significant relationship between institutions and vo la tility , as well as, between 
institutions and growth crises. The results suggest tha t after accounting for 
institutions, standard macroeconomic variable play lit t le  role in  explaining 
growth vo la tility  as commonly suggested in  the literature. These findings 
may suggest why, for the past decades, the poor and volatile growth episode 
of most o il-rich economies have defied various macroeconomic policies and 
structura l reforms, such as those proposed by the International Monetary 
Fund (IM F) and the W orld Bank.
We conclude this thesis by suggesting that, rather than for developing oil 
exporting countries emphasizing the importance of getting macroeconomic 
policies right in order to achieve fast and steady growth, they should par­
ticu la rly  concentrate of building strong institu tiona l features tha t guarantee 
property rights, rule of law and constraints on the excesses of the executive 
in order to avoid resource curse. These sweeping conclusion, by no means, 
does not suggest tha t sound macroeconomic policies are not im portant, but 
tha t sound macroeconomic policies can only emerge when there are strong 
and efficient quality of institutions.
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4.5 A p p e n d ix  to  C hapter 4
4.6 A ppend ix: Selectorate M odel
The game is an in fin ite ly  repeated game w ith  the payoffs in  each round 
discounted by a common discount factor 5.
•  The selectorate group is denoted by S and the winning coalition is 
denoted by W.
•  The incumbent leader ( I )  picks a coalition Wl  E S and the challenger 
((7)picks Wc C S.
•  They both propose tax rates and policy provisions: tax rate rp , public 
goods x l , private goods Ql and tax rate r c , public goods xc, private 
goods gc respectively.
•  The citizens allocates their resources between productive activities I  
and leisure (1 — Ip, where k e [0,1]
The incumbent leader policy are implement only if:
r LE ieN{ 1 -  k) -  pxL-  | WL | gL >  0 (4.5)
if  the above holds the leader is retained and the affin ity10 preference ordering 
of the leader is revealed.
4.6.1 A ctiv ities , policies and payoffs o f the Game
•  Given a tax rate r, each ind ividual retains ( 1 - r )  proportion of her 
economic activ ity  (1 — Ip, i.e. (1 — r)(l — Ip  and the overall level of 
economic activ ity  is:
10 The preference of one individual or group over another independent of the policies of 
the individual or group. A bond between leader and follower based purely on anticipation 
of future loyalty.
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E  — E iew ( l ~  h) (4-6)
The overall government revenue is given by: rE . The incumbent’s cost of 
providing xl  and ql given a coalition Wl  is:
M l =  pxL+  || WL | gL (4.7)
Private goods have un it cost and all members of the coalition receive the 
same level of private goods, hence the size of W  effectively acts as the price.
Each individual receive payoffs from x,g,yj I  y =  return on economic ac­
tiv ity . The individual u ti l ity  function is given by V(x,g,y,l) which is assumed 
to be additively seperable and a twice differentiable function tha t is increas­
ing and concave in each component. I f  the incumbent leader retains office 
w ith  policies r i ,  gL and the ind iv idua l chooses lif then the individual i  
payoff for tha t period is given by:
V x l , ( l]VL,i)gL, (1 — ^ l) (1  — h), k (4.8)
where (lwL,i) is an indicator function tha t takes the value 1, i f  i  is a member 
of W l and 0 otherwise.
The incumbent leader payoff is given by:
T  +  R l — M l (4.9)
where RL denotes to ta l government revenue and (M L — P%l +  \ WL | P l)  
denotes to ta l government expenditure i f  she survive in  office and 0 other­
wise. 4/ >  0 represent the inherent value of holding office and R l  - M l is 
the surplus resources the incumbent can keep for her own discretion.
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I f  the challenger succeeds in  coming to power his pay off is:
^  +  R C- M C (4.10)
where Rc — r cE ieN( 1 -  h) and M c =  pxc-+ \W c \g c
4.6.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium  and C redib ility  o f the Game
In  a Markov perfect equilibrium 11 players condition their strategy on a state 
variable - in  this case, the incum bent’s preference ordering over selectors. In 
addition to the standard equilibrium  requirement tha t each player’s strategy 
must be u tility  maximizing given the strategy of the other player, the Marko­
vian assumption of perfect equilibrium  requires tha t players condition their 
strategies only on the state variable and on no other aspect of the history of 
the game.
The taxes and policy choice at equilibrium  of both the incumbent and chal­
lenger are represented by : r f  , x*L, g*L and r*, x*, g*c, respectively , and the 
citizen each period leisure/effort choice is I*
then, in  equilibrium  the overall level of economic activ ity  w ill be : E  =  
N (  1 — I*) and government revenue w ill be : tlE.
I f  the incumbent survives, the value of the game starting the next period 
for the selectors is given by:
zv  = rfy n -c  i, (id m*)A> t1 -  ri)(i -  n  n  + n )
where (In,...!*/),* is a preference order indicator function tha t takes the value 1 
i f  i  is one of the selector for whom the incumbent(L) has the highest affinity,
11 see Fudenberg and Tirole, (1991)
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i.e. i  e (1, ....W } and 0 otherwise.
Given tha t all a ffin ity ordering are equally like ly12, the probability of being 
one of the challenger’s highest affin ity selector is w ith  the complimentary 
probability of (1 — tha t each selector w ill be excluded from the chal­
lenger’s coalition in  all future periods.
The value of the game i f  the challenger deposes the incumbent is
= rb ( j v [ x l ' 9 h  - n  n + o, ( i - r £ ) ( i - o ,  n)
(4.12)
In tu itive ly  for i  E Z Zx >  ZC)p This follow the argument tha t the
incumbent can credibly promise members of his coalition private goods in 
every future period, while the challenger can only offer private goods proba­
bilistically. This condition create a loyalty norm which affects taxation and 
policy provision as institutions vary.
R esu lts :
i f  I =  Ir solves:
- ( 1  -  r )  V „( .,., (1 -  r ) ( l  -  ii) , ii)  +  V i ( ,  ,  (1 -  r ) ( l  -  k) =  0 (4.13)
I t  follows that:
di y „ ( ( l  -  r ) (  1 -  I)) +  (1 -  r ) ( l  -  i) y ro( ( l  -  r ) ( l  -  i)) 
dr ( l - r ) * K „ {(1 -  r ) ( l  -  I ) +  * , ( ! ) )  ’
For V, i =  p+j and §  =
i.e. Pr(BL = 6) = Pr(BL = b) = (1 /S\)Vb,b
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4.6.3 Proposi tions:
I f  W <  > tiien there exist MPE in  which the equilibrium policies solve
the following:
1. L  matches C  best possible offer.
71 =  V{xc,gc, ( l - r c) ( l - l c) , lc -  V(xL =  0
(4.15)
2. Budget Constraint:
12 =  r cN{ 1 - I ) -  pxc — Wgc =  0 (4.16)
3. L  optim al policy choice:
73 =  pVg{ xL, g L , (1 - 0 , 0 -  WVx(x L, (1 -  - 0 , 0  =  0 (4.17)
4. C optim al policy choice:
14 =  pVg{xc, gc, (1 -  r c) ( l  -  Ic), lc) -  WVx(xCi gCi (1 -  r c)( 1 -  lc) , l c) =  0
(4.18)
5. L  optim al tax choice: 15 =  - - £ f r LN +  N( 1 — I) +  vJ(xL) “  0  “
(1 -  *■)£) n((i -  r£)(i -  0) +  f l  Vito) =  0
6. C optim al tax choice: 76 =  —- ^ r x77+ 1V(1 — 1) +  vJ Xi ) ( ( —(1 — 0 ~
(1 -  r . ) * )  ^ ( ( 1  -  r . ) ( l  -  0 )  +  t  =  0
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4,7  A ppend ix: P robabilistic-Voting T heory
The probabilistic voting theory13 is the mathematical prediction of a politi­
cians’ behavior in anticipation of election in which politicians are uncertain 
of voters’ preferences. The theory model whether optimal politician strate­
gies can be determined given uncertainty about voter preferences and what 
those strategies are given various circumstances. The framework suggests 
what public policies will be supported by the voters and what patronage will 
be offered by the politician to guarantee the votes.
In the model there are two periods (1 and 2 ), a society with two parties 
(Politician A and B), and two voters (A and B)u . The economy (society) has 
some stock of extractable natural resource with an intertemporal and exoge­
nously determined price path px and p2. The resource (J) can be extracted 
the first period by the incumbent (Politician A) and K(5) left for the second 
period after the election, with K* < 0 and iV < 0. The per - period income 
of the voter is given by:
V\ = fat + Ct -  rft (4-19)
where:
wxt = wage income
Q = Transfer to the voter
rft — Lump-sum tax paid by the voter
P\, The per-period utility of politician i is given by:
Pi = Sl + p f  V'd(4.20)
where:
S\ — income of the politician.
13 Earlier developed in Peter J. Coughlin,(1992).
14 The mass of voters is normalised to 1, and each group ffor B is |
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(3 = the politician bias for members of his group - [0 < (3 < 1]
V\ = per period income a voter/member - ie  (A,B) 
income of a voter is given by:
Vj(A) + tt* + tf > V\(B) (4.21)
where:
V\(A) — income of a voter i if the incumbent(A) wins.
TTi = voter i ideological bias towards the incumbent 15.
3  = a popularity shock in favor of the incumbent16.
Voter i supports the incumbent only if equation (3) holds.
4.7.1 Players Pay-off.
The unit mass of voters are employed either in the public sector or in the 
private sector. We let 0 t represent total number of public sector employees 
at time t and (1 — <kt) represent the total number of private sector employees. 
We assume that productivity in the private sector is higher than productivity 
in the public sector. If a worker is employed in the private sector, is wage is 
equal to his exogenous productivity Hpt while for simplicity we set the pub­
lic sector productivity to zero. Hv is therefore the productivity differential 
between the private and public sector. The public sector employee has an 
endogenously determined wage Tt. (A) denotes whether or not a politician 
(A) offers a job to an individual (i) in the public sector at period (t).
When the politician makes a job offer in the public sector he offers a wage. 
We assume that it is costly to fire the same individual employed in the first
15 7Tl is uniformly distributed at interval
16 is uniformly distributed at interval
J_ JL 2a ’ 2q
jL_ _L
2b > 2b
with density a > 0 
with density b > 0
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period , the second period after election. The cost of firing is represented by 
Fr and the wage is represented by T.
1st Period:
Politician (A) choose a policy vector Tft <&{, 5 , (ft r]\ 
end of 1st period:
Politician (A) and (B) competitively offer: T^AJ^^A), CsjM j and
T2(£), (B), d(B), 4 (B),.
2nd period:
if (A) wins election he renegotiates17 all policies optimally to solve:
(—T + jST) — P(—Fr + Hp) T -(-F r + Ep)Max t 
where:
(—T + (3T) = utility for employing voter (A) at T.
/?(—Fr + Hp) — utility for firing the same voter (A).
T — (—Fr + Hp) = voter (A) second period gain/surplus derived from the 
public employment relationship.
4 .7,2 Second-Period Pay-off
, The new wage is bilaterally determined according to a symmetric Nash 
bargaining solution between the politician and each voter as:
T  5x (A) =  I (W-(4 22)
and for voter (B), T ^ A ) which solves:
MaxT [—T][T -{-Fr + Hp)] 
cannot holds, hence voter (B) is fired.
The optimal new wage is given by:
Y *    y *  ___ 1  (2/3—l)(Fr — Hp)
2 1 i>2iW —  2 1-/3
17 all pre-election promises are not credible ex-post.
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4 .7.3 Number of Voters and Probability of Re-Election.
The number of voters from group (B) that support politician (A) is repre­
sented by:
~ 2 (2 +6 (4-23)
The number of private sector employee from group (A) that support the in­
cumbent is given by:
+24)
2 J \2
The total number of public sector employee that support the incumbent is : 
fa* = 4>1 P  +6 0  + [T; -  (-Fr + P„)])) (4.25)
The probability of re-election of the incumbent is given by: 
r ( $ i)  = Pr 91b + Oaq? + 91 ap > - (4.26)
where:
r ( $ 0  = Pr{<?} > -®i[T5 -  {-Fr + Pp)]}
=  r* > 0*d$i — ®
Hiring public sector employees from among the people from is own group 
increases the incumbent’s probability of retaining power.
4 .7.4 Equilibrium Decision
At the end of the first-period, the incumbent is faced with the problems of 
choosing policy options such as public sector employment, wages and resource 
extraction18 to maximize his expected utility. The incumbents’ policy choice
18 taxes and transfer are assumed to be zero
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will affect his re-election probability T according to equation (8). The incum­
bent therefore retains the same public sector workers in the initial period and 
at the same wage after the election. This initial levels of employment and 
wages is given by: <f>i and T 1( and he chooses policy ( J, 3>i, Yi) so as to 
maximize:
The constraint is a pareto optimal condition, so that the 4>i is at least as 
well off, over the two periods, as the private sector worker 1 — dq:
It follows that, if (5 < 1, and the initial public sector wage T i is equals to 
Hp + Fr — r($i)(T* + Fr — Hp, the participation constraint holds as an equal­
ity. This means that because the incumbent will not like the members of 
his group more than himself, he equates productivity loss and cost of firing 
to the next period wage required to retain the same level of public sector 
worker necessary for him to remain in power.. He does not employ anybody 
from the private sector neither will he fire anybody already employed in the 
public sector.
Taking the derivatives with respect to : 5 and we get:
+ r($i)
+  /? I - ® , H  + ( i - r {
subject to:
Tj +  i w r ;  +  (i -  r(4>1) ) ( -F r +  hp) 2 (4.27)
P i+ r(4>1)p2k((5) = 0 (4.28)
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and
-ffp[i+r($1)]-(i-A )P r[i-r($1)]+r*($1) p2K{S)-Hp^ 1+ 0 . - P ) F T^ 1+ j F r
(4.29)
This first-order conditions with respect to resource extraction and public 
sector wages represent a significant outcome of the model which will be used 
to explain and proof the various scenarios that are observed in the following 
propositions:
4 .7.5 Proposition I: Inefficiently over-extraction of Resources
5 > 5s.
This means that the first-period extraction of the resources (J) is greater 
that the socially optimal efficient extraction path denoted by:
5s).
The socially optimal extraction path of the resources in the first-period solves 
the maximization function:
M a x 5p i 6  +  p 2K ( 5 ) :
as the solution to the first-order condition thus:
pi + p2I<‘(6s) = 0 (4.30)
Comparing equations, suggests that F < 1 for 5 > 5s
to hold. The incumbent politician discounts the future stock of the resources 
[K(5j\ by the probability that he wins election at the end of the first-period. 
If the parameter (F) representing the politician probability of re-election is 
low, he cares less about the resources left for the second period and hence 
discount the value of the future stock of the resources very high. He therefore 
inefficiently over extract the resources in the current period. However, if the 
probability that he will win election at the end of the first-period is high, then
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he discount the future stock of the resources very low and hence his resources 
extraction path tends towards the socially optimal efficient extraction path. 
The key factor to his decision of policy choice is therefore the probability of 
re-election and not economically rational social-welfare constraints.
Writing equations () and () in differential form, in order to obtain (A), the 
second-order derivation we have thus:
xi = rp2k" < o, X2 = r $p2K' < o 
X3 = - 1, X4 = rft < o 
0 !  =  p 2i v f t  <  0 , Tp2 =  2 [ H p -  (1  -  p ) F r ] r *  <  0  
■03 =  0, 04 =  —KT$ < 0
The standard second-order conditions for the maximization requires that: 
Xi < 0, < 0, and
x A  -  X2<01 = p2[ -2[ify -  (1 -  p)Fr}rr*K" -p 2(r$)2(/ft)2 = p2a > o
Given the above, we can find how resource extraction, as well as, efficiency 
of extraction varies according to various resource price regimes - permanent 
price boom, temporary price boom , or anticipated permanent price boom.
4 .7.6 Proposition II: Efficiency of extraction and Resource Prices.
Permanent price Boom: Reduce extraction and increase efficiency of extrac­
tion.
4e i  — _  dp.
Pl P2 p *
Temporary price Boom: Increase extraction and reduce efficiency of extrae-
Xi ds +  X 2A &1 =  Xsdpi +  X4 dp2 
d5 +  =  ^ Mpi + 4>^ dp2
(4.31)
(4.32)
where
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tion.
b). d p i  > 0, and d p 2 = 0
Anticipated price Boom: Reduce extraction and increase efficiency of extrac­
tion.
c). d p i  = 0 , and d p 2 > 0 
Proofs:
a.) A Permanent price boom:
Following from equations () and () that:
Given that 5 > S6, then a permanent resource price boom increases efficiency
of extraction path.
b.) Temporary price boom:
Following from () and ():
dS   2[HP — (1—/?)Fr]r$ ^  q
dpi P2A
where:
Therefore:
dd >  dS5
dpi dpi
and if 5 > 5s, then over extraction 5 -  5s increases with p\.
c.)Anticipated price boom
dp/p A
d5 p2K(r$)2K' < Q (4.33)
where:
A = [—2 [hp -  (1 -  p)Fr]rr9 K" -  p2(r*)20O 2]
Differentiating () gives: 
d5s _  1
sin. If"dpi K"p2
substituting for A gives:
dS
dpi
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following from () and ():
d6_ _  2\Hp~ ( l - P ) F r ] r r ^ K ' + p 2 ^ ) 2I<I<' . n 
dp2 pa A
Differentiating () gives:
ds5 _  k ' . n
dp2 K " P2
substitute for A and rearrange terms gives : 
d6_ =  k ' 2fffp-(i-j3)Fr]rr^ +P2(r^ )2/r - K '
dP2 k"p2 2[Hp-(i-p)F]rril+P2(r*)f')2 K"p2
therefore:
rig ^ dS5 
dp2 dp 2
and since 5 > 5s, then over extraction 5 — 56 decreases with p2.
In general, under this proposition, as price varies the benefit of being in 
power varies and so the incentive to extract the resources more efficiently. 
The higher is the value of being in power in future, the more efficient the 
incumbent extract the resources and the more motivated he is to strive to 
retain power in future. However, when the boom is temporary or transitory, 
the value of being in power does not vary only when price increases. It is
rather politically rational at this time for the incumbent to extract more of
the resources during the first-period and this deteriorates the efficiency of 
extraction path.
4 .7.7 Proposition III: Effect of Price boom on inefficient re-distribution of
resource rent
a.)
Permanent boom; Increase public sector employment and decrease private 
sector employment.
dpi   dp2   dp
PI ~~ P2 P
b.)
Temporary boom: Decreases public sector employment and increases pri­
vate sector employment.
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Anticipated future boom: Increases public sector employment and de­
creases private sector employment. 
dpi — 0, and dp2 > 0 
Proofs:
following from (13) and (14) we find that:
Because the incumbent increases the probability of re-election by employ­
ing more people in the public sector or retaining a very large public sector, 
he inefficiently redistribute the resource rent at the expense of the societal 
well-being and productivity. He does this by transferring labour from the 
relatively high productivity private sector to the low productivity public sec­
tor during resource boom. The more the misallocation of labour from the 
private sector to the public sector as the efficiency of extraction increases, 
and the less the misallocation of labour as the efficiency of extraction de­
creases. labour misallocation and the efficiency of extraction pull in opposite 
directions.
4 .7.8 Proposition IV: The effect of resource boom of total Income.
Resource boom may increase or decrease total income depending on the qual­
ity of Institution.
All the three types of resource boom regimes considered above have ambigu­
ous effects on total income.
dp/p A
d$! -r r \ k k " n
-r-r- =  n  > 0 (4.34)
dpi A (4.35)
d®, rr„[(g ')2 -  k k "] ; Q
dp-2 A (4.36)
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Proof: Permanent price Boom. Given total Income as:
Y = 2(1 -  4\)HP + P l6 + P2K(6) 
where:
Y = Total (net present value of) income.
2(1 — 4>i)HP = Total production.
Pi5 + P2K(5) = Total resource rent.
dY . d5 nTT d$i ..
d+~p -  p^ + vJ< + ^  + ^ K (4-37>
The three effects:
The increased proportional value of the resource has the direct effect of in­
creasing income:
i) pid + p2K - absolute Income effect .
A resource boom increases income as efficiency of the extraction path in­
creases:
ii) (pi “ efficiency of extraction effect-which is positive since
ViK' = - f  <-Pi and ^  < 0
A resource boom transfers labor from the private sector to the less produc­
tive public sector, in the direction of decreased income.
iii) 2Hp/jftfa - factor misallocation effect. Income is more likely to go down 
with permanent resource price boom, the more the incumbent can affect the 
re-election probability by hiring public sector workers. In societies where 
it is not possible to affect the re-election probability by hiring members of 
the incumbent group in the public sector, the boom will increase income. 
However, if the institutions are weak, permanent boom will decrease income 
and if the institutions are strong , the incumbent does not have control of 
extraction path and allocation of labor and so income will be increased.
5 . C O N C L U D I N G  R E M A R K S
This thesis has re-examined the volatile and poor growth performance of 
oil-rich developing country by adopting a sequential series of analyses of the 
various facets of the problem, with a view of finding a new understanding 
of the continued growth dilemma of resource rich developing countries. In 
three chapters of the thesis, a different approach is used to investigate why 
oil rich countries have experienced poor growth, in order to find a common 
factor that is model-invariant and instrumental to the poor growth episode 
of the oil-rich developing countries.
The literature review in chapter two provided a critical survey of the econo­
metrics of cross - country growth regression as a starting point to identify 
the key determinants of economic growth and development. This survey 
provides a robustness assessment of the degree of consistency and reliabil­
ity of previous empirical methodology and by implication the accuracy of 
their priori predictions and policy recommendations. There are ample evi­
dence to suggest that previous empirical studies on the determinants of long 
term growth, within the framework of a cross-sectional dynamic endogenous 
growth equation, suffer significantly from several econometric lapses - includ­
ing attenuation bias, endogeneity and heterogeneity effects, and omitted vari­
able bias. These problems certainly leads to gross model specification errors 
and subsequently invalid or misleading estimation parameters. Specifically, 
after controlling for these estimation biases in a dynamic endogenous cross
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country growth model, it is evident that resource abundance is not necessar­
ily a significant variable that explain growth differences amongst countries of 
the world, compared to variables like, initial income, human capita, inflation 
and institutions. This outcome goes to suggest that, the negative correlation 
between growth and resource abundance evident conspicuously in existing 
literature, is empirically spurious and insignificant, such that resource abun­
dance does not cause poor growth performance.
Having discovered that resource abundance alone, does not sufficiently ex­
plain the poor growth episode of resource abundant nations, chapter three 
looks at why resource rich countries record poor and volatile growth by ex­
amining the direct impact of resource gains (revenue) on growth performance 
and other macroeconomic indicators. Shocks to oil revenue do not necessarily 
show negative impacts on GDP growth or manufacturing output decline, as 
argued in the famous Dutch Disease’ hypothesis, for most developing oil rich 
countries, particularly the middle east oil rich countries. However, there are 
very clear evidences to suggest that government expenditure shocks for devel­
oping oil-rich countries have negative impacts, in the forms of decline in GDP 
growth and manufacturing output, and increases in money supply and infla­
tion rate. Following the strong correlation between government spending and 
Income(GDP), there is also a strong causality from oil boom shocks (increased 
income) to government expenditure. The government expenditure shocks 
that follow from an initial oil revenue shock accounts significantly for the 
poor growth and macroeconomic outcomes of resource abundant economies.
The question answered in chapter four is not why government spending is 
bad for growth and economic development in resource abundant countries, 
but rather, why do governments in resource abundant countries persistently 
spend in a bad way through distortionary macroeconomic policies? The
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chapter extends the boundaries within which macroeconomic policies are 
analyzed, to include socio-political incentives that shape government behav­
ior and by extension her policy preferences. There are indications, estab­
lished empirically in this chapter, that governments in these resource abun­
dant countries follow unsustainable and distortionary macroeconomic policies 
(leading to growth volatility and crises) because the economies are charac­
terised by weak institutions. Using historically determined components of 
institutions as a measure of current institution, there is clear evidence of a 
strong correlation between institutions and growth volatility, and between in­
stitution and growth crises, such that, after controlling for this institutional 
effect, standard macroeconomic variables play little role in explaining the 
growth crises of resource rich countries. The political leaders and elites, who 
constitute the government, embark on inefficient ’spending spree’ following 
resource windfall, because there are no credible institutional apparatus to 
check their excesses - in actual fact the institutional structure in place facili­
tate distortionary macroeconomic policies, as it benefits the politician at the 
detriment of the general economy and the people.
Overall, this research concludes that the major causes of large cross-country 
differences in growth performance are institutional, and none of the stan­
dard macroeconomic variables emphasized in the literature, are comprehen­
sive enough, neither do they serve as the primary mediating channels through 
which institutional causes lead to poor growth performance and macroeco­
nomic instability. The disappointing growth and macroeconomic outcomes 
experienced by many developing oil-exporting countries are rather symp­
toms of deeper institutional causes. This does not necessarily suggest that 
macroeconomic policies do not matter, but that there are remote institutional 
causes which leads to economic instability, and these institutional causes lead 
to bad macroeconomic outcomes through several mediating channels. Put
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differently, distortionary macroeconomic policies are part of the instruments 
that elite groups and political leaders use in order to enrich themselves or 
perpetrate their control of state resources and political power.
This thesis could not empirically identify, with reasonable accuracy, the ex­
act channel through which institutional weakness translate to poor growth 
performance for the resource abundance countries, however it shows that 
political/state failure, matter for why countries experience macroeconomic 
instability. There is a need for further research to identify the key mediating 
channel through which weak institutions lead to bad macroeconomic policy 
outcomes.
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